Title: Command Responsibility, Accountability, and Discipline: Part 1—B-52

A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight, and still be a very bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource that should always be a source of strength within the state.

—Sir John Winthrop Hackett, Harmon Lecture

Introduction: Over the past few years a number of incidents reflected unfavorably on the USAF. These incidents include unauthorized use of government aircraft, promotion board improprieties, sexual misconduct by senior officers, the B-52 crash at Fairchild, the shoot down of the Black Hawks in Iraq, and the T-43 accident at Dubrovnik. Only one captain was held accountable under the UCMJ for his role in the shoot down of the two U.S. Army helicopters in Iraq in April 1994. On 20 June 1995, he was acquitted of any wrongdoing. You can contrast this finding (and reluctance to assign accountability?) with the trial of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita following World War II. General Yamashita was charged with dereliction of duty after his troops committed brutal atrocities against U.S. soldiers and allied civilians. He was found guilty and hanged even though he had no knowledge of the crimes at the time and probably would have taken action to stop the atrocities had he known about them.

This IP touches on issues of law, ethics, morality, leadership, command, and professionalism. General Fogelman emphasized the Core Values, and that they apply equally to all members of the Air Force family—officer, enlisted, and civilian. Has the Air Force drifted away from these values over the past few years? Are we holding each member of the "Air Force family" to the same standards? What standards of discipline and accountability are appropriate for senior officers today?

The first reading is a synopsis of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Formal Report. The second reading offers a junior officer's analysis of the accident and the issues surrounding it. Both readings were researched from the same evidence and testimony with somewhat different conclusions.

Lesson Objective: Analyze the extent to which senior officers are accountable for incidents taking place during their command. CV-Integrity, Service before Self, Excellence; PJELA-4, 5 (SUPPORTED)

Desired Learning Outcomes:

1. Appraise the standards of integrity, conduct, and discipline to which senior officers should be held.

2. Assess the senior officer's competing loyalty to the individual versus loyalty to the institution.

3. Contrast the often-conflicting principles of the legal rights of the individual and the professional responsibility of senior officers.

4. Assess the leadership responsibilities at the different levels within the chain of command.

5. Apply Air Force Core Values to operational leadership.
Questions for Study and Discussion:

1. What senior leadership and ethical issues are raised by the B-52 crash at Fairchild? How do we prevent a recurrence?

2. What USAF Core Values are relevant to the case cited above?

3. Were the disciplinary actions toward the Air Force officers involved in the accident appropriate? Why or why not?

4. Is this a one-mistake Air Force? If not, should it be? Are there different standards for senior officers?

5. Where is the traditional military service “belly button” for accountability?

6. The Fairchild B-52 crash illustrates failures of command responsibility, accountability, and discipline that resulted in a loss of lives. Have other similar command or leadership failures occurred which, although they may not have involved aircrew personnel or resulted in a loss of lives, did result in a significant loss of readiness or resources?

Assigned Readings:


Suggested Readings:


On 24 June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild AFB, Washington, launched at approximately 1400 hrs local time to practice maneuvers for an upcoming base open house and air show. The crew of four was very experienced in the B-52 and included as pilot the Chief of Wing Standardization and Evaluation (5000 hours in the B-52), as co-pilot the 325th Bomb Squadron Commander (2800 hours), as radar navigator the 325th Bomb Squadron Operations Officer (2900 hours), and as an observer in the instructor pilot seat the 92nd Bomb Wing Vice Commander (3200 hours). Following a maximum thrust (TRT) takeoff on runway 23, the aircraft performed a climbing 360 degree turn around the control tower with flaps down. 45 to 60 degrees of bank were used. After completing the 360 degree turn, the aircraft turned right to a heading approximately 30 degrees off the runway 23 heading, continued to climb, and retracted flaps. The aircraft then turned left and descended for a low altitude (estimated at less than 500 feet above the ground), medium speed (estimated 250-270 knots airspeed) pass down the runway (runway 05) perpendicular to the one used for takeoff. After completing this pass the aircraft turned left approximately 30 degrees, using 45 degrees of bank angle, to set up for a high speed approach to runway 23 (the runway used for takeoff). The aircraft then accomplished a low speed approach (estimated at 150 knots airspeed) at an altitude of less than 200 feet above the ground. At the end of the runway a large amount of power was added and the aircraft made a steeply banked (approximately 80 degrees), climbing right turn. Part way around the turn the aircraft entered a partially stalled condition and began a tail first slide, losing approximately 100 feet of altitude.

As the aircraft rolled out approaching a downwind heading the stall was broken and the climb to pattern altitude (1200 feet above ground level) was continued to set up for a landing approach to runway 23. This was to be the end of the planned air show profile. After rolling out on final to runway 23, a go-around was executed because another aircraft was on the runway. The landing gear was raised, but flaps remained down. The aircraft then turned slightly left to offset from the runway and a 360 degree turn around the control tower was requested. The tower acknowledged the request, but did not specifically clear the aircraft for this maneuver. During this go-around the aircraft maintained approximately 250 feet above ground level and 170-180 knots of airspeed. As the aircraft passed in front of the tower a level left turn was begun and a small amount of additional thrust added.
As the aircraft rolled into the left turn, the pitch angle was increased, bringing the aircraft's nose slightly above the horizon. Initial bank angle was greater than 70 degrees and increased to past 70 degrees after accomplishing 60 to 90 degrees of the turn. At this point the aircraft again entered a partially stalled condition and experienced another tail slide, losing 50 to 100 feet of altitude. The aircraft then rolled out to approximately 45 degrees angle of bank, which broke the stall and arrested the descent. No additional power was added and the aircraft was now flying slower than the 170–180 knots at the start of the turn. The aircraft was then again rolled to approximately 90 degrees of bank, entering a stalled condition once more, and its nose began to drop. The pilot did attempt to bring the right wing down and roll out. This effort failed and the bank angle actually increased as the nose continued to drop. The aircraft impacted the ground at 150 knots of airspeed and 95 degrees of bank. The co-pilot attempted ejection but was out of the envelope and the ejection sequence was interrupted by ground impact. All four crew members were killed in the crash. The flight lasted approximately 18 minutes.

The Crash Investigation

The accident investigation eliminated maintenance, weather and crew medical conditions as factors in this crash. The focus became the airmanship and flying behavior of the crew. The question remained, why did four very experienced crew members fly a fully mission capable B-52H into the ground? The accident investigation established that the pilot was flying the aircraft at time of impact and that the air show profile flown violated regulatory provisions, flight manual guidance and directions from the wing commander. During the accident profile, restrictions on bank angles, altitude minimums, airspeed restrictions, and aircraft aerobatics were violated. The Pilot's Flight Manual for the B-52H specifies that the maximum bank angle for circling or visual approaches in the pattern to be 30 degrees. Bank angles greater than 30 degrees are considered to be "steep turns." Steep turns should not exceed 50 degrees angle of bank maximum and will not be accomplished at altitudes less than 1000 feet above ground level according to Air Combat Command Regulation 51-50 Volume 22, B-52 Aircrew Training and Air Combat Command Regulation 55-152, B-52 Operating Procedures. Except for takeoff and landings the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) restricts aircraft to a minimum altitude of 500 feet above ground level. The Air Force authorizes a lower altitude of 250 feet for flyovers if approved by the FAA and approved by Major Command (MAJCOM) headquarters. No approval was requested or granted by either agency for this flight. FAA and AF regulations also prohibits the operation of aircraft below 10,000 feet at speeds greater than 250 knots indicated airspeed without waivers and MAJCOM approval. The high pitch angle climb performed in the profile is defined as an aerobatic maneuver and such maneuvers are prohibited in air traffic control zones without FAA and MAJCOM approval. Aerobatics are also prohibited by the B-52 Pilot's Flight Manual.

Immediately following the accident, a letter was sent by a former associate of one of those killed in the accident to the commander of Air Combat Command alleging a repeated history of flight discipline violations by Lt Col Holland and a refusal by senior leaders within the 92nd Bomb Wing to discipline this pilot. The accident investigation panel then conducted an inquiry covering the previous three year period to determine the veracity of these claims and the extent any problems. The investigation revealed a continuing pattern of flight discipline breaches by Lt Col Holland. Over the same three year period the wing leadership took no significant corrective action or in any way documented breaches of the rules by Lt Col Holland.

The failure to document any of the actions against or problems with Lt Col Holland meant that in a period of great transition in the wing (four wing commanders, three vice wing commanders, three ops group commanders, and five squadron commanders in a three year period) there was no "memory" by which to measure the repeated flight discipline violations. In addition, the wing leadership was unfamiliar with regulations concerning air shows as well as the basic flight procedures contained in the B-52 pilot's manual and appropriate ACC regulations. This ignorance of the rules and procedures prevented the wing leadership from recognizing air discipline violations and in several cases led to wing leadership apparently approving illegal maneuvers and profiles.
Background

Events Related to Lt Col Holland's Airmanship and Flight Discipline

In May 1991, Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition at the 1991 Fairchild AFB air show. During this show high-banked turns (excess of 30 degrees of bank) and a high pitch angle (over 45 degrees) climb were executed. In addition, part of a high-banked turn was flown over the crowd. Neither the wing commander nor the ops group commander (equivalent) were aware that this exhibition profile violated FAA regulations, MAJCOM directives, and flight manual procedures.

Two months later, in July 1991, Lt Col Holland flew a B-52 fly over for a 325th Bomb Squadron change of command ceremony. The aircraft flew over the ceremony formation at a height of less than 500 feet above ground. One observer estimated that the pass was between 100 and 200 feet above the ground. Earlier in the day several passes were practiced that also appeared to be at an altitude of less than 500 feet. One pass included a steep banked turn (over 45 degrees of bank) and another ended with a high pitch angle climb followed by a wingover. Scheduling a fly over at a change of command required Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force approval. It was not requested. The bank, pitch angles and wingover maneuvers violated pilot manual guidance and the passes below 500 feet disobeyed FAA regulations. Both the wing commander and the ops group commander (equivalent) were present at the fly over and though their testimony to the accident investigation board indicated some concern over the very low altitude of the fly over, no further investigation was conducted, no actions were documented, and nothing was annotated in the pilot's permanent training or qualification folders.

Ten months later, in May 1992, Lt Col Holland again flew the B-52 exhibition at Fairchild AFB open house. A new wing commander, Col Ruotsala, was unfamiliar with the previous incidents. The profile for this show included low altitude steep turns (greater than 45 degrees of bank) and a high speed pass down the runway followed by a steep pitch angle climb and a wingover. A Stan Eval flight commander who witnessed the exhibition described the maneuvers as "a little bit insane." At a minimum this profile violated flight manual procedures and would have required Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters approval. Col Ruotsala testified he believed the exhibition to be in compliance with applicable MAJCOM policies. However, the wing assistant deputy commander for operations (Col Capotostl) saw the exhibition and was concerned with the profile. Seven days later, Col Capotostl became the 92nd Ops Group Commander and called Lt Col Holland into his office. At this meeting Col Capotostl told Lt Col Holland that he was never going to fly in another air show as long as Col Capotostl was the ops group commander. Col Capotostl also told Lt Col Holland that any future violation of flying regulations would result in permanent grounding. Col Capotostl communicated this position to his deputy Lt Col Harper. But Col Capotostl did not communicate this decision or his opinion of the air show profile to Col Ruotsala. Nor did he document any of these decisions or opinions in Lt Col Holland's records.

In April 1993, Lt Col Holland was mission commander for a two aircraft Global Power mission to the bombing range located in the Medina De Farallons, a small island chain off the coast of Guam. During the mission, close visual formation was flown to take pictures. This type of formation was prohibited by Air Combat Command for B-52s. Later in this mission Lt Col Holland permitted a crew member to leave the main crew compartment and take up a position near the bomb bay access door to take a video of the bomb bay while live munitions were released on a target. The 92nd Bomb Wing commander, Brig Gen Richards was never informed of the actions that occurred during the flight. Col Capotostl did not recall being made aware of these events. However his deputy, Lt Col Harper, did become aware of the flight's events sometime afterwards and believes he did discuss them with Col Capotostl. In addition, Lt Col Bullock, the commander of the 325th Bomb Squadron at the time, remembers some discussion of impromptu flight activity; however he did not learn (nor did he attempt to learn) specifically what happened and who was involved. No action was taken concerning these events and nothing appears in Lt Col Holland's records.

In May 1993, Col Capotostl was reassigned and left the base before the new 92nd Ops Group Commander, Col Pellerin, arrived in June. Colonels Capotostl and Pellerin were never able to meet and discuss personnel in the group. Lt Col Harper, the deputy group commander, did remain in his position to provide continuity.
In August 1993, Lt Col Holland again flew the B-52 exhibition for the Fairchild AFB open house. A crew member on the flight described the profile as being flown with extreme aggressiveness. The flight profile included turns with very steep bank angles, over 45 degrees of bank, at very low altitudes, less than 500 feet above ground level. The exhibition also included a high speed pass down the runway followed by a steeply pitched climb ending with a wingover. The airspeed at the beginning of the climb was 390 knots and the pitch angle was estimated to be between 60 and 80 degrees nose high. ACC approval was required for this exhibition, but it had not been asked for or granted. The Bomb Wing commander, Brig Gen Richards, testified that he looked to his Ops Group commander, Col Pellerin, to ensure that the exhibition was in compliance with appropriate ACC and FAA regulations. Col Pellerin testified that he counted on Lt Col Holland to coordinate with the appropriate authorities. It appears that no one in the wing command structure realized that the profile violated ACC, FAA, and flight manual guidance.

In March 1994, Lt Col Holland flew a single ship mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to drop practice munitions and provide an authorized photo opportunity for a freelance author. During this mission the aircraft repeatedly flew closer to the ground than the minimum 500 feet above ground level specified in ACC regulations. The aircraft consistently crossed ridge lines at less than this minimum altitude. The lowest crossing altitude was estimated at less than 30 feet. A member of the crew believed that if he had not intervened and demanded a climb, and then assisted with the controls, the aircraft would have hit the ridge. During the low crossovers the aircraft flew directly over people on the ground, contrary to FAA and AF regulations. Also, while on the range, the aircraft joined a formation of A-10s for an impromptu flyby that was not planned or pre-briefed and contrary to ACC policies and directives.

After hearing of the events on the range, the 325th Bomb Squadron commander, now Lt Col McGeehen (who would later be the co-pilot killed in the crash), asked the Ops Group commander, Col Pellerin, to restrict Lt Col Holland from further flying. Two meetings were held in April 1994 concerning Lt Col Holland's airmanship at the Yakima Range and the poor example it set for younger pilots. Lt Col Holland attended the second of these meetings. Col Pellerin testified that he was not aware of the events on the range until Lt Col McGeehen brought them to his attention. In explaining his actions to Col Pellerin, Lt Col Holland claimed to be demonstrating the capabilities of the aircraft. Col Pellerin verbally reprimanded Lt Col Holland, calling the actions at the bombing range a breach of air discipline. Lt Col Holland assured Col Pellerin that there would be no further violations of air regulations. Col Pellerin denied Lt Col McGeehen’s request that Lt Col Holland be grounded. Col Pellerin testified that he was unaware that another member of the crew had to intervene to prevent an accident and never did see (or ask to see) the videotape of the mission. Lt Col McGeehen did not pursue the issue with wing or MAJCOM leadership. However, Lt Col McGeehen did decide to fly with Lt Col Holland anytime he flew, rather than expose young members of the crew force to his poor airmanship. Col Pellerin did not inform the wing commander, Col (Brig Gen select) Brooks, of Lt Col Holland’s actions at the range and nothing was annotated in Lt Col Holland’s records.

Some time in the April–May 1994 time frame the 92nd Air Refueling Squadron Flight Surgeon, became concerned when he heard that Lt Col Holland would be flying the B-52 exhibition at the 1994 Fairchild AFB open house. The flight surgeon had on at least one occasion been informed by a patient that the patient would not fly with Lt Col Holland because of Lt Col Holland’s overly aggressive flying. The flight surgeon expressed these concerns to the Chief of Wing Safety. However, Lt Col Pellerin told the flight surgeon that Lt Col Holland was a good pilot and that the maneuvers had all been done before. Later, the flight surgeon discussed his concerns with the wing Chief of Aeromedical services but the issue was not pursued because it had already been discussed with a wing safety officer.

During this April–May 1994 time frame, planning for the B-52 exhibition at the 1994 air show began. Lt Col Holland was assigned this mission and there is no evidence that any other pilots were considered or objections raised. At a 15 June 1994 meeting, attended by the wing, ops group, and squadron commanders, the air show plans were reviewed and the proposed exhibition briefed. During this briefing Lt Col Holland proposed a profile that included bank angles of at least 60 degrees, a high pitch angle climb of 50–60 degrees nose high, and a KC-135/B-52 formation. The proposed formation was rejected by the ops group commander and KC-135 aircraft
The wing commander, Col Brooks, instructed Lt Col Holland that there would be no formation maneuvers, no bank angles greater than 45 degrees and no pitch angles greater than 25 degrees. Following the meeting Col Brooks was still concerned with the proposed profile, so the ops group commander, Col Pellerin, said he would talk with Lt Col Holland. The following morning Col Pellerin reiterated to Lt Col Holland that there would be no pitch angles in excess of 50 degrees.

No type of approval was requested by the 92nd Bomb Wing for this planned exhibition. At a minimum MAJCOM approval was required for any type of flying exhibition. In addition, an FAA waiver was required for the type of exhibition to be flown. No waivers to authorized flight parameters were asked for or approved. The authorized parameters included a maximum airspeed of no more than 250 knots below 10,000 feet, no aerobatic flight maneuvers, no bank angles over 30 degrees for circling or visual approaches, and no steep turns below 1000 feet above ground level or greater than 45 degrees of bank.

On 17 June 1994, the first practice mission for the 1994 air show was flown. This profile was nearly identical to the accident profile, except that two complete profiles were flown. Both profiles included steep bank angles and a high pitch angle of climb. Though bank angles were not as aggressive as those flown during the accident profiles, they were contrary to ACC and flight manual guidance. Both profiles violated the wing commander’s guidance given at the 15 June meeting. The ops group commander, Col Pellerin, flew on this mission. After this practice he told the wing commander that “the profile looked good to him; looks very safe, well within parameters.” The wing commander viewed only a small portion of this flight and remembered nothing extraordinary or objectionable about what he saw.

Conclusion

The accident investigation board discovered a pattern of repeated flight discipline violations by Lt Col Holland. In every case the wing senior leadership either did not recognize the seriousness of the violation and did nothing or chose to deal with it in an unofficial manner. The investigation revealed much about a “climate” in the wing where junior officers participated in, witnessed, or later learned of flight discipline violations and did nothing. In their testimony to the board some of these officers felt that Lt Col Holland was given greater leeway in matters dealing with flight parameters because of his great experience and position in the wing. Another testified that he felt “blackmailed” into remaining quiet about activities in which he participated. Still another described Lt Col Holland as quietly desperate, sensing that the closing of B-52 operations at Fairchild was ending his own career.

There were contributing factors involved in this accident. The rapid turnover of wing leadership minimized continuity and prevented commanders from overlapping each other. The imminent closure of B-52 operations at Fairchild and its transition from an Air Combat Command to Air Mobility Command base meant that many senior leaders were unfamiliar with B-52 operations and applicable regulations and flight manual guidance.
Darker Shades of Blue:  
A Case Study of Failed Leadership

by

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United States Air Force

Author’s Preface

When leadership fails and a command climate breaks down, tragic things can happen. This is the story of failed leadership and a command climate which had degenerated into an unhealthy state of apathy and non-compliance—a state which contributed to the tragic crash of a B-52 at Fairchild Air Force Base, on the 24th of June, 1994, killing all aboard.

I have three purposes with this case study. First, I hope to integrate the various elements of the story into a historically accurate and readable case study for all interested parties, to provide a clearer picture of what actually occurred at Fairchild Air Force Base in the years and months leading up to the tragedy. Secondly, I wish to analyze leadership and the command climate at the wing, operations group, and squadron levels. This analysis will identify possible errors and provide lessons learned, for use in academic environments. Finally, I wish to show the positive side of this episode, for there were many who did the right thing, and acted in a timely and proactive manner. Their actions might well have averted the disaster in a more rational command climate. Their story should be told.

All testimony contained in this report are taken from the AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation Board transcripts, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, or through personal interviews conducted by the author. I analyzed transcripts from 49 individual testimonies, and conducted 11 personal interviews. I wish to make it perfectly clear, that no data was taken from the Air Force Safety Mishap Investigation, so the issue of privilege was not a factor in preparing this report. In fact, I intentionally did not read or receive a briefing on the results of the safety board for the express purpose of avoiding even the appearance of a conflict.

Placing blame on individuals was not my intention and is not the purpose of this monograph. However, my interpretation of events found potentially significant errors in leadership, disregard for regulations, and breaches of discipline at multiple levels. As an officer and aviator, I found many of these events personally and professionally appalling. Occasionally, my interpretation of events reflects this mood. Although I have attempted to avoid bias, I make no apologies for my discoveries. Any errors of omission or commission are strictly those of the author. I write this as my contribution to promoting the Air
Force values of integrity, fairness, discipline, and teamwork—all found to be tragically lacking in this example.

Format

Because it is envisioned that this case study may be used in academic settings, the format includes certain features that will lend themselves to effective instruction. Key concepts and terms appear in boldface, and are discussed in summary at the end of the monograph. Additionally, hypothetical questions are posed to spur thought and facilitate discussion. The companion “Instructor Guide” is designed for use to a generic Air Force audience and may be modified in any manner to suit effective instruction.

I have documented this case study through the extensive use of informational endnotes and traditional citation endnotes. However, to preclude breaking up the narrative with endless citations (I could have literally footnoted almost every line of the monograph), I have often placed a single citation at the end of a group of testimony or statements which came from the same source in an effort to improve on the readability of the document. I beg the academic purists’ indulgence in this matter.

As a final note, I have copyrighted this case study not to inhibit its use or dispersion among military personnel, but to prevent portions of the study being quoted out of context to cast negative light on the Air Force or its personnel. This foreword provides blanket approval for military personnel to duplicate this case study in total (cover to cover). I must emphasize again that I do not wish individual segments to be isolated and taken out of context.

Prologue

“What’s the deal with this guy?” Captain Bill Kramer asked, indicating a car conspicuously parked in the center of the red-curbed “No Parking” zone adjacent to the wing headquarters building. It was a short walk from the HQ building, commonly referred to as The White House, to the parking lot where they had left their own vehicles while attending the briefing on the upcoming airshow. As they passed the illegally-parked car and then the various “reserved” spaces for the wing and operations group commanders, Lt Col Winslow turned to Captain Kramer, and replied, “That’s Bud’s car. He always parks there.” After a few more steps the Captain inquired, “How does he get away with that?” The Lieutenant Colonel reflected for a moment and responded, “I don’t know—he just does.”
Section One: Introduction

There are no bad regiments, only bad colonels.
—Napoleon

Failed leadership can have tragic consequences. In the words of Major General (Retired) Perry Smith, a career Air Force aviator and former commandant of the National War College, “Leaders make a difference, and large and complex organizations (like an Air Force Wing) make special demands on the men and women who run them.” This is the story of a group of leaders who did not meet all the demands required to establish a healthy command climate, and when confronted with evidence of regulatory deviations and poor airmanship, did not take appropriate disciplinary actions. There were several manifestations of these failings. Only the most tragic and dramatic is addressed here—the crash of Czar 52. An examination and analysis of the command climate which existed at Fairchild AFB in the three years preceding the crash illustrates several examples of failed leadership relating to a series of breeches of air discipline on the part of a senior wing aviator, Lt Col “Bud” Holland, the pilot in command of Czar 52.

On the 24th of June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, launched at approximately 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), to practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. The aircrew had planned and briefed a profile, through the Wing Commander level, that grossly exceeded aircraft and regulatory limitations. Upon preparing to land at the end of the practice airshow profile, the crew was required to execute a “go-around” or missed approach because of another aircraft on the runway. At midfield, Czar 52 began a tight 360 degree left turn around the control tower at only 250 feet altitude above ground level (AGL). Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with the left wing and crashed. Impact occurred at approximately 1416 hours PDT. There were no survivors out of a crew of four field grade officers.

Killed in the crash were Lt Col Arthur “Bud” Holland, the Chief of the 92d Bomb Wing Standardization and Evaluation branch, Lt Col Holland, an instructor pilot, was designated as the aircraft commander and was undoubtedly flying the aircraft at the time of the accident. The copilot was Lt Col Mark McGeehan, also an instructor pilot and the 325th Bomb Squadron (BMS) Commander. There is a great deal of evidence that suggests considerable animosity existed between the two pilots who were at the controls of Czar 52. This was a result of Lt Col McGeehan’s unsuccessful efforts to have Bud Holland “grounded” for what he perceived as numerous and flagrant violations of air discipline while flying with 325th BMS aircrews. Colonel Robert Wolff was the Vice Wing Commander and was added to the flying schedule as a safety observer by Col Brooks, the Wing Commander, on the morning of the mishap. This was to be Col Wolff’s “fini flight,” an Air Force tradition where an aviator is hosed down following his last flight in an aircraft. Upon landing, Col Wolff was to be met on the flightline by his wife and friends for a champagne toast to a successful flying career. The radar navigator position was filled by Lt Col Ken Huston, the 325th BMS Operations Officer.

While all aircraft accidents that result in loss of life are tragic, those that could have been prevented are especially so. The crash of Czar 52 was primarily the result of actions taken by a singularly outstanding “stick and rudder pilot,” but one who, ironically, practiced incredibly poor airmanship. The distinction between these two similar sounding roles will be made clear as we progress in this analysis. Of equal or greater significance, was the fact that supervision and leadership facilitated the accident through failed policies of selective enforcement of regulations, as well as failing to heed the desperate warning signals raised by peers and subordinates over a period of three years prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, there was considerable evidence of Lt Col Holland’s poor airmanship spanning a period of over three years.
Significance of the Case Study

The Fairchild example is worth our further analysis and contemplation, not because it was a unique aberration from what occurs in other military organizations, but rather because it is a compilation of tendencies that are seen throughout the spectrum of our operations. Many aviators report that rules and regulations are "bent" on occasion, and some individuals seem to be "Teflon coated" because their mistakes are ignored or overlooked by their supervisors. Most honest flyers will readily admit to operating under different sets of rules depending on the nature of the mission they are about to fly. For example, standard training missions are treated differently than evaluations. Likewise, higher headquarters directed missions are treated differently than inspections, or airshow demonstrations. This often leads to a confusing mental state for young or inexperienced flyers, who see ever-increasing "shades of gray" creeping into their decision-making process. This case study illustrates examples of such missions, and of aviators who felt that the rules were different for them.

Methodology

This monograph takes a case study approach to identify positive and negative aspects of leadership. This study uses no formal definition of leadership, although there are many to choose from. This is not an oversight, but rather by design, to allow each reader the opportunity to apply his or her own notions of leadership to the case study. Leadership assessment will use criterion taken from several sources, chosen for their relevance and practicality, including Major General Perry Smith's Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders, The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun, by William Roberts, Follow Me: The Human Element of Leadership, and Follow Me II, by Major General (Retired) Aubrey S. Newman, and J. K. Van Fleet's The 22 Biggest Mistakes Managers Make. In addition, the author selected several points from a lecture given by Lieutenant General (Retired) Calvin Waller on the subject of Ethical Leadership. From these sources, the author compiled a list of questions with which to assess the leadership behaviors. They follow.

Did the leader have all the facts necessary to make an informed decision? For example, did they know and understand the applicable guiding regulations and directives?

Were the leader's actions and words congruent? Did he talk the talk and walk the walk?

Did the leader act in an ethical manner? Would his actions pass the "newspaper test?"

Did the leader consider the implications of his actions on subordinates?

Did the leader's actions promote a sound command climate? Did he permit and encourage the free flow of information? Did he require that deviations from standards be reported?

Did the leader enforce established standards? Was the leader able to effectively discipline? Was he fair and decisive?

Senior leadership actions (or lack thereof) will be addressed using a chronological approach and the Leader—Follower—Situation framework outlined by Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, a textbook used at the United States Air Force Academy.

Key Concepts: Airmanship, Rogue Aviators, Leadership, and the Culture of Compliance

At a gut level, most aviators can determine reasonable from unreasonable courses of action, regardless of the nature of the mission. This quality is referred to as judgment or airmanship. From the beginning of an aviator's training, he or she is taught that "flexibility is the key to airpower" and is given considerable latitude in employing methods for accomplishing mission objectives. This is one of the major strengths of airpower and should not be changed. But there are also those aviators, usually of high experience, skill, and confidence, who see this built in flexibility as a chaotic environment which may be manipulated for their own ends—often with tragic results. These rogue aviators are usually popular and respected, possess considerable social skills, and have learned what rules they can break, when, and with whom. They are usually perceived much differently by superiors than by peers or subordinates. This level of sophistication makes the direct oversight role of the supervisor more difficult, and the role of effective command climate more important. What the leader may not recognize as an individual, must be identified for him by the organization. Further, upon this recognition, the leader must act. Failure to act after the organization has fulfilled its role in identifying a problem, leads to a deterioration of faith in the system by subordinates, who now feel that their input is of little value. A culture of compliance
must be inculcated and constantly nurtured to prevent the downward spiral into disaster, such as occurred at Fairchild Air Force Base in June of 1994.

The culture of compliance was certainly not in place at Fairchild AFB in the three years preceding the crash of Czar 52. In this case study, the signs of trouble were present early and often. A pattern of negative activity could be found in complaints from other crewmembers, maintenance problems from over-stressing or exceeding aircraft limitations, and stories of the Lt Col Holland's grand accomplishments and plans that circulated throughout the crew force. After reviewing the history contained in the testimonies, one suspects that an energetic historian could find earlier signs of Lt Col Bud Holland's departure from the aviators' "straight and narrow" path of regulatory compliance, but for our purposes we will limit the analysis to the period between 1991 and June of 1994.

By the summer of 1994, the entire Fairchild culture was caught up in the activities of a single B-52 pilot. Red flags of warning were abundant—and yet those who could act did not do so, in spite of recommendations to ground Bud Holland. As one B-52 crewmember said about the accident, "You could see it, hear it, feel it, and smell it coming. We were all just trying to be somewhere else when it happened."
Section Two: The Players

THERE were many individuals involved with this story. This section introduces the reader to Lt Col Holland and the command staff at Fairchild AFB during the period of this analysis. The remainder of the personnel will be discussed as they fit into the narrative.

Lt Col Bud Holland

Lt Col Arthur “Bud” Holland was the Chief of the 92d Bombardment Wing Standardization and Evaluation Section at Fairchild Air Force Base. This position made him responsible for the knowledge and enforcement of academic and in-flight standards for the wing’s flying operations. By nearly any measuring stick, Bud Holland was a gifted stick and rudder pilot. With over 5,200 hours of flying time and a perfect 31-0 record on checkrides, Lt Col Holland had flown the B-52G and H Models since the beginning of his flying career in March of 1971. He was regarded by many as an outstanding pilot, perhaps the best in the entire B-52 fleet. He was an experienced instructor pilot and had served with the Strategic Air Command’s 1st Combat Evaluation Group (CEVG), considered by many aviators to be the “top of the pyramid.” But between 1991 and June of 1994, a pattern of poor airmanship began to surface. Perhaps his reputation as a gifted pilot influenced the command staff, who allowed this pattern of behavior to continue. The following were typical comments from Lt Col Holland’s superiors:

“Bud is as good as a B-52 aviator as I have seen.”

“Bud was ... very at ease in the airplane ... a situational awareness type of guy ... among the most knowledgeable guys I’ve flown with in the B-52.”

“Bud was probably the best B-52 pilot that I know in the wing and probably one of the best, if not the best within the command. He also has a lot of experience in the CEVG which was the Command Stan Eval ... and he was very well aware of the regulations and the capabilities of the airplane (emphasis added).”

A far different perspective on Lt Col Holland’s flying is seen in statements by more junior crew-members, who were required to fly with him on a regular basis.

“There was already some talk of maybe trying some other ridiculous maneuvers ... his lifetime goal was to roll the B-52.”

“I was thinking that he was going to try something again, ridiculous maybe, at this airshow and possibly kill thousands of people.”

“I’m not going to fly with him, I think he’s dangerous. He’s going to kill somebody some day and it’s not going to be me.”

“(Lt) Col Holland made a joke out of it when I said I would not fly with him. He came to me repeatedly after that and said ‘Hey, we’re going flying Mike, you want to come with us.’ And every time I would just smile and say, ‘No. I’m not going to fly with you.’”

“Lt Col Holland broke the regulations or exceeded the limits ... virtually every time he flew.”

The reasons for these conflicting views may never be entirely known, but hint at a sophisticated approach to breaking the rules that became a pattern in Lt Col Holland’s flying activities. Additionally, some light can be shed on the issue by looking at the rapid and frequent turnover of the 92d Bomb Wing senior staff.

The Shifting Command Structure

The 92d Bomb Wing experienced numerous changes to its wing and squadron leadership during the period from 1991 to 1994. The changes included four wing commanders, three vice wing commanders, three deputy commanders for operations/operations group commanders, three assistant deputy commanders for operations, and five squadron commanders at the 325th BMS. Figures 1 and 2 show a leadership timeline at the 92d Bomb Wing from mid-1990 through mid-1994. Above the timeline are listed the eight significant events that will be analyzed. As the discussion proceeds, the interaction between incoming and outgoing members of the staff will be addressed.
Section Three: The Events

EACH of the events leading up to the crash of Czar 52 on 24 June 1994 provides insights on leadership performance. We will analyze each event by providing a synopsis of what occurred, as determined from eyewitness testimony. Secondly, we will look at the action of the followers, which were typically (but not always) B-52 air crewmembers. Finally, we will conclude the analysis of the event with a look at the leader’s actions. This framework, or model for analysis is suggested by leading researchers for use in the case study approach.16 It is important to understand that a historical case study cannot provide definitive guidance for other situations. All situations are unique and must be defined in terms of their own circumstances. It is hoped, however, that this discussion will provide some general lessons that may carry over into other environments.

Situation One: Fairchild AFB Airshow 19 May 1991

Lt Col Holland was the pilot and aircraft commander for the B-52 exhibition in the 1991 Fairchild AFB air show. During this exhibition, Lt Col Holland violated several regulations and tech order (T.O. 1B-52G-1-11, a.k.a. Dash 11) limits of the B-52, by (1) exceeding bank and pitch limits, and (2) flying directly over the airshow crowd in violation of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91. In addition, a review of a videotape of the maneuvers leaves one with the distinct impression that the aircraft may have violated FAR altitude restrictions as well.

The Followers

Many of the crewmembers who were at Fairchild for the 1991 airshow were unavailable for interview, but it appears as if there was no large public or private outcry as a result of the 1991 B-52 exhibition. However, some aircrew members had already began to lose faith in the system. One B-52 pilot, when asked why more crewmembers didn’t speak up about the violations, said, “The entire wing staff sat by and watched him do it (violate regulations) in the ’91 airshow. What was the sense in saying anything? They had already given him a license to steal (emphasis added).”17

The Leaders

There is no evidence to indicate that commanders at any level took any action as a result of Lt Col Holland’s flight activities. There is no indication that either the wing commander (Col Weinman) or the deputy commander for operations (Col Julich) was aware that the profile flown was in violation of existing MAJCOM regulations or FARs. However, there can be little doubt that they were both aware that the profile violated the Dash 11 T. O. Both men were experienced pilots and were undoubtedly aware of the bank and pitch limitations of the B-52 in the traffic pattern environment, which were grossly exceeded as they personally observed the flyover.

Analysis

The Fairchild leadership failed in two major areas. The first was allowing a command climate in which such a blatant violation of air discipline could be planned, briefed, and carried out without interference. The fact that Lt Col Holland planned and briefed a profile that did not meet established regulatory and Tech Order guidelines suggests a complacent command climate. J. K. Van Fleet, in The 22 Biggest Mistakes Managers Make, would see this as “a failure to make sure that the job is understood, supervised, and accomplished.”18 One could argue that this level of oversight was unnecessary, since Lt Col Holland, as the Chief of wing Stan-Eval, was a senior officer with a great deal of experience. If this argument is accepted, then the leadership failed to act decisively after the violations occurred. William Roberts, in Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun would see this failure to act as a lost teaching opportunity. “Chieftains must teach their Huns what is expected of them. Otherwise, Huns will probably do something unexpected of them.”19 Simply stated, the wing commander and DO did not know certain things they should have known (like command regulations on airshows) and did not enforce standards on violations of regulations that they clearly understood. This would not be the only lost teaching opportunity.
Interestingly, the wing commander had a reputation for demanding strict adherence to air discipline. While acting as the commander of a provisional bomb wing at Andersen AFB, Guam, in GIANT WARRIOR 1990, Colonel Weinman had been very proactive to prevent low altitude violations during airfield attack portions of the exercise. After two days of observing aggressive simulated airfield attacks at Andersen, he remarked, “If we keep trying to outdo each other every day, there is only one way this is going to end—with somebody getting killed. The next guy that busts an altitude will talk to me personally and explain why I shouldn’t ground him and send him home.” The author could find no explanation for the apparent disconnect between what Col Weinman demanded in the provisional wing and what he allowed to occur at his own airshow.

Situation Two: 325th BMS Change of Command “Fly Over”
12 July 1991

Lt Col Holland was the aircraft commander and pilot for a “fly over” for a 325th BMS Change of Command ceremony. During the “practice” and actual fly over, Lt Col Holland accomplished passes that were estimated to be “as low as 100–200 feet.” Additionally, Lt Col Holland flew steep bank turns (greater than 45 degrees) and extremely high pitch angles, in violation of the Dash 11 Tech Order, as well as a “wingover”—a maneuver where the pilot rolls the aircraft onto its side and allows the nose of the aircraft to fall “through the horizon” to regain airspeed. The Dash 11 recommends against wingover type maneuvers because the sideslip may cause damage to the aircraft.

The Followers
Because most of the 325th BMS personnel were standing at attention in ranks for the Change of Command ceremony, they did not personally see the violations as they occurred. Most had to rely on descriptions from family and friends. The followers were acutely aware, however, that the senior staff had a ringside seat, and therefore may not have felt the need to report or complain about a situation that their leaders had witnessed directly.

The Leaders
This time the leadership was forced to take action. The ADO (Col Capotosti) went to the DO (Col Julich) and remarked “We can’t have that, we can’t tolerate things like that, we need to take action for two reasons—it’s unsafe and we have a perception problem with the young aircrews.”

Evidence indicates that Lt Col Holland may have been debriefed and possibly verbally reprimanded by either (or both) the DO and wing commander. However, Lt Col Harper, the outgoing Bomb Squadron commander stated, “No overt punishment that I know of, ever occurred from that (the Change of Command flyover).”

Analysis
Failures in oversight, an ineffective command climate, and a lack of continuity between words and disciplinary actions earmarked the leadership response to this situation. As in the previous situation, the flyover plan was developed, briefed, and executed without intervention. The flyover for a change of command required approval by the USAF Vice Chief of Staff. No such approval was requested or granted. Although the senior staff was spurred to action by the magnitude of the violations, the response appeared to be little more than a slap on the wrist, a point certainly not missed by other flyers in the wing.

Situation Three: Fairchild Air Show
17 May 1992

Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition at the Fairchild Air Show. The profile flown included several low altitude steep turns in excess of 45 degrees of bank, and a high speed pass down the runway. At the completion of the high speed pass, Lt Col Holland accomplished a high pitch angle climb, estimated at over 60 degrees nose high. At the top of the climb, the B-52 leveled off using a wingover maneuver.

The Followers
Once again, perhaps because the senior staff were eyewitnesses to the violations, the junior crewmembers kept their opinions on the flyby to themselves. A B-52 pilot remarked, “I was amazed that they (the senior staff) let him keep doing that. Getting away with it once you could understand, you know—forgiveness is easier to get than permission. But this was the third time in less than a year.”26

The Leaders
The wing commander was Col Ruotsala and the Deputy Commander for Operations (DO) was Col Julich. The DO was TDY during the airshow planning sessions from January to April 1992, and was to leave for another assignment within a month after the airshow. The Assistant Deputy

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Commander for Operations (ADO), Col Capotosti, did not take part in any of the airshow planning due to a family emergency.28 As a result, the normal command structure was not in place for the planning phase of the air show. The ADO, Col Capotosti, was to move up to DO a week after the air show. He was upset by the lack of Lt Col Holland's air discipline and told his wife “This will never happen again. In seven days, I'll be the DO. Lt Col Holland will never fly another air show as long as I am the DO.”29 After he took over as DO, Col Capotosti “took Holland in and told him to his face, behind closed doors, ‘If you go out and do a violation and I become aware of it, I will ground you permanently.’”30 Although Col Capotosti began to keep a folder on flyover and air show regulations, there was no documentation of the reprimand or counseling given to Lt Col Holland in any form.

Analysis

A lack of attention to detail, failure to adequately discipline, and a failure to document counseling, were the primary leadership failures at this juncture. Once again, the required waivers were not obtained for the B-52 demonstration. The wing commander stated “I guess I assumed that it had been approved because there are a lot of other flyovers, or flying events ... and it was all kind of bunched up into one approval for the event.”31 This was an incorrect assumption. The outgoing DO took no disciplinary action, perhaps feeling that the new DO would handle the situation. The incoming DO’s statement that “this will never happen again” was soon to be qualified with “as long as I’m the DO.” Perhaps more significant was the fact that the counseling sessions which apparently occurred after the last incident (Change of Command flyover, 12 July 91), were apparently not passed on to the new DO. If there had been any implied or stated threats to Lt Col Holland after the last event, such as “If you do this again, you are grounded,” they were not passed along. This left the new DO at “step one” in the disciplinary process. By this time, the credibility of the senior staff had been severely damaged, and the DO’s verbal reprimand most likely sounded hollow to Lt Col Holland, who had been verbally reprimanded by the wing commander for similar violations the previous July. Apparently, the senior staff at the 92d Bomb Wing was unwilling to take preventative disciplinary action, even after three public displays of intentional and blatant deviations from regulations and Technical Orders. Further deterioration of airmanship should not have come as a surprise.

Situation Four: Global Power Mission
14–15 April 1993

Lt Col Holland was the mission commander of a two-ship GLOBAL POWER mission to the bombing range in the Medina de Farallons, a small island chain off the coast of Guam in the Pacific Ocean. While in command of this mission, Lt Col Holland flew a close visual formation with another B-52 in order to take close up pictures.32 This type of maneuver was prohibited by Air Combat Command (ACC) regulations.33 Later in the mission, Lt Col Holland permitted a member of his crew to leave the main crew compartment and work his way back to the bomb bay to take a video of live munitions being released from the aircraft. This was also in violation of current regulations.34

The Followers

The members of the crews on this GLOBAL POWER mission participated in the unauthorized activities that took place. When questioned as to why they did this, several crewmembers testified that Lt Col Holland told them that the wing commander, Brigadier General Richards, had instructed him to do “whatever you need to do, to get good pictures.”35 The pictures and video which resulted were clear and unequivocal evidence that regulations had been broken.

The Leaders

After the mission, the 325th BMS commander, Lt Col Bullock, became aware of the video. One crewmember testified that the squadron commander attempted to coerce him into taking a job as the wing scheduler by using the videotape as “blackmail.”36 The crewmember was so upset with this development that he went to the base Judge Advocate General (JAG) to file a complaint, but was told “he could not win.”37 Lt Col Bullock denies these events took place and states that “no one told him specifically” that illegal events had taken place on the flight.38 The same crewmember later showed the video to the Deputy Operations Group Commander (ADO), Lt Col Harper, who advised him, “I would not show any of this” relating to certain sequences of the video tape which he (Lt Col Harper) felt were in violation of regulations.39 When the DO was made aware of the presence of the potentially incriminating video he allegedly responded “Okay, I don’t want to know anything about that video—
don’t care.”40 The entire episode began with Lt Col Holland’s impression that he was given “some orders (presumably from the wing commander) to basically free-style to get good photographs and video ... to make the presentation (of the wing’s accomplishments) more spectacular.”41

Analysis
For the first time, the wing leadership was confronted with “hard copy” evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Lt Col Holland. Yet there was apparently no attempt at any level to interview the crewmembers or to reprimand the guilty parties. If the story of blackmail is true, the actions of the squadron commander were clearly unethical and possibly illegal. If they were not true, he still did not enforce existing standards and regulations. The ADO, by his own admission, was aware that illegal activities had taken place during the flight. He claims to have advised the DO of the problem, which the DO denies. In either case, no disciplinary action was taken as a result of this episode. If the DO actually stated “I don’t want to know anything about that video—I don’t care” he was clearly complacent and failed in his leadership role by not enforcing standards, as well as inhibiting communications. The wing commander may not have been involved at all in this case, as he denies that he ever told Lt Col Holland to “do what it takes to get good pictures.” Once again there was no disciplinary action taken or any documentation of counseling.

Perhaps the most disturbing part of this situation is that it shows at least three examples of military officers telling lies, an unpardonable breach of integrity. Either the blackmail incident occurred or it did not, either the ADO informed the DO of the problem or he did not, and either the wing commander told Lt Col Holland to “do what it takes” or he did not. It is unlikely that the individuals involved would have forgotten or misinterpreted these events, making it highly likely that several officers lied while testifying to the investigating authority. Integrity—the cornerstone of officership, was clearly lacking at, or within, all three levels of command.

Situation Five: Fairchild Air Show
8 August 1993
Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition for the 1993 Fairchild air show. The profile included steep turns of greater than 45 degrees of bank, low altitude passes, and a high pitch maneuver which one crewmember estimate to be 80 degrees nose high—ten degrees shy of completely vertical. Each of these three maneuvers exceeded technical order guidance. As was the case in previous air shows, Air Combat Command approval was required, but was neither requested or granted.

The Followers
By now, the crewmembers of the 325th BMS had grown accustomed to Lt Col Holland’s air show routine. But a more insidious effect of his ability to consistently break the rules with apparent impunity, was manifested in younger, less skilled crewmembers. In one example, Captain Nolan Elliot, a B-52 Aircraft Commander who had seen several of Lt Col Holland’s performances attempted to copy the “pitch-up” maneuver at an air show in Camloops, Canada—with near disastrous results.42 The navigator on this flight said “we got down to seventy knots and ... felt buffetting” during the recovery from the pitch up.43 At seventy knots, the B-52 is in a aerodynamically stalled condition and is no longer flying. Only good fortune or divine intervention, prevented a catastrophic occurrence in front of the Canadian audience. A second example occurred at Roswell, New Mexico, when a new Aircraft Commander was administratively grounded for accomplishing a maneuver he had seen Bud Holland do at an air show. “It was a flaps down, turning maneuver in excess of 60 degrees of bank, close to the ground.” His former instructor said of the event “I was appalled to hear that somebody I otherwise respected would attempt that. The site commander was also appalled, and sat the man down and administered corrective training.”44 The bad example set by Col Holland had begun to be emulated by junior and impressionable officers, and had resulted in one near disaster and an administrative action against a junior officer. This was precisely what Col Capotosti had feared when he warned the DO about Holland’s influence on younger crewmembers in July of 1991.

The Leaders
There was no disciplinary action taken at any level of command as a result of the 1993 air show.

Analysis
The response to this event from the wing commander, Brigadier General Richards, sheds some light on the nature of the overall leadership prob-
lem at Fairchild AFB. In testimony after the crash in June of '94, Richards said of Lt Col Holland, "he never acted ... anything other than totally professional ... nothing I saw or knew about when I was at Fairchild led me to any other belief" (emphasis added) about Bud Holland."45 This testimony was from a Wing Commander who personally witnessed Lt Col Holland's flagrant and willful tech order and regulatory violations at his own 1993 air show. Regarding the '93 air show, BG Richards went on to state "I made it absolutely clear that everything that was going to be done in this demonstration was going to have to be on the up and up and in accordance with tech order and in accordance with the regulations ... and I was sure that it was" (emphasis added.)."46 It is interesting to note, that the site commander at Roswell, New Mexico, immediately recognized a high bank maneuver by a B-52 as a violation of tech order guidance, and took administrative action against the offender. What was going on at Fairchild? Did the Wing Commander not know or understand the tech orders or regulations? Was he misinformed? BG Richards states he looked to the DO, Col Pellerin for guidance.47 Col Pellerin states he looked to his Chief of Stan-Eval, Lt Col Holland for guidance—and so the demonstration proceeded under the guidance of an aviator who already had been verbally reprimanded (perhaps twice) for willful violations and poor airmanship.48 A B-52 pilot interviewed about this state of affairs, said "it was worse than the blind leading the blind. It was more like the spider and the fly" referring to the abilities of Lt Col Holland to bend the leadership to his will.49 Although there was a new DO in place, Col Pellerin did not take any more forceful action than did any of his predecessors. In fact, there was no verbal reprimand or counseling given to Lt Col Holland, as there had been in the past air shows. He may have seen this as another signal of the senior leadership's acquiescence to his brand of airmanship.

**Situation Six: Yakima Bombing Range**

**10 March 1994**

Lt Col Holland was the aircraft commander on a single ship mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to drop practice munitions and provide an authorized photographer an opportunity to shoot pictures of the B-52 from the ground as it conducted its bomb runs. Lt Col Holland flew the aircraft well below the established 500 foot minimum altitude for the low level training route. In fact, one crossover was photographed at less than 30 feet, and another crewmember estimated that the final ridgeline crossover was "somewhere in the neighborhood of about three feet" (emphasis added) above the ground, and that the aircraft would have impacted the ridge if he had not intervened and pulled back on the yoke to increase the aircraft's altitude. The photographers stopped filming because "they thought we were going to impact ... and they were ducking out of the way."50 Lt Col Holland also joined an unbriefed formation of A-10 fighter aircraft to accomplish a flyby over the photographer. This mission violated ACC Regulations regarding minimum altitudes, FAR Part 91 and Air Force Regulation (AFR) 60-16, regarding overflight of people on the ground. There were several occasions during the flight where other crewmembers verbally voiced their opposition to the actions being taken by Lt Col Holland. Following the flight, these same crewmembers went up the squadron chain of command with their story and stated they would not fly with Lt Col Holland again.

**The Followers**

During the flight, crewmembers strongly verbalized their concerns about the violations of air discipline and regulations. At one point, Lt Col Holland reportedly called the radar navigator "a pussy" when he would not violate regulations and open the bomb doors for a photograph with live weapons on board. On another occasion, following a low crossover, the navigator told Lt Col Holland that the altitudes he was flying was "senseless."51 But the real hero on this flight was Capt Eric Jones, a B-52 instructor pilot who found himself in the copilot seat with Lt Col Holland during the low level portion of the flight. On this day, it would take all of his considerable skills, wits, and guile, to bring the aircraft safely back to Fairchild. After realizing that merely telling Lt Col Holland that he was violating regulations and that he (Capt Jones) was uncomfortable with that, was not going to work, Capt Jones feigned illness to get a momentary climb to a higher altitude. Capt Jones also said he needed training and flew a few more passes. But in the end it was once again Lt Col Holland at the controls. The following is Capt Jones recollection of the events that took place then:

> We came around and (Lt) Col Holland took us down to 50 feet. I told him that this was well below the clearance plane and that we needed to climb. He ignored me. I told him (again) as we approached the ridge line. I told him in three quick bursts 'climb-climb-
... I didn't see any clearance that we were going to clear the top of that mountain ... it appeared to me that he had target fixation. I said 'climb-climb-climb,' again, he did not do it. I grabbed ahead of the yoke and pulled it back pretty abruptly ... I'd estimate we had a cross over around 15 feet. ... The radar navigator and the navigator were verbally yelling or screaming, reprimanding (Lt) Col Holland and saying that there was no need to fly that low ... his reaction to that input was he was laughing—I mean a good belly laugh.51

Following the low level portion of the mission at the Yakima Range, the crew was scheduled to fly another low level at a different route. Capt Jones convinced Lt Col Holland that the other copilot on the flight needed some training. When Lt Hollis climbed in the seat with Capt Jones (replacing Lt Col Holland at the other set of controls) Capt Jones "told Lt Hollis that he was not to get out of the seat again, (even if) Col Holland ordered him to."53

Upon returning from the mission, the crewmembers discussed the events among themselves and came to the conclusion that they would not fly with Lt Col Holland again. Capt Jones reports, "I vowed to them that never again would they or myself be subjected to fly with him. That if it required it, I would be willing to fall on my sword to ensure that didn't happen." The next day, Captain Jones reported the events to Major Don Thompson, the squadron operations officer stating "I did not ever want to fly with Lt Col Holland again, even if (Lt) Col Holland ordered him to."54

Major Thompson told Captain Jones that he didn't think it would come to that, because he "was joining a group of pilots in the squadron who had also made the same statement."55

The Leaders

The staff at the squadron level began to take action when Captain Jones reported the events to Major Thompson, the squadron Ops officer. Major Thompson had also already seen a videotape taken from the ground during the photography session the previous day and was aware of the severity and degree of the infractions. Although he was admittedly a good friend of Bud Holland, Major Don Thompson had seen enough. He immediately went to the Squadron Commander, Lt Col Mark McGeehan. Major Thompson recalls, "I had an intense gut feeling that things were getting desperate ... I said 'I feel like I'm stabbing a friend in the back. I like (Lt) Col Holland but we need to remove him from flying. That Yakima flight needs to be his fini-flight.' I guess I was just trying to protect Bud Holland from Bud Holland."56 The Squadron Commander concurred with his Ops officer, but it was agreed that in order to restrict the wing Chief of Stan-Eva1 from flying, the order would have to come from the DO. Lt Col Mark McGeehan went to see Col Pellerin. At the meeting, Lt Col McGeehan laid the facts on the table and made his recommendation to ground Bud Holland. The DO thanked him and said he would get back to him with a decision after he had heard the other side of the story. Colonel Pellerin consulted with Lt Col Holland and was told that he (Holland) was just trying to demonstrate aircraft capabilities to the more junior crewmembers. Lt Col Holland was verbally reprimanded by Col Pellerin (undocumented) and promised not to break any more regulations in the future. The DO then called a meeting with Lt Col Holland and Lt Col McGeehan to announce his decision. He informed them both that he had reprimandedLt Col Holland but that he had decided against any restriction on his flying. At that point, Lt Col McGeehan made a decision to restrict his crews from flying with Lt Col Holland unless he was in the aircraft. According to his wife "Mark said afterwards that he knew that he was not going to let (Lt) Col Holland fly with anybody else unless he was in the airplane ... that he was going to be flying whenever Bud flew."57 He was true to his word.

Analysis

The squadron leadership at the 325th BMS performed admirably. After acquiring the facts and evidence, the squadron senior staff reached a logical conclusion and made an ethical and appropriate decision. They attempted to use the chain of command to enforce established standards and upchanneled the information to the appropriate level. After the decision of the DO was rendered, they saluted smartly and went about taking actions that were within their purview, in an attempt to do what they could to keep everyone safe.

There were two apparent failures at the DO level. First, Col Pellerin did not obtain all of the available information. He did not view the videotape of the event, and he did not contact previous senior wing leaders to ascertain if Lt Col Holland had a history of airmanship problems. This leadership error was not unique in the history of the 92d Bomb Wing. When confronted with clear evidence of willful violations of regulations, Colonel Pellerin did not take proactive action to prevent a
reoccurrence. Once again, the unrecorded verbal reprimand was the extent of the disciplinary action. By failing to take further action, the DO had set the stage for a bizarre and dangerous situation. Two men (Lt Col McGeehan and Holland) who were professionally at odds, were to be paired in the cockpit for the next several months. Lt Col McGeehan had confided in his wife that he did not trust Bud Holland to fly with his aircrews. Captain Eric Jones related the following encounter with Lt Col Holland (after the DO’s decision):

I was sitting there and he came over and said “That little f---er,” referring to Lt Col McGeehan, “tried to get me grounded. But I solved that, the three of us.” And Lt Col Holland told me, speaking directed at Lt Col McGeehan, that he didn’t respect him as a man, as a commander, or as a pilot. Apparently Lt Col McGeehan had said something about him being dangerous and Lt Col Holland indicated that he told him that he was just a “weak dick.”

The DO had not adequately considered the implications of his actions when he allowed Bud Holland to continue to fly. Within his Operations Group there was, in essence, a small mutiny going on. Many of the crewmembers were no longer willing to fly with his Chief of Standards and Evaluation, even under orders. He had alienated his Bomb squadron commander, who was now having to spend time tracking the flying schedule of Bud Holland, to ensure that his crewmembers were not put in the unenviable position of choosing between risking their careers or risking their lives. The DO’s last error was that he failed to pass either the information or his decision up to the wing commander, Colonel Brooks, who remained unaware of the entire situation.

The Command Climate at Fairchild AFB in Early 1994

The Yakima mission brought to a head many emotions that had been lying beneath the surface at Fairchild. In addition to the problems in the Operations Group, the antics of Bud Holland were being discussed by the officer’s wives, civilians, and even on the high school playground.

The rift that existed between Lt Col McGeehan and Lt Col Holland extended beyond the men themselves. A B-52 aircraft commander stated “Everybody was lining up on one side or the other, Bud had his groupies, and then there were the rest of us.” The effects and strain was also felt by Lt Col McGeehan’s wife Jodi, who related a conversation she had with Bud Holland’s wife, Sarah Ann. “I was at Donna Pellerin’s going away luncheon and I never really had a chance to meet Sarah in the whole year ... somebody mentions something about one of the air shows, and Sarah Ann just turned to me and she said ‘You know, there is not anybody that could do anything to stop my husband from flying the way he wants to fly.’” The children were no more exempt from the controversy than were the wives. Patrick McGeehan, Mark and Jodi’s oldest son came home from school one day extremely angry at Victoria Harper, the daughter of the Lt Col Steve Harper, the Deputy Operations Group Commander. When his mother asked him why he was so upset he replied, “Well all year long she just kept telling me that the best pilot in the squadron was Colonel Bud Holland ... it annoyed me, but the thing that really annoys me the most now is that she said that if anybody is going to roll the B-52, Bud Holland is going to be the one to do it, and I can just see him doing it some day.”

There is also some evidence to suggest that the local civilian community was aware of the controversy swirling around Lt Col Holland’s flying practices. One civilian complained to the local TV station that a B-52 was in 60 to 70 degrees of bank over the local supermarket in Airway Heights.

But it was the crew force morale that was most affected. Captain Shawn Fleming, an B-52 instructor pilot and a weapons school graduate, was an opinion leader within the squadron, and summed up the feelings many 325th BMS aviators had about Lt Col Holland’s airmanship, and the wing leadership’s actions related to it.

Everybody had a Col Holland scare story. Col Holland was kind of like a lazy sot ... the parents say "Ignore her..." and the hypocrisy was amazing. For him to be in the position of the Chief of Standardization ... is unconscionable. When Col Holland did something ... he’s patted on the back by the leadership, "Good Show." What’s the crew force supposed to learn from that? You got the “He’s about to retire” (and) “That’s Bud Holland, he has more hours in the B-52 than you do sleeping.” Yeah, he might have that many hours, but he became complacent, reckless, and willfully violated regulations.

By June 1994, the command climate at Fairchild Air Force Base was one of distrust and hostility. “Everybody was just trying to get out of here.” In spite of these facts, Lt Col Holland was selected by Col Pellerin to perform the 1994 air show. “It was a non-issue,” Pellerin said. “Bud was Mr. Air show.”
Situation Seven: Air Show Practice  
17 June 1994

Lt Col Holland and the accident crew flew the first of two scheduled practice sessions for the 1994 air show. The profile was exactly the same as the accident mission except that two profiles were flown. Once again they included large bank angles and high pitch climbs in violation of ACC regulations and technical order guidance. The wing commander, Col Brooks, had directed that the bank angles be limited to 45 degrees and the pitch to 25 degrees. These were still in excess of regulations and technical order guidance. Both profiles flown during this practice exceeded the wing commander’s stated guidance. However, at the end of the practice session, Col Pellerin, the DO, told the wing commander that “the profile looks good to him; looks very safe, well within parameters.”

The Followers
Because the 325th BMS was scheduled to close, most of the bomb squadron crewmembers had already been transferred to new assignments. But those that remained were not comfortable with the situation. In fact, one of the squadron navigators refused to fly the air show if Lt Col Holland was going to be flying. This required the ranking navigator in the 325th BMS, Lt Col Huston, to be the navigator for the air show and practice missions. Major Thompson, the squadron Operations Officer was also uneasy. “I had this fear that he was again going to get into the airshow ... that he was going to try something again, ridiculous maybe and kill thousands of people.”

It wasn’t just the flyers that were getting nervous. Lt Col (Dr) Robert Grant, the 92d Air Refueling Squadron Flight Surgeon, was told by a crewmember during a routine appointment, that he refused to fly with Lt Col Holland. This, coupled with a concern that Lt Col Holland was scheduled to fly in the 1994 air show, led Dr. Grant to take his concerns to both the 92d Bomb Wing Chief of Safety, Lt Col Mike McCullough, and to Dr. Issak, the Chief of Aeromedical Services at Fairchild. The Chief of Safety told Dr. Grant that “Lt Col Holland was a good pilot and that the maneuvers had been done before.” Dr. Issak did not pursue the issue after he learned that Dr. Grant had spoken to the wing safety officer.

Major Theresa Cochran, the nurse manager in emergency services, attended an air show planning session in which Lt Col Holland briefed that he planned to fly 65 degree bank turns. The wing commander quickly told him that he would be limited to 45 degrees maximum. Major Cochran recalls Lt Col Holland’s response in a prophetic discussion between her and a co-worker who was also in attendance at the planning session.

Colonel Holland’s initial reaction was to brag that he could crank it pretty tight ... he said he could crank it tight and pop up starting at 200 (knots). Bob and I looked at each other, and Bob is going, “He’s f--ed,”, and I said “I just hope he crashes on Friday, not Sunday, so I will not have so many bodies to pick up.”... those words did return to haunt me.

The Leaders
During the planning session briefing on June 15, Lt Col Holland briefed using overhead slides (see Appendix). As the briefing progressed, Col Brooks, the wing commander, made clear that (1) there would be no formation flight, (2) bank angles would be limited to 45 degrees, and (3) that pitch angles would be limited to 25 degrees. Although the slides and briefing clearly indicated that a part of the demonstration would include a “wingover,” there was curiously no discussion on this point. Although Lt Col Holland was clearly not pleased with the wing commander’s guidance, there is no doubt that he left the briefing with an understanding of what the commander’s guidance was. During the practice mission, the commander’s guidance was repeatedly violated, but was not reported as such by Col Pellerin, the DO to the wing commander. The wing commander had only personally witnessed a small portion of the practice, because he was at a rehearsal for a retirement ceremony for the outgoing Base Commander. Lt Col Ballog, who was serving as the Commander of Troops on the parade field at this rehearsal, recalls Col Brooks making a negative comment about the portion of the air show practice that he was able to see. “The comment was basically, that this was not supposed to be happening ... not a part of the agenda ... that he (Lt Col Holland) was too low and banking over too hard ... which were contrary to guidance that had been put out.” In spite of this personal observation, no action was taken following the report of “well within parameters” by the DO upon landing from the practice session.

Analysis
Once again, there was incongruity between senior leadership words and actions. After stat-
ing that certain safety criteria (which still ex-
ceeded regulatory and T.O. guidance) regarding
bank and pitch angles would be followed, the
senior leadership personally witnessed the viola-
tions. The DO witnessed them from the aircraft
and the wing commander witnessed them from

On Monday, the 20th of June, disaster did strike
Fairchild AFB, but it was not the one that is the focus of
this analysis. A lone gunman entered the base
hospital and killed several Air Force members before
being shot and killed by a security police officer
responding to the scene. Understandably, the air
show and all preparations for it were immediately put
on hold. After some discussion, it was determined
that going ahead with the air show would aid in the
healing process of the personnel still at the base, and
so another practice session was scheduled for the
morning of 24 June.

the ground. Both undoubtedly knew that the de-
vviations were intentional. Lt Col Holland's un-
questioned flying skills ruled out the possibility
that these overbanks and excess pitch angles
were simply slip ups or errors. Yet no action was
taken.

It appears that at this point, the leadership had
given up on enforcing standards with regards to
Lt Col Holland. Further, they appeared to be un-
able to read an atmosphere of impending disas-
ter that permeated nearly every aspect of the 92d
Bomb Wing.

On that morning, Secretary of the Air Force
Sheila Widnall and United States Congressman
Tom Foley visited the base, so the takeoff for the
practice session was delayed until the afternoon.
At 1335 Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), Czar 52 tax-
iied to runway 23 for departure. At 1416 PDT, the
aircraft impacted the ground killing all aboard.
Section Four: Conclusions and Implications

Leadership exists in direct proportion to the degree to which subordinates are willing to follow. Leadership is a social phenomenon. When followers cease to follow, leaders cease to lead. This is true even if the “leaders” hold high military ranks and fill positions of great power and responsibility. To a large degree, this was what had occurred within the 92d Bomb Wing at Fairchild AFB in the early 1990s. Describing what occurred is interesting and insightful, but determining why it occurred is absolutely essential if we are to avoid similar catastrophes in the future. Using the questions posed in Section One of this study, the following conclusions were reached.

Followers Stopped Following

Just as “up” has no meaning without the concept of “down,” leadership must be defined in terms of followership. On an individual basis, Lt Col Holland refused to follow written regulations and B-52 tech orders, as well as ignoring the verbal orders and guidance given by the Wing Commanders and DOs. Even when verbal reprimands and counseling sessions focused on the specific problem of airmanship, he steadfastly refused to follow their guidance. At one point, only weeks prior to the accident, he clearly stated his feelings on the issue of guidance from senior officers.

I'm going to fly the air show and yeah, I may have someone senior in rank flying with me, ... he may be the boss on the ground, but I'm the boss in the air and I'll do what I want to do.74

The aircrews quickly perceived this as an integrity problem within the leadership. The flyers, and eventually other members in the wing, simply lost faith in the leadership’s ability to deal with the problem. Capt Brett Dugue summed up the crewmember’s frustration this way. “You’ve got to be kidding me, if they allowed him to fly a 50-foot fly-by at a change of command, do you think me telling anybody about him flying low at IR 300 is going to do any good?”75 As a result of this loss of faith the aircrews began to employ other survival techniques, such as feigning illness and openly refusing to fly with Lt Col Holland.

The lesson learned and implication for current and future commanders is that trust is built by congruence between word and deed at all levels. Subordinates are quick to pick up on any disconnect. They are closer to the action, have more time on their hands, and love to analyze their leaders. Retired Air Force General Perry Smith writes, “Without trust and mutual respect among leaders and subordinate leaders, a large organization will suffer from a combination of poor performance and low morale.”76 He was right on target in this case.

Standards Were Not Enforced

A rogue aviator was allowed, for over three years, to operate with a completely different set of rules than those applied to the rest of the wing aviators. The institutional integrity of the 92d Bomb Wing leadership was severely damaged by this unwillingness to act. The entire leadership structure of Fairchild Air Force Base (above the squadron level) appeared to be operating in a state of denial, hoping for the best until the base closed or Lt Col Holland retired. Why? Either the wing leadership did not understand or know that the rules were being violated, or they chose not to apply them uniformly. The first case illustrates possible negligence and incompetence; the second hints at a lack of integrity.

In the words of retired army Lt Gen Calvin Walker, “Bad news doesn’t improve with age.”77 Leaders must act upon information or evidence of noncompliance. If they elect not to act, they should communicate their reasons for not doing so. Failure to do either invites second guessing and criticism, often eroding the critical element of trust between the leader and the led. Leaders must also learn to recognize the traits of the rogue aviator, for while Lt Col Holland stood out like a beacon, many others still operate today to a lesser degree.

A Key Position Was Filled with the Wrong Person

Selecting an aviator who exercised poor airmanship as the Chief of Stan Eval was a poor choice, but leaving him there after multiple flagrant and willful violations of regulations sent an extremely negative message to the rest of the
The crash of Czar 52, like most accidents, was part of a chain of events. These events were facilitated through the failed policies of several senior leaders at the 92d Bomb Wing. These failures included an inability to recognize and correct the actions of a single rogue aviator, which eventually led to an unhealthy command climate and the disintegration of trust between leaders and subordinates. However, in most aircraft mishaps, the crash is the final domino to drop in the cause and effect chain of events. In this case, however, scores of young and impressionable aviators "grew up" watching a rogue aviator as their role model for over three years. They remain on active flying status in various Air Force wings, pass-

One recommended technique when there is little or no overlap of commanders, is for the outgoing leader to make an audio tape and file for the incoming leader detailing any problem areas or "skeletons in the closet" that would lend continuity to an organization during the crucial transition period. In any case, critical information must be passed along to preserve the "corporate memory" and integrity of a command position.

Leaders Did Not Keep Open Channels of Communication

In some cases, the problem was blatant and obvious, such as the DO who told a subordinate "I don't want to know about any video. I don't care," after the Global Power mission. In other cases it was more subtle. The fact that the DO did not inform the Wing Commander of the Yakima Bomb Range issue, with the resultant request for Lt Col Holland's grounding, begs the question "Why didn't he tell the boss?" Would the Wing Commander have made the same decision to keep Lt Col Holland flying? Perhaps the DO did not want to "air dirty laundry" outside of the Ops Group, or perhaps the Wing Commander was unapproachable with bad news. These are purely speculative statements, but are mentioned here to get the reader to analyze similar traits in themselves or leaders they have worked for, and to emphasize the importance of communication throughout the chain of command. This is especially important now that there are Brigadier Generals as wing commanders throughout the Air Force. The flag rank adds a new factor to the communication equation and can make it much more difficult for subordinate[s] to feel comfortable bringing the bad news to the boss.

A Final Perspective

The Senior Leadership Positions Did Not Speak with Continuity

That is to say that when an individual Wing Commander or DO issued an ultimatum, like "If you do this again, I will ground you," they did not pass this information along to their replacement. Consequently, new commanders were left having to deal with the problem as if [it] were new. Lt Col Holland undoubtedly viewed this situation like a "get out of jail free" card, a new commander or DO equaled a fresh start. While outgoing leaders didn't fulfill their responsibility to inform new commanders, incoming commanders didn't ask the right questions.

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ing along what they have learned. Because of this, the final domino in this chain of events may not yet have fallen.

Endnotes

All Endnotes that include Tab numbers, for example "V-21 7," refer to the USAF 110-14 Accident Investigation Board Report of the B-52 Mishap at Fairchild AFB, 24 June 1994.

1. Telephone interview with Major Kramer (pseudonym), 16 Dec 94. Pseudonym used for prologue continuity. Actual name withheld by request.
4. Medical Statement to the Accident Board from 93rd Med Group/SGP, 19 Aug 94
5. As a rest of ethical soundness, Lt Gen (Ret) Waller asked himself the question "If this came out in the newspaper, could I defend my actions as honorable?"
6. Personal interview, Captain Pilot who preferred to remain anonymous, 525th BMS.
7. Aeronautical Order (PA) Aviation Service, 92d Bombardment Wing, Combat Support Group, 10 Mar 89.
8. Col Compotosti, V-3.3.
10. Col Ruotsala, V-6.3.
13. Captain Brett Dugue, B-52 Aircraft Commander, V-27.10.
15. Mr. Al Brown, Former B-52 instructor pilot, V-32.3.
17. Personal interview, Captain B-52 Pilot who preferred to remain anonymous, 525th BS.
20. The author was present at the post-mission debriefing in which this comment was made.
24. AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board, AA-2.7.
25. AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board, Vol 1, Executive Summary, p. 5.
26. Personal interview, Captain Pilot who preferred to remain anonymous, 525th BMS.
27. Col Julich, V-7.3.
29. Col Capotosti, V-3.10.
32. Capt Donnelly, V-26.18.
33. Air Combat Command Message, DTG281158Z Feb. 94.
34. Capt Donnelly, V-26.20.
36. Capt Donnelly, V-26.23. According to Capt Donnelly, Lt Col Bullock stated, "This is the blackmail part." and went on to say that the wing commander knew about the video and wanted to court martial Capt Donnelly, but he (Lt Col Bullock) stepped in to prevent it. However, if Capt Donnelly did not take the job in scheduling, Lt Col Bullock would see to it that the court martial went through. It was later discovered that the wing commander was unaware of the existence of the videotape and had no intention of court martialing Capt Donnelly.
38. Lt Col Bullock, V-1.1.
40. Capt Donnelly, V-26.29.
41. Capt Donnelly, V-26.32.
42. Capt Donnelly, V-26.12.
43. Capt Donnelly, V-26.12. This airspeed is approximately 80 knots below minimum inflight airspeed for flaps up maneuvering in the B-52. If the seventy knot figure is accurate, the aircraft had already stopped flying and the resultant "recovery" was merely a fortunate pitch down into the recovery zone. The aircraft could just as easily departed controlled flight.
44. Capt Al Brown, V-32.7.
45. BG Richards, V-1.4.
46. BG Richards, V-1.8.
47. BG Richards, V-1.6.
49. Personal Interview, Captain B-52 Pilot who preferred to remain anonymous, 325th BMS.
53. Capt Jones, V-28.11.
56. Maj Thompson, V-21.7.
57. Mrs. Jodi McGeehan, V-33.3.
59. Personal Interview, Captain B-52 Pilot who preferred to remain anonymous, 325th BMS.
60. Mrs. Jodi McGeehan, V-33.4.
63. Capt Fleming, V-38.7.
64. Personal interview, Captain B-52 Pilot who preferred to remain anonymous, 325th BMS.
68. Dr. Grant V-14.7.
69. Dr. Issak, V-41.
70. Maj Cochran, V-19.7.
71. Col Brooks, V-2.15-16.
72. Lt Col Ballog, V-9.3.
74. Maj Thompson, V-21.1 0.
75. Capt Dugue, V-25.20.
77. Lt Gen (Ret) Waller, CGSC lecture slides.
78. Former B-52 instructor pilot, name withheld by request.
Davis-Monthan AFB, Adz. (AFNS)—Air Force Col. William E. Pellerin was sentenced to forfeit $1,500 per month for five months and to receive a written reprimand May 22 after being found guilty of two allegations of dereliction of duty associated with his performance of duty as commander of the 92nd Operations Group at Fairchild AFB, Wash., last year.

Pellerin had pleaded guilty to the two offenses in a military judge alone proceeding on May 19. His plea was part of a pretrial agreement in which he offered to plead guilty to the two offenses in exchange for a third offense being dismissed and limitations on the amount of punishment which could be imposed.

By law, the agreed-upon punishment limitations were not disclosed to the judge until after he announced his own adjudicated sentence. However, the pretrial agreement's sentence limitation will not affect the judge's announced sentence, because the judge's sentence did not exceed the agreed limits.

The first dereliction of duty of which Pellerin was found guilty involved failure to obtain required higher headquarters approvals for aerial maneuvers and failing to ensure that maximum bank angles were not exceeded in airshow-related flights. The second dereliction involved failure to make adequate inquiry into a pilot's qualifications to perform flying duties after becoming aware of issues concerning the pilot's airmanship and air discipline.

The pilot and crew died in a B-52 crash in 1994 while practicing for an airshow at Fairchild.

The offense that was dismissed was an allegation that the accused had been derelict in his duties by failing to remove the pilot from flying duties.