AIR FORCE CORE VALUES GURU'S GUIDE

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Prepared by Lt Col Pat Tower and Lt Col Doug Dunford, this in-depth guide was used during the initial promulgation of the Core Values throughout the Air Force. There is much of value here for those interested in further education or the history of the initiative.

Table of Contents

Chapter I. The Core Values Initiative: An Introduction 3
Chapter II. The Field Wave 13
Chapter III. The Schoolhouse Weave 21
Chapter IV. The Continuation Phase 29
Chapter V. Doctrine 35
Chapter VI. Supporting Ideas 44
Chapter VII. Active Learning 48
Appendix 1. Tables A-F 61
Appendix 2. Global Engagement 76
Appendix 3. Comprehensive Lesson Plan 84

CHAPTER I

THE CORE VALUES INITIATIVE: AN INTRODUCTION

A. HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE

The Air Force Core Values initiative has a history—a history that goes back at least 25 years, and some people argue that it goes back to the late 1950's. Although it was not until January of 1995 that the Air Force officially embraced the specific formulation we have today—*Integrity first*, *Service before self*, and *Excellence in all we do*—the Air Force has been wrestling with the Core Values and arguing about their significance for a very long time.

1972 (NOV): Following the scandal involving General Lavelle and his alleged illegal air war over North Vietnam, then-Chief of Staff John D. Ryan sends his commanders a policy letter dealing with the importance of integrity (entire letter is in box at right).

> Integrity—which includes full and accurate disclosure—is the keystone of military service. Integrity in reporting, for example, is the link that connects each flight crew, each specialist, and each administrator to the commander in chief. In any crisis, decisions and risks taken by the highest national authorities depend, in large part, on reported military capabilities and achievements. In the same way, every commander depends on accurate reporting from his forces. Unless he is positive of the integrity of his people, a commander cannot have confidence in his forces. Without integrity, the commander in chief cannot have confidence in us.
>
> Therefore, we may not compromise our integrity—our truthfulness. To do so is not only unlawful but also degrading. False reporting is a clear example of a failure of integrity. Any order to compromise integrity is not a lawful order.
>
> Integrity is the most important responsibility of command. Commanders are dependent on the integrity of those reporting to them in every decision they make. Integrity can be ordered but it can only be achieved by encouragement and example. General John D. Ryan

1980/1: During the very early 1980's, the Academy's Dean of the Faculty searches for a set of principles that would capture the personal standards he wished to enforce. As a result, he arrives at an early expression of the Core Values involving integrity, service, and excellence.

Early 1990's: Then-Chief of Staff McPeak publishes six Air Force Core Values: integrity, courage, competence, tenacity, service, and patriotism.

1994: In an effort to strengthen its character development efforts, the Academy rejuvenates the Core Values and refines them into *Integrity first*, *Service before self*, and *Excellence in all we do*.

1995 (JAN): The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, delivers a speech to the opening session of the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE) in which she announces she is contemplating streamlining the Air Force Core Values from the six identified by General McPeak to the three adopted by the Academy in 1994.

1995 (JAN): Joint Publication 1 (*Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*) is issued. The second chapter is entitled "Values in Joint Warfare" (chapter excerpt, box at right).

> Our military service is based on values—those standards that American military experience has proven to be the bedrock of combat success. These values are common to all the Services and represent the essence of our professionalism. This chapter discusses those values that have a special impact on joint matters.
>
> First and always is integrity. In the case of joint action, as within a Service, integrity is the cornerstone for building trust. We know as members of the Armed Forces that whatever the issue at hand, we can count on each other to say what we mean and do what we say. This allows us to rely with confidence on others to carry out assigned tasks. This is an enormous advantage for building effective teams.

1995 (MAY): Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman publish a policy letter identifying the Air Force Core Values as *Integrity first*, *Service before self*, and *Excellence in all we do*. For the next year they give several speeches in which they identify the Core Values and emphasize their crucial importance to the Air Force and the American people.

1996 (APR): General Fogleman directs AETC/CC, General Boles, and USAFA/CC, Lt Gen Stein, to form the Core Values Strategy Panel (**CVSP**) (box at left, below). AETC/ED, members of the Air Staff, and several other competent authorities are invited to participate on the panel and its associated working group.

25 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR AETC/CC USAFA/CC

FROM: HQ USAF/CC
PENTAGON
Washington, DC

SUBJ: Air Force Core Values

For the past several months the Secretary and I have emphasized Core Values as the cornerstone of who we are and what we do. We've spread this word throughout the force among officers, enlisted, and civilians.

Now we need to bring this together into a coherent, corporate Air Force strategy. We need to do it by adding the themes of Integrity, Service, and Excellence to officer, enlisted, and civilian training and education programs across the Air Force. This strategy must address Core Values in the accession stage and build upon this foundation in the training and education processes, tailoring the focus each step of the way. Such a career-long approach to Core Values will help frame our strategic direction and bolster the professional and personal stature of our people by applying in real, meaningful, and practical terms Core Values concepts at every level.

Please put together a conceptual plan suitable for CORONA TOP. It should reinforce our Core Values at every stage of professional development and leverage the work already underway. Following that presentation I anticipate a full court press with progress updates at subsequent CORONAs.

(signed)
RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

1996 (JUN): CORONA Top receives an initial description of the proposed Core Values implementation plan.

1996 (OCT): CORONA Fall receives and approves the final conception of the Core Values implementation plan, including its three phases, web site, supporting publication, and oversight committee.

1996 (NOV): CSAF kicks off the Field portion of the initiative at General Officers calls held in the continental United States and overseas.

1996 (NOV): The Secretary and Chief of Staff unveil *Global Engagement: A Vision For the 21st Century*, which expresses where the Air Force is heading in the coming decades and how it will get there. The Core Values are discussed at length in two different places in this document, and they are discussed in such a way as to leave no doubt about their continuing, critical importance to the Air Force mission as it is defined by the challenges of the next century. Far from being empty slogans, the Core Values are deemed essential to mission accomplishment.

1996 (DEC): Training of cadre begins.

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Several lessons can be taken from this history—lessons that have a direct bearing on the nature and purpose of the initiative itself.

***First**, the Air Force Core Values dialogue has been going on for a very long time.* Sometimes (unfortunately) the dialogue has been fueled by the eruption of a sensational scandal in the press (for example, the Lavelle affair, the Fairchild B-52 crash, the Blackhawk shoot down, the Ramstein CT-43 accident), *but more often than not, the quest for an adequate formulation of the Core Values has been driven by a desire to provide the force the vision and guidance it needs to accomplish the mission in the face of future challenges*. (The search for the right expression of the Core Values is similar to the search for the best instrument to navigate a ship: Do we use gyroscopes? Do we use GPS receivers? Both? Something else? And once we have identified the NAVAIDS that are best for us, how do we know they are being properly followed and maintained?) In other words, what we learn from the efforts of the Academy, General McPeak, Secretary Widnall, and General Fogleman is that the search for the Core Values has an important, pro-active function for the senior leadership: the Core Values help to organize and steer our efforts in the direction the senior leaders deem to be best.

***Second**, the Core Values have been and remain a special interest item for the most senior leaders of the organization.* Three Chiefs of Staff and a Secretary have recognized their importance for the Air Force as a whole, and the importance placed on them at the most recent CORONA is ample testament to their importance to all of the current senior leaders of the Air Force.

***Third**, the senior leadership of the Air Force and the Department of Defense have come to a consensus as to the nature of the Core Values and their essential importance in defining professionalism.* The Core Values are described as essential or indispensable and as playing a crucial role in our basic capacity to defend the Constitution of the United States. Over and over again, the senior leadership has told us the Core Values point to something substantial, unchanging, timeless, fundamental, and foundational—something without which we will fail to do our jobs. This point is made clearly by the excerpt from *Global Engagement*, which is found in the box above, right. The information in the box at right appears in *Global Engagement* after that section in which we are told that "*In the future, any military or civilian member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space power will be considered an operator.*" In other words, the nature of the Air Force team will

A FORCE GROUNDED IN CORE VALUES

The ideals embodied in the Air Force core values are:

Integrity first
Service before self
Excellence in all we do

They are universally prescriptive. Despite the uncertainty of the future, the Air Force can say with certainty that today and tomorrow, it must live up to these ideals or it cannot live up to its responsibilities. Our core values are fundamental and timeless in nature, and reach across the entire force. Our core values are values for service, values for life, and must be reflected in everything that we do.

A values-based Air Force is characterized by cohesive units, manned with people who exhibit loyalty, who want to belong, and who act in a manner consistent with Air Force core values, even under conditions of high stress. To ensure this values-based Air Force, three elements—education, leadership and accountability—provide a framework to establish the strongest imprint of shared Air Force core values. In the Air Force of tomorrow, as in the Air Force of today, these stated and practiced values must be identical.

The Air Force will continue to reinforce its core values in all aspects of its education and training. The goal is to provide one hundred percent of the Total Force with core values education and training continually throughout a career. The Air and Space Basic Course will also ensure that the Air Force's future leaders, military and civilian, have a common, shared foundation in core values, doctrine, and operations.

change in the near future. Civilians, contractors, Guard, and Reserve members will be shouldering burdens now carried by the active, uniformed force. As a result, we can no longer afford the old and somewhat obsolete concept that a professional can only be a commissioned officer. The newer conception focuses on what you can do, and what you can do is a combination of how you have been trained and what character traits you possess. That is, the newer conception is based on the Core Values. If you possess integrity and place it first among your priorities; if you practice service before self in the genuine sense; and if you strive for excellence in all you do—then and only then are you a professional.

***Finally**, even though the Core Values dialogue stretches back over more than half of our independent history, we are entering a new, more dynamic phase in the relationship between the Core Values and the members of the force*. The dialogue about the Core Values and their meaning must continue, but we must also now take steps to ensure they are actively accepted and followed across the force. Something far more important than individual reputations or careers is at stake.

B. SNAPSHOT OF THE INITIATIVE

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the Core Values initiative is to take those prudent, common sense steps that will ensure we have (as *Global Engagement* puts it) *"a values-based Air Force . . . characterized by cohesive units, manned with people who exhibit loyalty, who want to belong, and who act in a manner consistent with Air Force core values, even under conditions of high stress."*

2. STRATEGY

The strategy of the Core Values initiative (as General Fogleman's letter to AETC/CC and USAFA/CC puts it) "must address Core Values in the accession stage and build upon this foundation in the training and education processes, tailoring the focus each step of the way. … It should reinforce our Core Values at every stage of professional development and leverage the work already underway."

3. METHOD

The method to be used by the strategy also is hinted at in the letter from General Fogleman to AETC/CC and USAFA/CC: such a career-long approach to Core Values will help frame our strategic direction and bolster the professional and personal stature of our people by applying in real, meaningful, and practical terms Core Values concepts at every level. The four key words in this statement are 'applying'; 'real'; 'meaningful'; and 'practical', which set the parameters for the method we employ.

That method is active learning, which brings the Air Force Core Values initiative into complete alignment with the recommendations of the so-called "Cheney Report", which is due to be released to Congress in early 1997. Page 20 of the 12 July 1996 draft of that report contains an extended discussion that is found in the box at the top of the next page.

The Air Force Core Values initiative goes beyond the Cheney Report's recommendations, however, in two critical respects. First, active learning will be used to instruct all Air Force members in the Core Values. Second, as Chapter VIII of this Guru's Guide makes clear, our definition of active learning goes well beyond free-wheeling discussions. In fact, the Air Force Core Values initiative recognizes seven different types, each of which has a special role to play.

> . . . ethics instruction should be customized to correspond to the real-life demands of an officer's next assignment and level of command.
>
> At each plateau of ethical instruction, active learning models based on free-wheeling seminars and discussion should take precedence over more passive lecture courses. As one instructor emphasized, "ethics are best caught, not taught." Officers need to refine how they think about important ethical issues, wrestling along with their fellow officers with the moral dilemmas presented by real-world case studies.
>
> The essential ingredient of each ethics course should be a commitment to pull officers out of "group think," and to give them an opportunity to reflect on ethical questions free from the pressures and demands of an operational environment. In their PME experiences they should continue to be presented with moral controversies, exposed to other points of view, and engaged in reasoned argument about what is "right" and "wrong" in the context of modern military operations.
>
> As officers advance through the PME system, and climb the hierarchy of command, ethics instruction should emphasize the increased ethical and moral responsibilities they assume. —*Professional Military Education (PME): An Asset For Peace and Progress* (Draft), 12 July 1996, Center For Strategic and International Studies (The Cheney Report)

4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

From the very start of the Core Values Strategy Panel's deliberations it was clear that certain important rules of engagement would have to be observed:

1. *Another wrinkled-poster-on-the-wall program will not be successful.* Such programs have been unsuccessful in the past, and such a program could not meet the requirement that the initiative must "bolster the professional and personal stature of our people by applying in real, meaningful, and practical terms Core Values concepts at every level."

2. *Training and education programs alone cannot deliver "a values-based Air Force . . . characterized by cohesive units, manned with people who exhibit loyalty, who want to belong, and who act in a manner consistent with Air Force core values, even under conditions of high stress."* Both the Schoolhouse and the Field must be involved in the initiative because the Field can undermine in 10 minutes what it took the Schoolhouse weeks to build. Therefore, the strategy we develop must enlist the full and unreserved collaboration of the Field with the Schoolhouse.

3. *If the Field and the Schoolhouse are both required for the success of the initiative, then the strategy we develop must address the special needs of each of those functional areas and closely coordinate their activities.*

4. Common Air Force Core Values doctrine must be universally available to our people, written in plain language, and easy to carry so it can be applied at a moment's notice. We must all read from the same sheet of music, and we must understand what we are reading.

5. *The success or failure of the Core Values initiative will be determined by the behavior of Air Force leaders, from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to the flight level.* An Air Force leader can be anyone who steps forward with the courage to do the right thing. An Air Force leader is anyone—officer, enlisted, civilian—with the gumption to take the lead. Therefore, the Core Values strategy must encourage value-driven leadership from all directions and echelons. If we all read from the same sheet of music, then the song sung by leaders must be the same as ours, and the voices of leaders must be the strongest, the purest, and most constantly on pitch.

6. *We must not assume that we know in advance whether or not a unit or person is truly values-driven; past programs have failed because they pushed rigid solutions resting on false diagnoses*. We don't want to be in the business if fixing what isn't broken or correcting what isn't the cause of a problem. Thus, the initiative must carry with it the capacity to accurately diagnose and flexibly respond to the conditions discovered. If we already have *"a values-based Air Force . . . characterized by cohesive units, manned with people who exhibit loyalty, who want to belong, and who act in a manner consistent with Air Force core values, even under conditions of high stress"* (and there are persons in the ranks who believe we do have such a force), then the initiative has very little to do beyond the diagnosis stage.

7. *We must aggressively include all members of the Air Force team in this initiative.* No one is exempt from the ideals of excellence, selflessness, or integrity. Civilians, enlisted personnel, officers, and contractors must be educated in the Core Values and expected to walk this talk.

8. *If the Core Values are "the bedrock of military success" (as expressed by Joint Pub 1), then the Core Values initiative must be one that continues indefinitely into the future*. In the arena of national defense, we can never rest on our laurels or ever just assume that we can do the job. We must be ever-vigilant that a values-driven Air Force, once achieved, is maintained into perpetuity. Of course, given the fact that the care and feeding of the Core Values historically has been the prerogative of senior leadership, the perpetuation of the dialogue about the Core Values seems likely in any case, initiative or not.

9. *Given that our people are outstanding in all other ways, we also must assume (until proven otherwise) that they are inclined to follow the Core Values; our first order of business is to ensure we have an environment for ethical success.* That is, we want first to create an environment in which good people can thrive and set the example for those who are unsure about their acceptance of the Core Values.

5. ARCHITECTURE

The initiative has three major architectural components. The first of these components pertains specifically to the operational or field units of the Air Force. The second component pertains specifically to the classroom or schoolhouse units of the Air Force. And the third component is a mechanism that will (a) coordinate the efforts of the field and the schoolhouse and (b) ensure the perpetuation of the initiative. The first component is called the "Field Weave"; the second component is called the "Schoolhouse Weave"; and the third component is the "Continuation Phase." *As Global Engagement makes clear, "to ensure this values-based Air Force, three elements—education, leadership and accountability—provide a framework to establish the strongest imprint of shared Air Force core values."* ***The***



Schoolhouse Weave provides for most of the education element; the Field Weave covers most of the leadership element; and the Continuation Phase provides for the greatest amount of accountability element. Nevertheless, all three of these elements are at work in all three of the architectural components of the Core Values initiative.

a) "Field Weave"

The purpose of the Field component of the initiative is to ensure that the Core Values are woven into the operations of the Air Force and that they are actively supported and applied by all of our personnel in the operational environment. There are three basic parts of the Field component: the so-called top-down or "Command Cascade" portion, the so-called bottom-up or "Impediment Removal" portion, and the continuation plan.

The purpose of the command cascade is to get the word out to all persons in the force who are not presently enrolled in a formal training or education program. Each commander at each echelon will teach a core values lesson to subordinates in which the commander's personal commitment to the Core Values is underscored and the Core Values initiative itself is explained. *Commanders may not delegate the teaching of this lesson*.

The Impediment Removal phase will involve the creation of grass-roots, cross-functional teams to explore ways of ensuring that each wing and its subordinate units. An impediment can be any policy, process, procedure, circumstance, or thing that is construed by the cross-functional team to contribute to the compromise of the Core Values in the unit. *An impediment is **never** a human being from the standpoint of a cross-functional team*.

The team elevates the recommendation to the wing level and the wing commander makes a decision as to the merits of the recommendation. Because all such recommendations will include the identification of the impediment and a careful plan for its removal or fix, any recommendation deemed to have merit by the wing commander can be returned to the cross-functional team for action.

Each wing will establish a plan to ensure a continuation of the Core Values emphasis, to include the Impediment Removal process.

b) "Schoolhouse Weave"

There are ten major professional development opportunities in the full career of the average uniformed military professional. Nine of these opportunities sort themselves into two basic tracks: the Field track and the Schoolhouse track. Each of the Field opportunities is defined as the first tour following an appropriate level of training or education. Opportunity #4 follows accession and initial technical training, #6 follows the first level of PME, #8 follows the second level, and #10 follows the final level.



LEGEND
① = Selection/induction.
② = Accession training
③ = Initial technical training
④ = First field assignment
⑤ = First PME school
⑥ = First field after 1st PME
⑦ = Second PME school

If the Schoolhouse is to provide the student with the opportunity to apply Core Values concepts in "real, meaningful, and practical terms . . . at every level," then the Schoolhouse must be sensitive to the first Field

assignment following school; for, it is that first Field assignment that determines what is real, meaningful, and practical for the student. Opportunities ##2 and 3 must prepare the student for opportunity #4; opportunity #5 must prepare the student for opportunity #6; and so on. Likewise, each of the Field opportunities generates a set of experiences and lessons-learned that the student can bring to the next classroom opportunity.

The Core Values must be woven into each course, but they must be woven in such a way as to build upon and contribute to the other opportunities in the career sequence, including the Field opportunities.

c) *The "Continuation Phase"*

The Continuation Phase covers whatever it takes to support the initiative and to keep it running on a long-term basis. In this regard, it includes the following:

- The creation of the Air Force Core Values booklet (the *Little Blue Book*).
- The creation, maintenance, and regular updating of the Air Force Core Values Web Site.
- The management of the Air Force mentoring and performance feedback programs as prime mechanisms for the promulgation of a values-based Air Force.
- The formation of a two-tiered body to oversee the implementation process and to ensure continuation of the Core Values initiative. This body—called the Architectural Control Committee or "ArchConCom"—will do the following:
    1. Review materials for inclusion on the Web Site.
    2. Review Schoolhouse plans to ensure the initiative provides a true cradle-to-grave education and training strategy.
    3. Review the Continuation plans of Field wings.
    4. Create, train, and provide support to a cadre of Core Values "gurus" across the Air Force.
- Make recommendations to the Chief of Staff, as necessary, on matters pertaining to the Core Values initiative.

C. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. COMMANDERS

Commanders and other leaders at all echelons can make a profound difference in the success of the Core Values initiative, especially at their specific level of responsibility. As such, commanders should be concerned with the following:

❒ Select their very best personnel to perform as Core Values Gurus. These must be values-driven persons capable of working with a wide range of persons at all echelons of command. Two years retainability is highly desired, but not required.

❒ If commanding a Schoolhouse unit, then the commander must be sure the Schoolhouse Weave is correctly and fully performed (see Chapter III).

❒ All commanders, whether they are responsible for Schoolhouse or Field units, must perform the Field Weave (see Chapter II).

❒ All commanders must create a plan to continue the initiative at the local level, to include the regular and orderly selection and training of Gurus, the regular dissemination of information about the initiative, the creation of some standing mechanism for the identification and removal of impediments, and the regular reaffirmation by all leaders of their commitment to the initiative (see Chapter IV).

❒ Field and School Commanders may submit their local plans to the ArchConCom for review/feedback. Schoolhouse commanders must submit a single plan containing a section devoted to the Schoolhouse Weave.

2. GURUS

Gurus are persons selected by their local commands (wing and above) to do the following: Gurus are to serve as advisors and resource managers, they cannot serve as surrogate commanders. As a minimum, Gurus can be expected to do the following:

1. Serve as an authoritative, local source of information about the Core Values initiative, to include the regular tracking of developments as found on the Core Values web site.

2. Assist the commander with the development of a plan to carry out the Command Cascade, to include schedules, lesson plans, and other support as required.

3. Assist the commander with the application of those active learning techniques appropriate to the unit served (applies to both Schoolhouse and Field).

4. Assist the commander with the development of a plan to carry out Impediment Removal at the wing level.

5. Assist the commander with the development of a local Continuation plan, to include the recurring orientation of newly reported personnel, the promotion of a robust mentoring and performance feedback system, and the effective publication of the existence of the local program and its role in unit operations.

6. Assist the commander with the creation and administration of an ethical climate survey, to include the writing of questions; collection , analysis, and proper interpretation of data; and the formulation of 'get well' plans, if required.

7. Maintain a healthy liaison with the Guru at the next higher level of command, to include the relaying of possible impediments requiring the attention of the commander at the next higher level.

8. Maintain a healthy liaison with other Gurus across the Air Force by sharing information via the web site and other appropriate Air Force communication channels.

The initiative recognizes two distinct kinds of Guru. In the Field, Gurus are referred to as "Field Consultants," and while their responsibilities are as described above, they are different from the other Guru type in that they must emphasize duties ##2 and 4, above. In the Schoolhouse, Gurus are referred to as "Case Cadre," and while they, too, are prepared to carry out all of the above duties, they must be especially expert with respect to duty #3.

3. ALL ASSIGNED PERSONNEL

There can be no doubt that the Air Force Core Values initiative emphasizes the roles of leaders and commanders, but this does not mean the initiative cannot begin without the approval of local commanders and leaders. Undoubtedly, there will be those rare commanders and leaders who will toss the Core Values initiative into the trash can or who will delegate its implementation to some minion stuck in some back office.

But the lack of enthusiasm from 'on high' should not deter you from implementing the Core Values initiative in your work center. Your commander does not have to give you approval to pursue excellence, to hold yourself accountable, or to place service ahead of self. Your commander, whether or not he or she is corrupt, incompetent, indifferent, or callously skeptical, cannot prevent you from treating your coworkers with respect and giving them the benefit of the doubt.

The Core Values initiative will not be successful all at once. Our organization is a very large one, and it will take time to weed out the bad apples and to remove impediments to a culture of conscience. In the interim, all of us would be well served to study the *Little Blue Book*, strive to structure our professional lives around it, and keep faith in the system that has produced and will continue to promote the Core Values initiative.

CHAPTER II
THE FIELD WEAVE

A. CORE VALUES IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

1. THE TASK

For a brief introduction to the Field Weave and what it requires, please read Chapter I, section 5a. The Field Weave is the first of three 'rounds' of the Core Values initiative; its focus is the entire Air Force, including the so-called 'Schoolhouse' units of AETC , the Guard, and USAFA.



2. RESPONSIBILITIES

Wing and Group commanders are responsible for implementation of the initiative at their level and in subordinate units. This responsibility will not be delegated. The Core Values initiative is an initiative by and for leaders—whether they are formally recognized as such or are informal leaders—and leaders *must* be responsible for its implementation.

Leaders must be directly involved in the process of developing a local plan for fully implementing the more general Air Force Core Values initiative, and they must be directly, regularly, dynamically, and proactively involved in the actual implementation process. *The degree of a leader's involvement is an index of that person's integrity.* The Field Weave demands much, much more than an annual 10 minute briefing given by a second lieutenant at commander's call. The Field Weave demands nothing less than a daily demonstration by leaders at all echelons of their commitment to fully meeting the obligations of professional military service. This is much more than walking the talk—it is *being* the walk.

3. REFERENCES

The Field Weave is governed by the following documents:

- "Air Force Core Values"—the *Little Blue Book*;
- Air Force Doctrine;
- Other directives (as indicated below).

These documents are authoritative. They cannot be rewritten to satisfy local interests or unofficial requirements. The *Little Blue Book* is the primary means for resolving disputes over the Core Values and their application, while Air Force Doctrine explains the relationship between the Core Values and the Air Force mission.

4. GOALS

In the most general or strategic sense, we can say there are five basic goals for the Field Weave:

1. Correctly EDUCATE all assigned personnel
2. ENCOURAGE a culture of conscience in your organization;
3. Ensure full ACCOUNTABILITY for following the Core Values at all echelons
4. Appropriately EVALUATE the impact and effectiveness of the initiative
5. Establish strong, values-driven LEADERSHIP at all echelons

5. INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION

As described in the *Little Blue Book*, initial implementation occurs in three waves or approaches. Each approach supports the achievement of all five Field Weave goals, but each approach also emphasizes certain of the goals over the others.

a) The Top-Down Approach

The top-down approach is the first attempt at ensuring the Core Values are woven into field operations. Although it supports all five of the Field Weave goals, its main focus is upon education, leadership, and accountability. On the one hand, the so-called command cascade—which includes every echelon of command from CSAF through flight commanders—is designed to get the word out: *the Core Values initiative is here; this is what it involves; this is what it means to me; and this is how I will demonstrate my complete and unflagging support*. On the other hand, commanders have a chance to use the top-down approach to enlist the full commitment and planning talents of subordinate commanders, i.e., to build a viable command team.

b) The Bottom-Up Approach

The bottom-up approach should begin once the command cascade is completed. It too supports all Field Weave goals, but it especially emphasizes the second and fourth goals: encouraging an environment for ethical success and evaluating how well the initiative is doing. The point of the bottom-up approach is to identify and remedy those policies, procedures, and processes that are genuine impediments to the creation of a culture of ethical success at the unit-level., and to make an informed guess as to how well the impediment removal process and the rest of the initiative are working.

c) The Back-and-Forth Approach

The back-and-forth approach informally builds upon and helps to perpetuate the other two approaches. It too supports all five goals, but it most focuses upon leadership and the encouragement of an environment for ethical success. The back-and-forth approach is really a request to all assigned personnel to continue to work on the implementation of the Core Values initiative by ‘keeping straight’ those at one’s organizational echelon.

6. CONTINUATION

Every wing-level plan must describe those steps and measures to be taken to perpetuate the Field Weave once the period of initial implementation is over.

Every wing-level plan must be submitted to the Architectural Control Committee for review.

B. TACTICAL (BUSINESS) PLAN

1. RESPONSIBILITIES

All assigned personnel are responsible for implementation of that portion of the tactical plan covering their work center or functional area of responsibilities. Commanders are responsible for implementation in their organizations, and they cannot delegate this responsibility. *However, all assigned personnel—regardless of their title, position, or other role in the organization—are responsible for Core Values implementation in their specific sphere of operations and influence*.

2. REFERENCES

The references for the tactical plan are the same as those for the strategic plan, together with the strategic plan itself.

3. GOALS

The goals for the tactical plan are the same as those for the strategic plan; however, the tactical plan shreds those goals into intermediate goals which, if accomplished, will strongly support achievement of the strategic goal.

a) CORRECTLY EDUCATE ASSIGNED PERSONNEL

Ensure that every person assigned to your organization is issued a copy of the *"The Air Force Core Values"* (also known as the "Little Blue Book").

Educate yourself.

Don't assume that you have all of the answers by reason of your years in service. Your experience is extremely important, but you must also study the *Little Blue Book*, Air Force Doctrine, *Joint Pub 1, Global Engagement*, and the speeches and papers of the SECAF, CSAF, and other senior Air Force leaders. Be sure you can give credible answers to the questions found in Chapter VIII of this *Guide*, and be especially certain that you understand the operational importance of the Core Values and their relationship to the Core Competencies.

It is better to delay the training of your subordinates than to leap head first into unknown waters. If you teach without fully studying the material, the result may be irreparable damage to the initiative and to your organization.

Aggressively and conscientiously complete the command cascade by ensuring that all commanders and supervisors correctly teach the core values lesson to those they rate.

The command cascade does much more than merely pass the word from echelon to echelon (although that, too, is an important accomplishment). The command cascade also begins the process of influencing the local culture. The ill-informed or incompetent leader who sees no need to discuss the obligations of military service—and says so in public—has nearly guaranteed

that his/her organization will not be values-based (and that he/she is probably unfit for continued service).

The command cascade should leave no doubt in the minds of subordinates that you support the Core Values initiative; that you believe the Core Values are important to mission accomplishment; and that you are committed to creating and/or maintaining a values-based organization.

Establish a values centered mentoring program (afpd 36-34); although afpd 36-34 requires mentoring for company grade officers only, you should seriously consider the establishment of a mentoring program for all assigned personnel

As described by AFPD 36-34, the mentoring program you establish locally should do much more than provide performance feedback on an occasional basis. Mentoring is that important relationship by which the senior helps the junior member to understand the nature of the profession of arms, the requirements of military practice, and the obligations of a career professional. As a complex form of modeling (see Chapter VII), mentoring may well be the most common and the most powerful means of building and/or preserving a values-based organization. The trusted and respected mentor who walks the talk of the Core Values may be all anyone needs to begin the walking the talk themselves.

Of course, mentoring does not have to be a formal process. A leader can mentor at any time—formal recognition of the mentoring relationship and formal recording of the occurrence of the session are not necessarily required.

Ensure that all commanders, supervisors, and recognized informal leaders understand and can apply the active learning techniques of modeling, one-way storytelling, and directed discussion (see chapter VII of this guide).

This is not a difficult requirement. **Modeling** cannot be avoided because it is not something we *choose* to do. By reason of a person's rank, position, experience, role, or performance record, he/she is a role model for those occupying a position subordinate to him/her. Consequently, we need to understand the ways in which we can be good or bad Core Values role models. As the old saying goes, "Actions speak louder than words"—and we must all be conscious of the messages our actions (or in-actions) are sending to the ranks.

One-Way Storytelling is something that many of us do already. Why not turn some of those stories to the advantage of the Core Values initiative? As Chapter VII points out, this can be done without even mentioning the Core Values by name.

Directed Discussion is as easy to perform, and those who are unsure or reluctant to engage in it should probably avoid it. Nevertheless, if we think of Directed Discussion as the sort of discussion generated during healthy staff meetings, then engaging in it may not be all that frightening. The point of any Directed Discussion is to get your people to explore some Core Values issue at length or in depth. The trick is to start with the right question. For example: *Do we really need the Core Values initiative in this unit?*

Make the core values the centerpiece of performance feedback sessions by accentuating positive, values-driven actions and suggesting ways to avoid counter-value actions and attitudes.

This simple and straightforward idea should be easy to implement. As the performance feedback worksheet is being written, use the *Little Blue Book* to identify the person's strengths

and weaknesses. Your evaluation should emphasize what is right and how things can be improved. The *Little Blue Book* is **not**, however, meant to be used to create "integrity report cards," and the supervisor must **never** represent his/her remarks as definitive and final with respect to the person's integrity, selflessness, or commitment to excellence. The reason for this is straightforward: the *Little Blue Book* is designed to provide general guidance; it is at best a crude assessment tool. This is not a criticism of the *Little Blue Book*; it is in fact a reflection of the more general fact that any precise tool for character assessment does not as yet exist.

Employ public affairs and other avenues to emphasize the importance of the core values and the commitment of leaders to them.

Of course, this includes the writing and publication of newspaper articles by senior leaders, but it may also mean attempting to generate dialogue about the Core Values initiative via a Q&A column in the local paper, a call-in show on the radio, or even a discussion panel on the local closed circuit television channel. The creation and publication of flyers and posters may also be considered, but these should never be viewed as substitutes for other portion of the initiative.

Consciously set yourself the goal to Avoid turning this into a once-a-year-at-commander's-call or another-wrinkled-poster-on-the-wall "program."

The Core Values initiative asks us to make the appreciation of our professional obligations the focus of our daily activities. Such a focus requires a dynamic initiative that we constantly refresh and refuel. Posters, T-shirts, slogans, and souvenir key chains cannot do that for us. The Core Values are much, much than a few words in a booklet or slogans on a banner. They are nothing less than the unchanging foundation upon which we build the Core Competencies and ultimately achieve mission success.

Spontaneous opportunities for education occur several times every day; expect them, be prepared for them, and use them.

Those who apply the *Little Blue Book* to their daily affairs are surprised at how frequently they question whether or not some contemplated course of action, attitude, behavior, program, or process is values-driven or is a 'values issue'. Such questions, although informal and off the cuff, can stimulate extremely valuable discussions having genuine professional significance.

Likewise, commanders, supervisors, and other leaders have an obligation to raise Core Values questions when the contemplated course of action can have negative consequences for the values environment of an organization. But such consequences need not be earth-shaking or life threatening to stimulate useful discussion.

Above all, be judicious in selecting education opportunities: the sledgehammer approach and the fire hose technique will succeed only in killing the initiative.

The rules of engagement found in Chapter VII also apply to the Field Weave. The goal is to develop a 'light touch' when approaching Core Values discussion and not to bludgeon people with rigid ideas and inflexible thinking.

b) <u>ENCOURAGE</u> A CULTURE OF CONSCIENCE IN YOUR ORGANIZATION

The Core Values initiative assumes that most of our personnel are fundamentally good and decent people. As such, all we need do is provide an environment within which they can do, so to speak, what comes naturally—follow their conscience in doing the right thing. Thus, we

want to be sure that we have an environment in which they are not regularly forced to choose between keeping their jobs and doing the right thing. Thus, the following actions are a must.

Develop and employ a strategy to remove impediments to a values-based organization

An impediment can be any policy, procedure, principle, or process—whether formal or informal, whether written or unwritten—that impedes, retards, inhibits, frustrates, or prevents the creation or preservation of a values-based unit, wing, numbered air force, MAJCOM, or Air Force. The impediment may be a policy that demands the impossible—thus creating a circumstance in which persons must either lie or report themselves deficient. The impediment may be a system that promotes self-centered careerists—the "show, glow, and blow" types—who abuse their people and destroy their units merely to secure promotion to the next rank. Or the impediment may be a leadership model borrowed from some field outside the military profession—a model that makes excuses for people rather than holding them accountable.

No one can know in advance how many impediments there may be, but we can identify at least four strategies for identifying them.

- Strategy #1: Cross-functional teams from different units across the entire wing identify and develop plans to rectify impediments at the wing level;
- Strategy #2: Existing mechanisms (IG, EEO, etc.) reviewed to ensure they are values-driven, and their extensive use is promoted throughout the wing;
- Strategy #3: Intra-unit teams (squadron level) identify and develop plans to remove impediments;
- Strategy #4: Inter-wing teams identify and develop plans to remove impediments occurring in two or more wings.

Establish a means to keep the local initiative going as a vital part of wing operations, planning, and leadership

Develop a plan to keep the initiative going. See Chapter IV for a more detailed discussion.

c) ENSURE FULL <u>ACCOUNTABILITY</u> FOR THE CORE VALUES AT ALL ECHELONS

Accountability is the linchpin of the Core Values initiative—unless persons at all echelons are held to account for their actions, the initiative has no chance at all of succeeding. It is one thing to affirm your support of the Core Values, it is another thing entirely to hold yourself, your peers, your subordinates, and your superiors accountable for living those Core Values. Of course, accountability has a positive and a negative side. The positive side is the recognition and even the reward of those who have done something worthy; the negative side involves an entire spectrum of possible actions, from mentoring to execution.

Ensure values-driven actions are rewarded appropriately, publicly, and on time

In many instances, it is probably counter-value to reward values-driven behavior with certificates, plaques, and newspaper stories. The reason for this is simple: being values-driven is the *expected* behavior of all Air Force personnel, and we should not excessively reward that which is expected. However, informal rewards are very much in order. A word of thanks or glance of acknowledgment from a peer can go a long way toward promoting and reinforcing

values-driven activity—and a truly values-driven person would probably be embarrassed by anything more.

Of course, there are instances when public awards and proclamations are entirely in order. For example, awards given to organizations for exceptional excellence and rewards given to individuals for service above and beyond are entirely appropriate—not just because it was values-driven, but because it was values-driven conduct beyond the normally expected.

At the very least, it is important that we not make counter-value awards or praise counter-value actions. A person who accomplishes something should be praised when and only when he or she has accomplished something consistent professional service. For example, the junior officer who wins a marathon has performed a noteworthy act—but only in so far as he or she accomplished this feat without shirking professional responsibilities and obligations. When commendable action is publicly praised or rewarded, it must be commendable precisely because it is values-driven.

Ensure counter-value actions are dealt with by applying the appropriate corrective remedy

As already suggested, the spectrum of remedies for counter-values conduct runs from informal mentoring, on the one extreme, to imprisonment and execution, on the other. This spectrum of remedies was not created by the Core Values initiative. Indeed, the Air Force had programs and mechanisms for dealing with improper conduct long before it gained independence in 1947. The UCMJ and various personnel regulations have placed remedies at the immediate disposal of the commander and the supervisor for a very long time. The Core Values initiative merely says this: *Use the tools available, and use them in a judicious and appropriate way.* From the standpoint of the organization and mission accomplishment, the person who is lax because of a pre-existing friendship is just as bad as the person who is severe because of a pre-existing prejudice.

d) APPROPRIATELY EVALUATE THE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LOCAL INITIATIVE

It is no easy matter to evaluate the ethical climate of an organization, and in any case it is absolutely essential that any assessment tools that are adopted not be counter-value. One problem is that behavior is not always a good indicator of character. The fact that the people in your organization manage to avoid UCMJ actions may not be a sign they are committed to the Core Values. It may only be a sign that they are clever about avoiding detection. Another problem is that it is not clear how we can consistently 'count' values-driven actions. If a person tells the truth because he wants to cause trouble for another person, does that count as a 'full' instance of honesty or should we give it 'partial' credit. The simple fact of the matter is that unless you can look into the hearts of your people and can be aware of everything they do, the 'counting actions' approach simply won't work.

It may be possible to achieve limited results with an organizational climate survey (a sample of which is found on the last page of Appendix 3). Of course, this can only provide some idea of the way your people perceive things. Perceptions can be faulty, and they should never be used as the basis for remedial action. Nevertheless, they can serve as the basis for developing other ways of assessing what is taking place in the organization. (See Appendix 1, Table D, for an example of "crystal ball gazing" for your organization.)

e) <u>ESTABLISH</u> STRONG, VALUES-DRIVEN LEADERSHIP AT ALL ECHELONS

Given everything else that has been said, it should be obvious that we must promote leadership at all echelons, and here we mean what General Fogleman means by a leader—*anyone who is willing to step out in front and get the job done.* Specifically, we are looking for the following:

- Leaders who aggressively work to properly educate their people in accordance with the techniques described in the *Little Blue Book*
- Leaders with enough courage to hold themselves and others accountable for the actions they perform
- Leaders who will enthusiastically take the steps necessary to remedy impediments to a values-based organization—and can do so without violating the Core Values
- Leaders who are savvy enough to develop and appreciate the stark limitations of useful assessment tools—and can apply them without defeating the Core Values initiative provide direction and vision for the local implementation plan
- Walk the talk

CHAPTER III
THE SCHOOLHOUSE WEAVE

A. THE TASK

The Schoolhouse Weave is often referred to as the second of the three rounds of the Core Values initiative, but this does not mean it cannot begin until the first round (the Field Weave) has ended. Rather, the Field and Schoolhouse rounds are merely the two pincers of the more general strategy. Once the first two rounds have done their job of introducing the Core Values to the force, the Continuation Phase will take over and sustain the momentum.



The specific purpose of the Schoolhouse Weave is to introduce the Core Values into Air Force education and training in such a way so as to best promote a values-based Air Force. As pointed out in Chapter I, the Chief of Staff's letter to AETC/CC and USAFA/CC contained these words as its second paragraph:

> Now we need to bring this together into a coherent, corporate Air Force strategy. We need to do it by adding the themes of Integrity, Service, and Excellence to officer, enlisted, and civilian training and education programs across the Air Force. This strategy must address Core Values in the accession stage and build upon this foundation in the training and education processes, tailoring the focus each step of the way. Such a career-long approach to Core Values will help frame our strategic direction and bolster the professional and personal stature of our people by applying in real, meaningful, and practical terms Core Values concepts at every level.

At the very least, this paragraph makes it clear Air Force education and training activities must address the Core Values . . .

1. . . . with a coherent, corporate, career-long approach
2. . . . in officer, enlisted, and civilian education and training
3. . . . in successive stages such that each stage builds upon what has gone before
4. . . . in a manner relevant to all Air Force people

5. . . . through the use of active learning methodology, i.e., "by applying in real, meaningful, and practical terms Core Values concepts at every level."
6. . . . with the aim of framing "our strategic direction" and bolstering "the professional and personal stature of our people."

In other words, it should be clear that we must develop a strategy to teach the Core Values that is very far from the standard briefing given at enlistment and which is repeated every time a person transfers from one station to the next. On the contrary, we are talking about a long-term, dynamic strategy that responds to the professional needs of our members as they progress through a normal career.

B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The following rules of engagement seem to be most consistent with promoting the Schoolhouse phase of the initiative. Some of them were discovered immediately by the Core Values Strategy Panel (CVSP), others became obvious as the details of the initiative were worked out.

1. THE CORE VALUES MUST BE *WOVEN* (NOT STAPLED, NAILED, ETC.)

If it is true to say that the Core Values stake out the boundaries of professionalism, then it is certainly possible to plot everything we do as either falling inside, outside, or along those boundaries. The things that fall inside are professionally acceptable (and are generally obvious); the things that fall outside are clearly unprofessional (and they can be obvious, as well); and the things that fall along the boundaries are in that 'gray zone' which can be the source of so much trouble for the profession and its members. In the gray zone we find those possible actions, situations, and decisions that are ambiguous enough that they can be argued to be equally unprofessional as professional. (In the gray zone we find decisions involving conflicts between Core Values, those tempting circumstances in which the stakes do not seem to be too high, and those actions about which we find it more than easy to rationalize.)

Consider what this means. If we can plot the position of everything we do as professionals against this simple matrix, then there must be a Core Values aspect (positive, negative, or ambiguous) to everything we do, every situation we face, and every decision we make. And if there is a Core Values aspect to everything we do, face, and decide, then teaching the Core Values may require nothing more than identifying, discussing, and exploring what we should do about that aspect.

And this means that we do not need to invent a Core Values "block" that we shoehorn into a course already overflowing with material. On the contrary, we look at what we already teach and identify those places in the course where the Core Values aspects bubble to surface and almost beg to be discussed. This is what we mean by the "*Schoolhouse Weave*." We do not re-write lesson plans, we merely note where in those plans the Core Values discussion opportunities are the most natural and most profitable, and as those moments arise in the progress of the course, we take advantage of them. It should be obvious that this is very far from creating a one-hour block in which we lecture about the Core Values.

It also should be obvious that the most interesting Core Values opportunities are those having to do with "gray zone" actions.

2. NO COURSE OR SCHOOL IS AUTOMATICALLY EXEMPT

There may well be courses in which a discussion of the Core Values is itself a counter-value activity. Exemptions to the requirement to teach the Core Values, however, will be made on a case-by-case basis, with the final determination being made by the appropriate MAJCOM commander.

3. EXPERTS KNOW BEST

Given that we must weave the Core Values in the manner described, then it stands to reason that such a weave can only be performed by those who best know the subject matter into which the Core Values are woven. Only a Security Police Specialist, for example, can best answer the question, *Where in the basic SP course are there naturally occurring opportunities for discussing Integrity, Service, and Excellence*? Who else but an experienced security police specialist would know which actions and situations fall into the "gray zone" for security police specialists?

The same is true across the board. Only the expert in a particular field or technical subject matter can know where best to perform the weave in his or her course. Another way of demonstrating this is to answer the following question: If we needed to tell a One-Way Story to make a Core Values point about a given subject matter, who would be our source? That person is the person best qualified to perform the weave.

4. LESS IS MORE

Over-kill and over-exposure are to be feared at least as much as inaction in implementing the Core Values initiative. Indeed, it is quite likely that we can kill the initiative quickest by drowning personnel in a tidal wave of Core Values talk. Consequently, if we err, we should err on the side of doing too little than doing too much, and what this means can be explained in terms of two further rules of engagement:

a) When in doubt, leave it out.

If you are not convinced that you have identified a moment in the course that begs for Core Values discussion, then it is better to avoid that moment than to force the issue and turn the opportunity sour.

b) Saying trumps naming.

It is quite possible to have a Core Values discussion without ever mentioning the Core Values or the Core Values initiative by name. What is important is the professional substance the Core Values point to. You can *say* what happened when so-and-so falsified an aircraft maintenance report without *naming* the Core Value involved (Integrity: honesty or Integrity: responsibility).

Of course, there are circumstances in which the Core Values will need to be named and discussed in some detail, but if we keep our general focus on the professional substance, we are more likely to avoid turning the Core Values into a set of dreaded and dreadful buzzwords. Whenever possible, therefore, have a Core Values discussion without naming them.

c) Chuck the checklist.

Throw away the idea that the first section of the *Little Blue Book* is a checklist of the opportunities you must find in your course. It is hard to imagine a more counterproductive

situation than the one in which the instructor says on the last day, "Oh, by the way, we haven't thus far talked about humility, faith in the system, personal excellence, or internal operations excellence, so let's take a few minutes to do so." The goal is to take advantage in the opportunities that naturally present themselves so that students understand the Core Values are important to the way we do our business. If the student must read the *Little Blue Book* to figure some of it out on his own, so be it. Nothing at all is lost, and we have gained a student who has real familiarity with the *Little Blue Book.* If you find but two naturally occurring Core Values opportunities in a 30 week course, and the discussion of those opportunities leads students to appreciate the context of professional obligation within which they will serve, then you have accomplished much more than the person who mechanically ticks off the items on a checklist.

5. THE *LITTLE BLUE BOOK* TRUMPS ALL

The Little Blue Book will be used to resolve doctrinal disputes and disputes about the more general aspects of the architecture of the initiative.

6. NO COURSE IS AN ISLAND

In any course you name, students are coming from somewhere and going to some place else. The context for any course is defined by these two "somewheres," and the most effective course is the one that most sensibly responds to this context.

By knowing where the students came from, it is possible to avoid needlessly repeating what they have learned already about the Core Values or the Core Values initiative, thus avoiding further over-kill.

However, it is probably more important to know where they are heading. What will a values-based Air Force demand of them when they get there, and how best can you contribute to their preparation by building on what they have received in previous courses?

7. WE MUST CONNECT-THE-DOTS

If a course occurs in a family sequence of related courses, then those courses, when taker as a collection, should form a coherent Core-Values strategy in which students are consistently prepared at each step of the way to play a role in a values-based Air Force that is required of persons with their grade, experience, and function in the organization.

To "connect-the-dots" is to bring the courses of a family sequence into alignment so that they are governed by a coherent, responsible Core Values instruction strategy.

8. MATCH KNOWLEDGE LEVEL WITH ACTIVE LEARNING TYPE

Given that we know the context of a course, then we should have some sense of the knowledge level to which our students should be educated. What are their professional obligations once they leave the school? Will they be expected to follow the Core Values or will they also be expected to develop a unit-level Core Values initiative, mentor others with respect to the Core Values, write policy in a manner consistent with the Core Values, or something else?

Given that we have identified the knowledge level, then we must match it with the best active learning type. It should be obvious that Case teaching is not appropriate for BMT, 3-level tech school, or tech schools of short duration. However, BMT can and should use One-Way

Stories, Simulations, and Modeling to prepare Basics to carry out basic Core Values responsibilities.

On the other hand, it is probably inappropriate to use anything other than Case Studies, Simulations, or Directed Discussions at the Senior NCO Academy, Air War College, or the Wing Commanders Course.

C. COURSE ARCHITECTURE

If we follow the above rules of engagement as we combine the concept of a ten-stage, cradle-to-grave career progression with the requirement to employ active learning to produce a values-based Air Force, then it is possible to achieve a robust description of the architecture of the Schoolhouse Weave at the 'course' level.

As a general rule of thumb, we know that a person's professional responsibilities increase as that person progresses through the ranks, and this means much more than an increase in the number of professional responsibilities. In fact, as a person progresses, those responsibilities multiply and they become more sophisticated, thus demanding an increase in the knowledge and skill level of the professional. For example, the junior enlisted personnel may need to know only that the Core Values exist, that they must be adhered to, and that the responsibilities they impose are specific and job-relevant. By contrast, a Senior Master Sergeant may very well be in a position to actually administer a local Core Values initiative or to advise others to do so, and must therefore know the contents of this *Guru's Guide*, and be prepared to correctly interpret assessment data, conduct Directed Discussions, and run a cross-functional impediment removal team (see Chapters I-III). Obviously, there are profoundly different challenges here for the Schoolhouse. It is probably unnecessary to do anything more than Model and tell One-Way Stories about the Core Values for the junior enlisted person; but the Senior Master Sergeant will need to have more than a passing acquaintance with all seven types of active learning, as well Core Values doctrine and the initiative itself.

Appendix 1, Table F should be taken as a recommendation—and a recommendation only—concerning what active learning type(s) should be matched with what course. In the final analysis, only experts can truly know the student population and the challenges that population will face in the Field. Nevertheless, certain conclusions seem justified. For example, it seems right to say that case studies are far more appropriate to Squadron Officer School than they are to Basic Military Training.

Although Table F probably speaks for itself, it is important to take a moment or two and highlight important aspects of the more critical career development stages. The stages discussed below must be the prime focus of the Schoolhouse Weave if the initiative is to be successful. Officer and enlisted stages are discussed under the same heading.

1. SELECTION/INDUCTION STAGE

The *Selection/Induction* stage has the potential to perform a double service for the initiative. On the one hand, it affords the opportunity to screen persons for their adaptability to a values-based environment. On the other hand, the recruiter can be the first person to give the recruit a Core Values lesson. Clearly, recruiters already engage in that form of active learning we call “Modeling” (see Chapter VII), and they can also impress the importance of the Core Values on

the recruit by telling a One-Way Story about some previous recruit who succeeded because he/she would not compromise the Core Values.

{It is not clear how far the screening function should be taken. Part of the problem is the lack of reliable and relevant screening tests. Another part of the problem is our general reluctance to keep the initiative from becoming a misbegotten exercise in political correctness or group think. However, it may be very worthwhile to try to develop and apply better screening tools, especially for use on the officer side of selection and induction.}

2. ACCESSION TRAINING

Obviously, the *Accession training* stage is extremely important to career-long development. This is true whether we are speaking of Basic Military Training (BMT), Officer Training School (OTS), Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC), the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), or the new Air and Space Basic Course (ASBC), which is under development. All of these accession sources must take extra pains to understand the 'somewhere' from which their students originated; and they must know in great detail the 'somewhere' to which they are going.

Of course, there is a fundamental difference between BMT graduates and the graduates of the officer accession sources. The latter may be asked to function as commanders or supervisors during their first Field assignment. Hence, they must have more than a passing knowledge of the profession of arms, the ethical dimension of the profession of arms, and their obligations as professionals operating within that dimension. In other words, they must understand the Core Values, their obligations with respect to the Core Values, and the use of the Core Values in the context of professional activity (see the Compass, Crystal Ball, and Bag of Marbles applications, which are discussed at the end of Chapter V.)

Whereas One-Way Stories may be sufficient for BMT, the full range of active learning techniques should be considered for employment in the officer accession training institutions. Of special value are Lived Experience, Case Studies, and Simulations. Because of the length and intensity of their programs, USAFA and AFROTC are best positioned to maximize this active learning experience.

3. TECHNICAL TRAINING

The purpose of the Schoolhouse Weave in technical training is to demonstrate that the Core Values are relevant to each career field and that they frequently operate in ways that are specific to that career field. Thus, regardless of the active learning technique selected, it should have a career field focus or relevance. One-Way Stories, for example, should be straight from the career field. Two-Way Storytelling should be of the "I was there . . ." variety. And cases, if they are used at all, should be about real events that happened to real persons in the career field who have much in common with the students one is teaching. The stories told in 7-level school should be different from those told in 3-level school in at least two respects. First, they should be about persons at different career stages. Second, the 7-level stories should demand greater thought than the 3-level stories. The 7-level stories should be 'grayer' than the 3-level stories.

4. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME)

The emphasis across PME is on the more challenging forms of active learning, such as Directed Discussion and Case Studies, and the reason should be obvious: if persons remain in the service long enough to begin PME, it is likely they are engaged in professional activities requiring the sorts of skills developed by these active learning types. In addition, persons attending the more senior PME schools must do more than make decisions with the Core Values. They must be able to properly interpret assessment data, differentiate a good from a bad assessment tool, conduct Core Values discussions with subordinates, formulate a local Core Values implementation plan, and be prepared to sensibly employ the Core Values in the formulation of plans and policy.

In short, if the Core Values describe the architecture for professional conduct, then PME schools should design curriculums that are consistent with and promote appropriate knowledge of that architecture.

D. LOCAL INITIATIVE MANAGEMENT

Although the final decision is at the discretion of the wing commander, it is reasonable to suppose that management of local initiatives will be centralized at the wing level, and that the following will be true of the initiative that is established:

1. Although the wing commander retains overall responsibility and full accountability for the local initiative, the wing commander will personally select persons to assist with its management. These persons will be
   a) selected on the basis of their commitment to the Core Values, demonstrated teaching ability, and leadership skills;
   b) fully trained as Gurus;
   c) given direct access to the wing commander for the purpose of Core Values consultation;
   d) authorized the resources necessary to establish a robust local initiative;
   e) the daily managers of the local initiative and are directly accountable to the wing commander to ensure the local initiative meets all requirements as specified here and in published directives.
2. An education and training program will be established for all assigned instructors. This program will do the following:
   a) thoroughly familiarize instructors with the Air Force Core Values initiative, its architecture, components, doctrine, administration, and justification;
   b) introduce instructors to the seven basic types of active learning, and give them sufficient knowledge in this area so that they may make informed judgments as to which active learning types are most appropriate to their courses;
   c) explain the Schoolhouse Weave in such detail that all instructors can perform it for the courses they teach;
   d) thoroughly prepare instructors to apply the active learning types they will actually employ in the classroom;

3. The local initiative establishes a realistic, values-driven method for assessing the performance of instructors in the active learning environment.
4. The local initiative establishes a mechanism adequate to ensuring that
   a) Core Values opportunities are woven and not forced, i.e., they take full advantage of naturally occurring opportunities in the subject matter of the course;
   b) the dots are connected across all courses in a family or all courses in a sequence;
   c) course directors and instructors are following the *less is more* rule;
   d) course directors are by and large following Table F, Appendix 1 or have reasonably good reasons for deviating from its recommendations.

E. CONTINUATION

Every local initiative to perform the Schoolhouse Weave will (1) be fully consistent with the local initiative to perform the Field Weave and (2) adequately provide for the perpetuation of the initiative, to include the timely selection of Gurus and the regular review of the plan's effectiveness.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTINUATION PHASE

F. OVERVIEW

As described in Chapter I, the purpose of the Continuation Phase is do whatever it takes (in a values-driven way) to keep the Core Values initiative going on a long-term basis. The Continuation Phase is perhaps best thought of as the final stage of a rocket—the one that kicks the payload into final orbit. When the dust clears from the Continuation Phase, the initiative should be self-sustaining and self-directing, requiring nothing more than a tiny nudge from time to time to keep it on Course. The Continuation Phase has no projected end, but it is reasonable to believe that as time passes, the requirement for this phase will diminish almost to the vanishing point.



The Continuation Phase will be driven by the efforts of two organizations—one formal and the other 'semi-formal'. The formal organization is the Architectural Control Committee or "**ArchConCom**". The semi-formal organization is the "**Guru Network."** Each of these 'organizations' has a set of responsibilities, and the two sets of responsibilities will, when conscientiously carried out, produce the orbital boost we seek.

G. THE ArchConCom

The ArchConCom is made up of two subordinate bodies: (1) the *Executive Review Board* and (2) the *Working Group*. Neither of these bodies has 'approval/disapproval' authority—the formulation and implementation of local plans is the responsibility of local commanders; nevertheless, the ArchConCom is empowered to review Schoolhouse plans and make suggestions as to how they can be made better, and to make a 'How goes it?' report to SECAF and CSAF on an annual basis.

The two subordinate bodies of the ArchConCom are described below. Following those description, the specific responsibilities of the ArchConCom are identified and discussed.

1. EXECUTIVE REVIEW BOARD

The Executive Review Board (**ERB**) consists of senior persons who have been entrusted by the SECAF and CSAF with the responsibility to provide guidance to the other layers of the

ArchConCom, and to provide the SECAF and CSAF with the feedback they will need to ensure the Core Values initiative is on track and meeting its objectives.

Membership: The membership of the ArchConCom Executive Review Board will consist of the following senior persons:

- the Vice Chief of Staff (Chair) (AF/CV);
- Commander, Air Education and Training Command (AETC/CC);
- a MAJCOM CC (appointed on a revolving basis);
- Superintendent, US Air Force Academy (USAFA/CC);
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (AF/DP);
- an SES representative;
- a general officer from the Air Force Reserve;
- a general officer from the Air National Guard;
- a retired general officer;
- and the CMSAF.

Meetings: The Executive Review Board will meet on an as-needed basis, but at least once a year.

Administrative Support: Administrative support (typing, reproduction, etc.) will be provided by the Air Force Doctrine Center.

2. WORKING GROUP

The Working Group consists of those intermediate-level persons whose job it is to do the concrete work associated with the responsibilities of the ArchConCom (see below), and to perform any other tasks as the Executive Review Board deems appropriate.

: **Membership**: The membership of the ArchConCom Working Group will consist of

- the Chief of the Air Force Doctrine Center (Chair);
- a Major/Lt Col from AETC/XP;
- a Major/Lt Col from USAFA;
- a Major/Lt Col from AF/DPPE;
- a civilian representative from AFPC/DPK;
- a representative from the Air Force Reserve;
- a representative from the Air National Guard; and
- at least one senior NCO designated by the CMSAF.

Administrative Support: The Air Force Doctrine Center will provide administrative support to the ArchConCom Working Group.

H. ArchConCom RESPONSIBILITIES

The following list of responsibilities is tentative, but reasonable given our present understanding of what will be required to achieve 'orbit' with the Core Values initiative. The conclusion to be drawn from this list is that the Core Values initiative is an *Air Force* issue.

Because the Core Values belong to all of us, the Core Values initiative will be guided and perpetuated by all of us. In this regard, the following challenges must be met successfully.

1. CONNECTING THE DOTS

In the simplest possible terms, to "connect the dots" means to make sure that the parts of a plan fit together as designed to effectively and efficiently accomplish the work desired. In the case of the Air Force Core Values initiative, "connecting the dots" means the following:

- Schoolhouse plans must fit together appropriately so that over the course of their careers our personnel receive the appropriate kind of Core Values education for the appropriate level of responsibility they will next shoulder.
- The various components of the Field plans must fit together so that all Field requirements are satisfied fully, both at the MAJCOM and wing levels.
- Schoolhouse and Field plans must be mutually complementary and supporting; each must reinforce and perpetuate the other so that we can achieve the desired cradle-to-grave, career-long Core Values education continuum and, eventually, ensure that we have a values-based Air Force.

By definition, no Schoolhouse or Field Unit can perform this function completely. Only a group working outside of all Schoolhouse and Field units is able to collect the various plans and review them for their "connect-the-dots-ability". That outside organization is the ArchConCom. The members of the Working Group (or a sub-committee thereof) will collect the plans, review them using the *Little Blue Book* and the information provided in Chapters I-III of this *Guide*, and work with the plan writers to achieve the best possible connection of the dots. Schoolhouse units *must* submit their plans to the ArchConCom; Field units may do so if they wish. Questions raised by the ArchConCom will not be, as such, directed at the general content or conception of the plan; rather, the comments will pertain to the ways in which two or more plans that should fit together do not do so.

2. REVIEW WING-LEVEL CONTINUATION PLANS

An important service of the ArchConCom is its review of wing-level implementation plans. There is no requirement that Field wings avail themselves of this service, but it is available for those who have questions about the quality of their Continuation plans.

3. MAINTAIN THE AIR FORCE CORE VALUES WEBSITE

The ArchConCom also will maintain the Air Force Core Values Website. As the primary means for communicating with the Air Force on Core Values matters, the Website *must* address and fully meet customer needs. At this point it appears those needs include the following:

- Information concerning the nature and meaning of Air Force Core Values doctrine;
- A channel for communicating suggestions about the Core Values, the Core Values initiative, and the ethical environment of the Air Force and its subordinate organizations;
- A source for up-to-date, fresh lesson plans, case studies, and ideas for implementing the Field and Schoolhouse weaves;
- A means of exchanging information among the members of the Gurus Network;
- A source for information about events in the news or other items of public interest.

Selected members of the Working Group will be authorized to respond to routine e-mail queries about the initiative or published doctrine. However, questions not falling into this category will be passed to the ERB for evaluation and response.

4. TRAIN HQ AIR FORCE, MAJCOM, DRU AND WING GURU'S

Another service offered by the ArchConCom is the training of Gurus for Field and Schoolhouse units. This training initially will be conducted by a traveling team made up of persons from AETC and USAFA. Their focus will be on getting the initiative up and running, with a special emphasis on the three rounds of the implementation plan and the role of active learning across those three rounds. The nature of subsequent training has yet to be determined, but it will almost certainly include the development of assessment/evaluation tools as one of its focal points.

5. ENSURE CURRENCY AND USEFULNESS OF COMMONLY AVAILABLE MATERIALS

The ArchConCom also will ensure that commonly used materials—the *Little Blue Book*, materials on the Website, case studies, etc.—any materials that may require utility, currency, or sanity checks on a regular basis. This must be updated in response to the needs of the Air Force, the reader on the flight line, and the Core Values Gurus.

This does not mean that we can anticipate a near-term change to the Core Values or their definitions. CORONA Fall '96 reviewed the Core Values and approved the recommendation of the Air Force 2025 committee that the Core Values remain unchanged for the next 30 years. Of course, the initiative itself, as well as the mechanisms and tools used to implement it, can change in response to achieved results or the detection of problems.

6. DEVELOP RESPONSIBLE, VALUES-DRIVEN ASSESSMENT TOOLS

The ArchConCom must develop assessment tools that promote—rather than retard—the development or maintenance of a values-based Air Force. All too often in the past, such tools have been developed in the name of Core Values, yet have served the aims of inept leaders and micro-managers.

It *may* be possible to develop useful assessment tools, but their development must be methodical and they must be developed by those who are sensitive to the excesses of the past. The ArchConCom should solicit the help of persons from around the Air Force to assist in this task. Given the profound difficulties associated with the evaluation of ethical environments—and the universal absence of anyone remotely qualifying as an "expert" in this area—it is necessary that as many voices as possible take part in the dialogue over assessment techniques before any of them are distributed to the force for application.

7. SENIOR LEADERSHIP LIAISON

The ArchConCom also will serve as a direct liaison to the most senior members of the Air Force on matters pertaining to the Core Values, the Core Values initiative, and the state of the ethical climate of the force. The extent of this liaison and the formality with which it is conducted have yet to be determined.

I. THE GURU NETWORK

The Guru Network includes all of those persons selected by MAJCOM and wing commanders to serve as the local "belly buttons" for the Core Values initiative. Gurus are not as such assigned to a particular office nor do they come from a specific career field. But they should be self-directed, self-starting persons recognized for their values-driven conduct and attitudes who are fully committed to 'full up' implementation of the Core Values initiative.



The Gurus Network is the loose affiliation of Gurus that exists across the Air Force and includes all Field and Schoolhouse units. The primary means of contact among Gurus is the Air Force Core Values Website ("WEB" in the diagram), but they are also tied together via common Air Force doctrine and the *Little Blue Book* ("DOC"), as well as by direct ("VFR") communication from the ArchConCom's Working Group.

The Gurus Network is made possible by a common purpose and shared challenges—not by a common title, governing policy directive, or office symbol. Because the Core Values belong to all of us, then *anyone* can be a Guru. However, during initial implementation of the initiative, commanders must be careful to identify as Gurus those most likely to succeed in that capacity at the local level.

1. MAJCOM GURUS

Pursuant to the approval of the responsible commander, MAJCOM Gurus will serve as the conduits for information between the Working Group and the Wing Gurus. In addition to the duties outlined in Chapter I, MAJCOM Gurus should formulate a MAJCOM Continuation Plan, and that plan should address the following questions:

- What steps, if any, will we take to ensure that wing-level Continuation plans are formulated and implemented?
- What steps will we take to ensure that second generation (and later) Wing Gurus are properly trained or otherwise prepared for their duties?
- What process, if any, will we adopt to gather the wing-level plans, review them for adequacy, and possibly pass them to the ArchConCom Working Group for review?
- What process will we use to answer questions from the Working Group about the plans forwarded to it?

- ❍ What means will we use to ensure that fresh and timely Core Values information is made available to all persons in the command?
- ❍ What means will we use to ensure that civil servants receive the same immersion in the Core Values as uniformed personnel?
- ❍ What Public Affairs strategy will we employ to help keep the initiative going?
- ❍ How will we ensure that the wings continue to identify and work to change what are perceived to be impediments to a culture of ethical success?
- ❍ How will we assess whether or not the initiative is working at the wing level?
- ❍ How will we ensure the local Core Values initiative is values-driven and not counter-value?

2. WING-LEVEL GURUS

Gurus at the wing level function in much the same way as those at the MAJCOM level, but the concerns of the wings are somewhat more concrete and specific. Among the many questions they must address are the following:

- ❒ What should the wing Continuation plan look like, and who will be responsible for its implementation?
- ❒ What steps will we take to ensure that second generation (and later) wing supervisors are properly trained to mentor their personnel?
- ❒ What steps should we take to identify and properly train second generation (and later) wing gurus?
- ❒ What process should we develop to ensure that wing-level plans are collected and forwarded to the MAJCOM, if necessary.
- ❒ What means will we use to ensure that fresh and timely Core Values information is made available to all persons in the wing, to include information received from the MAJCOM as well as information we develop on our own?
- ❒ What process will we use to ensure that all assigned personnel—whether civilians, officers, enlisted, or contractor—receive the same immersion in the Core Values and become adept at their application on the job?
- ❒ What Public Affairs strategy will we employ to help keep the initiative going?
- ❒ How will we keep alive the goal of constantly evaluating the way we do business so as to identify and eliminate possible impediments to an ethical environment in the wing and its subordinate organizations?
- ❒ How will we assess whether or not the initiative is working?
- ❒ If the initiative is not working, what process will we use to get it on track?
- ❒ How will we ensure the local Core Values initiative is values-driven and not counter-value?

CHAPTER V
DOCTRINE

*Doctrine consists of the **fundamental principles** by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is the linchpin of successful military operations. Doctrine is meant to illuminate the judgment of airmen and govern the way we prepare for, plan, and conduct air and space warfare. Doctrine based on experience and technology advances reduces future uncertainties and provides a common set of understandings on which airmen base their decisions.* From a draft of *AFDD-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine*

Quite understandably, there are those who question whether or not the Core Values should be counted as part of Air Force doctrine. After all, they point out, Secretary Widnall cut the total number of Core Values from six to three in one speech in 1995. If we can so easily change the Core Values, then why should we consider them to be "fundamental principles?" How can they be fundamental principles if the Army recognizes one set, the Navy recognizes a second set, the Air Force has yet a third set, and *Joint Pub 1* identifies yet a fourth set.

But the persons who advance these objections miss the point entirely. Although the words we use to describe the values may change from time to time, the substance they point to is fundamental and unchanging. This substance is discovered in the collected experience of military leaders and warriors past. Julius Caesar and Lao Tzu undoubtedly had different words for Integrity, Service, and Excellence, but it is hard to believe they were unfamiliar with the ideas—the substantial ideas—behind these words. Suppose Genghis Khan caught one of his subordinates making a false official report; or suppose that Napoleon had reason to believe that a subordinate was shirking his duties; or suppose that General Sherman formed the impression that a subordinate had a "good enough" mentality—What would have been the consequence?

One way to understand the difference between the words we use to signify the Core Values and the substance they pick out is by use of an analogy like the following. To be sure, the analogy may be excessively descriptive, but it does help to understand these points.

Our oldest and grandest national park is Yellowstone. It is a vast nature preserve that consumes 2.2 million acres in the northwestern corner of Wyoming. It sits atop an ancient volcano that erupts every 100,000 years or so, and its last eruption was 100,000 years ago. We still don't understand many of the phenomena found there. Old Faithful is a geyser that erupts with predictable regularity, but its internal mechanisms are a mystery to us.

Early summer visitors discover that it is like no other place on earth: deep fields of snow lie adjacent to bubbling geysers, mud pots, and fumaroles; the smell of sulfur hangs heavy over pine forests; and tremendous waterfalls thunder into breathtaking gorges. There is no doubt that the park has a majestic beauty, but it is also clear that the conditions for survival there are brutal and unforgiving. To enter the park is to realize that the park is in charge: it makes the rules and those who cannot abide by them must leave or they will die. Of course, a person could 'hole up' in a room in one of the central hotels, and refuse to come out to experience what the park has to offer, but the park is still in charge.

If a hiker wants to take the time and risk the dangers, he or she will no doubt discover thousands of ways into the park. But the Forest Service has thoughtfully provided four entrances, one at each of the cardinal points of the compass. To enter by the north

entrance is to initially experience a part of Yellowstone significantly different from the part one enters by taking the south, west, or east entrances. But no matter where one starts, it is possible to explore the entire park. The interior of the park contains two inner road loops forming a rough "8" of hundreds of miles of pavement. It is possible to leave this beaten path, but the Forest Service has created the entrance system and the interior roadway specifically for the purpose of conducting visitors to the most important features and sights in the most direct way possible. The entrances are pipelines to what is most essential and famous about Yellowstone.

The leadership dimension of the profession of arms is very much like Yellowstone National Park. It is a vast territory containing many wonderful and exotic features, some of which we are only beginning to understand. Its conditions for survival can be harsh, even brutal, and while it is possible for a person to spend a career hiding from the leadership dimension, that person will achieve little and certainly will not flourish within the profession itself. Indeed, it is hard to see how such a person might qualify as a professional in the strict sense.

Adventurous persons can enter the leadership dimension of the profession from many different directions. Having crossed the outer boundary, they can wander about until, on their own, they fully discover all of its essential features and wonders. Such persons will discover first-hand the survival conditions inside the dimension, and although some of them will perish in the effort, those who survive will never forget the lessons they have learned.

It is also the case that those who have gone before us—the trailblazers, bushwhackers, and pathfinders of old—have already built trails and charted many of the major features of the leadership dimension. They report their findings in leadership manuals and personal memoirs, in which they distill the wisdom of their experience into handy action principles, rules of thumb, "do's and don'ts", and commandments.

The Air Force Core Values are just such principles distilled from the experience of past leaders. And they play the important role of serving as officially recognized entrances to the leadership dimension. Each of them points the way to a distinct region within the dimension, and those regions ultimately are connected in the interior of the dimension. Start with and explore one region and you will eventually end up exploring all of them. And to survive and flourish in the leadership dimension of the profession of arms, a warrior must learn these regions, submit to their harsh conditions, and come to terms with them.

To be sure, there are other possible entrances to the leadership dimension. One might, for example, choose the highly respectable values of "Duty, Honor, Country." Each of these values will deliver a person to the interior of the dimension because each picks out and points the way to an important feature of the leadership landscape, and it also tells us that those who have gone before found these features to be especially important.

The Air Force Core Values are especially useful in this regard. On the one hand, they are ours, and they link us to our leadership and to our heritage. On the other hand, they are extremely efficient entrances to the leadership dimension of the profession of arms. They

pick out the key regions within the dimension, and they tell us which region is the most important of all.

*For example, **Integrity first** is the Core Value that tells us that individual character is a critical feature of the leadership dimension. Without integrity, it is impossible for a leader to be a good leader. At the same time, this Core Value tells us that integrity is a central feature, something like a plateau, that rises up in the center of the leadership dimension. From this high ground, it is possible to survey, understand, and control the other features and components of leadership terrain. Unless one has achieved and fully explored that vantage point, one's efforts at leadership are at best haphazard or disorganized and, at worst, dangerous to the Air Force.*

*But this is not the only entrance to the leadership dimension recognized by our superiors. **Service before self** is the Core Value that points to the region of discipline, rule following, and priorities. From her vantage point, the person of integrity sees that military professionals must have the self-control and discipline to set aside personal fears and feelings so that the mission can be accomplished She also clearly sees that rules exist for the sake of getting the job done and should be ignored only under the most extraordinary circumstances. And from the plateau of integrity, the military professional sees and understands that his priorities must be defined, properly arranged, and conscientiously followed. Persons of integrity understand that what they see from their vantage point are the real requirements of military service.*

These requirements can be and frequently are inconvenient and harsh, but history teaches that they change very slowly, if at all. Hannibal, Montgomery, Sherman, and Schwarzkopf all placed a similar emphasis on the integrity of their subordinates and on their capacity to get straight and follow their priorities.

*Similarly, no great leader has ever settled for mediocrity in the ranks, and that is why we have the third Core Value:. **Excellence in all we do**. It points to another critical region of the dimension and tells us that we must be deeply concerned with the results of our actions and policies. All actions of interest to the military professional have consequences: they can affect the world around us, the other people with whom we work and associate, our organizations, and ourselves. Yet, although the Core Values are followed personally, they are required professionally. The Core Values are neither individual nor subjective. The Core Values are organizational values—the values all professionals must hold if this organization is to do its part in defense of the Constitution and the United States of Americas. Unless the members of the Air Force accept and follow these values, we have no chance of developing and delivering the core competencies to the joint force effort. Our customers expect nothing less than a total commitment to Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do.*

As the Air Force evolves, we may discover that these three Core Values do not efficiently, completely, or clearly capture those regions of the leadership dimension that are most important to our people. Indeed, it is our responsibility to regularly review the effectiveness of the Core Values, and we certainly may change them as we see fit. In fact, it wasn't long ago that the Air Force recognized six Core Values—integrity, courage, competence, tenacity, service, and patriotism—but they proved to be a cumbersome set of

entrances to the professional responsibility dimension of military service. But although we may revise our views about the best way to enter and survey the leadership dimension, the dimension itself remains unchanged. Its features and regions are, from the standpoint of our life-spans, immutable and unchanging.

If the Core Values point the way to fundamental principles, then those principles are fundamental for all of the services. When we look beyond the labels we use for the Core Values and examine the definitions given those labels by the services and *Joint Pub 1*, then it becomes clear that we all are reading from the same fundamental sheet of music. In fact, the Core Values are more fundamental than what we normally call "doctrine," but we have no term for something so fundamental. Perhaps we should call them "super doctrine" or "ultimate doctrine."

This means that the contents of the Little Blue Book are frozen unless the Secretary and Chief of Staff direct otherwise. The definitions of the Core Values it contains are ***not*** *optional, just as the initiative it describes applies to every person employed by the United States Air Force.*

J. INTEGRITY FIRST

Integrity first literally means what it says: given a choice between excellence and integrity, we choose integrity. Integrity is 'first among equals' under the Air Force concept of the Core Values, and it is such for three important reasons. First, Integrity holds together and is the foundation for the other Core Values. Integrity includes the general concept of Responsibility, and it is our specific responsibility to place *Service before self* and to pursue *Excellence in all we do.*

Second, without Integrity, it is impossible for us to establish and maintain the relationships of trust among ourselves or with civilian authority that are so essential to mission accomplishment. Confirmed shirkers and liars don't last long in positions of responsibility.

Third, it has been observed that our three Core Values pertain to the three main parts of the moral domain: character, duties or rules, and consequences or outcomes. *Excellence in all we do* tells us we must pay attention to consequences or outcomes; *Service before self* tells us that selfish interests take a back seat to certain duties that we have, and *Integrity first* tells us that we must have certain character traits if we are to live up to the other Core Values.



The box at right makes it clear the Air Force definition of Integrity includes much more than it normally is taken to involve. Generally speaking, many persons tend to equate Integrity with Honesty, and there can be no doubt that Honesty is part of Integrity's meaning. But Integrity means much more than that. In one sense, it means to integrate or bring things into unity—it is the ultimate character trait or the

character trait that holds all other character traits together as a whole. It also means to do what is right at the right time and in the right context—it is the disposition to be an ethical person. It also means that a person understands who he/she is as a being having fundamental worth, but also as a professional facing a task much too large for any one person or unit to carry out. A person of integrity also admits to being fallible and limited, not for the sake of self-pity, but for the sake of finding ways to overcome those limitations and to progress as a human being. There is much more involved in the concept, which you may discover for yourself by reading and reflecting on what the Little Blue Book has to say on that matter.

K. SERVICE BEFORE SELF

In several respects, *Service before self* is the most difficult of the three Core Values, and there are two reasons for this. On the one hand, *Service before self* is an idea out of style in the world outside the professions. While it may be acceptable to work hard for the purpose of earning large sums of money, many people cannot grasp why anyone would sacrifice themselves for a cause other than self-enrichment. Such persons would find the following quote from General Merrill A. McPeak, former Air Force Chief of Staff, completely absurd:

> I suspect that many of us go through the same sort of process—a journey we take that has three milestones. At the first milestone, you join up—the Air Force is a *job*. So, you get some great training, you mature, you maintain high standards, you reach the second milestone—the Air Force as a *profession*. Then you begin to gradually recognize your own personal obligation to your comrades-in-arms, the responsibility we all have for protecting our country. This is the third milestone—when you see the Air Force as a *calling*, a *vocation*. At this stage, you *are* the organization; the Air Force and you have become one thing. (*Order of the Sword* Induction Speech, 20 August 1994)

Nevertheless, however absurd it may sound outside the profession, there can be no doubt that defending the Constitution may once again require Americans to make the ultimate sacrifice, and no person can be part of the profession who refuses to place service ahead of self. In this day and age, that is a hard (but necessary) pill to swallow.

On the other hand, *Service before self* is the hardest of the three values because the definition given it in the *Little Blue Book* doesn't seem to jibe with what we normally think when we think of *Service before self*. The box at right illustrates this.

Frequently, when asked to give an example of *Service before self*, people will refer to some public service project to which they have contributed (such as a food drive, clothing drive, or effort to restore a local monument.) All of these actions are desirable and highly commendable, but they are not, strictly speaking, examples of *Service before self* as it is defined by the *Little Blue Book* (such projects are more properly placed under Community Excellence, which is discussed in section "C").



Rather, *Service before self* asks us to subordinate our personal interests, attitudes, and aspirations to the greater cause and the

demands it places on us. It means that we follow the rules as our default position; that we view others as we view ourselves—as persons deserving fundamental respect; and that we control our impulses and appetites.

Perhaps most importantly (and controversially), *Service before self* demands that we keep faith in the system. This does not mean that we may not question what we are doing. This does not mean that we must blindly follow our leaders without a second thought as to who, what, when, where, why, or how. But it does mean that we should place our trust in the processes, procedures, and people of the Air Force to get the job done in the end and to do it in the right way. The faith we are talking about is the same faith displayed by the pilot of a B-17 when he relinquished control of the aircraft to the bombardier for the purpose of making the final run on the target. If we refuse to relinquish control to the leadership, then we will fail when the nation expects us to apply our unique core competencies.

The *Little Blue Book* treats *Service before self* much the same way it treats *Integrity first,* that is it gives some general definitions of the concept and its parts, but it does so for the purpose of asking the reader to explore the wider implications of those definitions. The box on the preceding page contains that portion of the *Little Blue Book* that defines *Service before self*.

L. EXCELLENCE IN ALL WE DO

Perhaps the easiest Core Value to grasp is *Excellence in all we do*. The reason for this is that much of the discussion about this Core Value contains concepts that sound very much like those from the quality movement. But this fact is accidental. Excellence was not first discovered by the Quality Movement. The need for Excellence in warfare was apparent on the first battlefield, and it continues to be a fundamental requirement of professionalism.

Excellence also reminds us that our primary focus is to respond to the needs of our customers—the persons we are sworn to serve. Our only reason for being is to unfailingly deliver on our oath to defend the Constitution of the United States under terms specified by civilian authorities acting on behalf of the American people. No other justification for our existence can be given. No other reason for our operations is justifiable.

The need for Product or Service Excellence is perhaps the most obvious of all. Those we serve and with whom we serve expect (and deserve) nothing less. As members of this profession or vocation, to perform our jobs as well as we can as long as we can. This is not just a matter of contract, it is a matter of duty.



Personal Excellence is an equally strong professional obligation. It is our duty to constantly refresh and enrich our professional knowledge, to study those general subjects—such as military history or political science—that are indispensable to military professionals. Personal Excellence also requires a certain amount of self-regarding (not selfish) behavior—we are obliged to take care of our physical and emotional health so that we can maximize our level of performance.

Alcohol de-glamorization and smoking cessation programs, for example, are not just further intrusions in our lives by 'Big Brother'. Although both are legal substances, alcohol and tobacco can have profound and irreversible effects on personal health and professional performance.

Perhaps even more important is Community Excellence. If the mission requires a team effort, and if that team effort is impossible without an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect, then those who promote distrust and disrespect are jeopardizing the mission. But beyond even these important functional considerations, we cannot avoid the fact that all human beings, as human beings, have a fundamental worth and dignity that we must recognize and respect. This does not mean that we should not kill combatants in time of war, but it does mean there are limits to what we should do on the field of combat. The mutilation of corpses, for example, is a prohibited behavior under international law.

Resources Excellence is the commitment to properly managing our resources, whether that management covers the research and development of new weapons or the utilization of resources in the field. Resources Excellence is the primary goal of the Air Force Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Program.

Operations Excellence has two branches. The first pertains to Excellence of Internal Operations—operations internal to the Department of Defense and the Air Force itself. Internal Excellence embraces joint operations, and it reminds us that the Air Force team extends well beyond the limits of our immediate unit or organization. The second form of Excellence is External Excellence, and it covers our requirement to work with agencies outside the Defense establishment and to follow the rules and laws governing our operations in peacetime and in war. In peacetime, this certainly includes environmental law, for example, and in war time, the applicable laws of war.

M. APPLYING THE CORE VALUES

The Core Values are tools. They exist to be applied and their value is determined by how well they guide us in correctly meeting our professional obligations. It is crucial to note that the Core Values do not amount to a calculator or a checklist, and there are two important reasons why this is so.

First, the definitions of the Core Values are incomplete in one crucial respect: they do not (because they cannot) list each and every behavior that could conceivably be associated with each of the values. For example, in the very general sense given in the *Little Blue Book*, Honesty means for fuels personnel the very same thing it means for computer maintenance personnel. But on the 'nitty-gritty' level of job performance, Honesty may mean one thing for a fuels specialist (Don't pencil whip the vehicle inspection) and another thing for the computer maintenance specialist (Report damage done to a device while attempting to repair it). On the most general level, the Core Values mean the same thing for all Air Force personnel; but at the level of a specific career field or shred-out, they may have very specific and unique meanings. To list them all would be to turn the *Little Blue Book* into a telephone book.

Second, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the Core Values initiative presupposes that professionals can and must exercise judgment. It would be completely counter-value to publish a list of definitions that we are expected to follow in checklist fashion. As sign posts pointing to what is essential in the profession of arms, the Core Values invite us to more

fully explore, understand, and accept what it means to be a professional. If we act on that invitation, then we will understand the Core Values well enough to write the checklists we ourselves no longer need.

But so long as we understand that the Core Values are not dead items on a lifeless checklist; so long as we understand that the Core Values initiative demands that we explore and discover what is essential about professional service; and so long as we avoid the temptation of viewing the *Little Blue Book* as a kind of moral calculator; then we can apply the Core Values in meaningful and important ways. In fact, there are three basic ways in which the *Little Blue Book* and Core Values doctrine can be used, and these three applications are conveniently referred to as (1) The Compass; (2) The Crystal Ball; and (3) The Bag of Marbles.

1. THE COMPASS

To call the doctrine found in the *Little Blue Book* a "compass" is to call attention to our ability to use that doctrine as a professional navigation aid. Whether the application is at the personal level, the unit level, the planning level, or the policy formulation level, the *Little Blue Book* can help guide us through the ethical shoals that can scuttle a professional enterprise.

An efficient way of taking advantage of the compass application is to transform the definitions of the Core Values into a set of behaviors, attitudes, and ideas that can be used in response to professional challenges. Table C (Appendix 1) illustrates this point. The person completing this worksheet does so from the standpoint of the specific challenges he or she faces during the normal workday. Once those questions are answered, then they become a list of suggestions, reminders, cautionary notes, or even personal goals requiring constant attention. The same sort of worksheet can be developed for the organizational level, the planning level, or the level of policy development.

2. THE CRYSTAL BALL

To call the doctrine found in the *Little Blue Book* a "crystal ball" is to call attention to our ability to use that doctrine as a very informal means of assessing the ethical climate of an organization. To be sure, any attempt to do this can only produce a hazy, incomplete, and problematic result that should be taken with a large grain of salt and constantly re-evaluated. In other words, it is possible to evaluate the ethical climate of an organization through the lens of Core Values doctrine, but that lens gives a distorted and cloudy view like that supposedly afforded by a crystal ball. The lens is probably too distorted and cloudy to use as the basis for immediate action, but the view it affords may well be a gross indicator of how things stand at a particular time.

Table D (Appendix 1) contains a list of possible questions to use when making the Crystal Ball application of the Core Values doctrine. **It is not a checklist and must not be used as such!** ***It is merely a list of things to think about when attempting to size up the ethical climate of an organization. If the complete list of answers to these questions produces a product that is distorted and cloudy, then it would be a gross mistake to conclude that the answer to any one of these questions produces a sharp, definite, or reliable image.***

3. THE BAG OF MARBLES

The final way to apply the Core Values is in decision making about contemplated courses of action, and in this regard it is best to view the Core Values as a collection of principles held together in that conceptual 'bag' we call "professionalism."

There are only two questions we need to answer when making a decision:

A. Of the courses of action from which I may choose, which course of action is the one that will most likely promote a values-based Air Force?

B. Of the courses of action from which I may choose, which course of action is the one least likely to undermine a values-based Air Force?

To be sure, these are general questions, but we do have some specific ways of answering them because we know the following:

1. ***Integrity comes first***. In other words, if there is a conflict between Integrity and Service or Integrity and Excellence, Integrity takes precedence. For example, if the only way to achieve Product Excellence is to submit a false or unjustified emergency requisition for some supply item, then we must refrain from carrying out that action.

2. ***No Core Value exists in isolation from the others***. In other words, decisions should not be based on the consideration of a single Core Value. They all must be included in the decision. For example, when considering whether or not to lie to the enemy, a person cannot just focus on Honesty. One's Responsibility to defend the Constitution also must be considered.

3. ***Conflicts internal to Integrity are resolved by considering Service and Excellence***. For example, suppose that an airman observes smoke and flame coming from a building that is unoccupied, but which the airman cannot enter unaccompanied. Further suppose that no one else is around and that the airman knows there is a large fire extinguisher just inside the building. In this case, the airman has a responsibility to follow the rules covering who must be accompanied when entering the building. But the airman also has a responsibility to further the mission by safeguarding property. What should the airman do? In either case, the airman will violate a responsibility.

It is extremely important to note that a professional may face a circumstance in which he or she must choose between the Air Force Core Values and some other set of values derived from another source. The Air Force Core Values initiative does not rest on the claim that the Air Force Core Values take precedence over all other values. However, this does not change the fact that obeying the Core Values is the price of admission to the Air Force and is a condition of employment.

CHAPTER VI
SUPPORTING IDEAS

Along with Air Force Core Values doctrine, there are some additional supporting ideas that must be discussed before the initiative is fully understood. Some of these additional supporting ideas are guiding principles, others are concerns or issues that bubble to the surface of nearly every extended discussion of the Core Values and the Core Values initiative.

N. PESSIMISM, OPTIMISM, AND 'REALISM'

"*Do we really need this*?" is one of the very first questions to pop up in the course of a conversation about the Core Values initiative, and the answer a person gives to this question depends very much on whether he or she is an optimist, a pessimist, or a 'realist' at the moment the question is asked.



In the context of the *Guru's Guide*, an optimist is a person who believes the ethical climate of the Air Force has improved since 1947 and continues to get better. These persons are likely to point out that things that were done and accepted in Southeast Asia in 1972 were not only not accepted in 1992, they were prosecuted. From this perspective, it makes no sense to launch the Core Values initiative: If things are getting better without an overt Core Values initiative, then why do to the trouble or risk undoing the positive progress?



By contrast, a pessimist is a person who cannot avoid the observation that the Air Force seems to be on a strong downward spiral as we approach the 21st century. There seem to be too many scandals involving egregious violations of the fundamental principles of leadership and the time-tested obligations of military professionalism. The Ramstein CT-43 crash that took the life of Secretary Brown and other VIPs; the Fairchild crash that took the lives of several highly skilled airmen and destroyed vital national security assets; the shoot down of the Blackhawk helicopters and the failure of the chain of command in its wake—these and other recent scandals should tell us something is

wrong and getting worse. The result is that pessimists believe we should create a very robust initiative and implement it immediately with full force.

The third group is made up of those persons who like to call themselves 'realists' because they believe that history teaches us that human beings just don't change (or that they change so slowly that none of us can notice it occurring). The realist views the Core Values initiative as essentially harmless outside of the fact that it is a colossal waste of time.



Interestingly enough, the success of the Core Values initiative does not hang on any of these views. For one thing, they all tend to assume that the Core Values initiative is just a *reaction* to known corruption in the ranks, but that is not so. Recent scandals may have provided additional impetus to the initiative, but they are by no means its sole reason for being. As indicated elsewhere in this *Guide*, it is the positive prerogative of the chief executive officers of an organization to provide it with vision and direct guidance—to answer the questions, *What do we stand for*? and *What will it take from each of us to get the job done*? That prerogative exists whether the organization is perceived to be on an upward or a downward spiral, or whether human beings can change or not. This positive prerogative is being exercised through the Core Values initiative.

For another thing, they all seem to assume the initiative is about changing character, and it is not. See below for a more detailed discussion of this idea.

O. PERSONAL VS. ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES

Only human beings can recognize and follow values. Organizations 'have' and 'follow' values only in so far as significant numbers of their members their members have and follow them. Organizational values, therefore, are values shared by a significant number of the members of that organization. The larger the number of persons following a set of values, the more likely it is that the organizational climate will be influenced by those values. If many persons are venal careerists, then the atmosphere of the organization will be a poisonous one in which those who are either good or confused will be tempted to follow the example of those who are influencing the atmosphere.

Obviously, it is possible for our members to subscribe to values that are not consistent with the purposes of the organization. Those persons must realize they are potential liabilities for the organization, and will be dealt with accordingly. The Core Values initiative in no way requires them to give up the values they hold, but it *does* require them to hold those values *outside* the Air Force and in another line of work. Those who cannot subscribe to the Core Values must leave the service.

Likewise, those who do subscribe to the Core Values must act on them and they must act on them in a public manner. There must be no doubt that the Core Values are the values of the organization, and such assurance can be found only in the thoughts and deeds of the significant majority of persons in the profession.

P. CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT

In addition, all three of the viewpoints outlined above also seem to hint at the assumption that the Core Values initiative aims at fixing people by engineering the organization's culture. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the initiative presupposes that our people are good already and that they will help us improve the culture by 'de-engineering it' or by removing the remnants of past programs and policies that now retard our efforts to preserve or achieve an acceptable ethical environment in the Air Force.

In other words, the Air Force Core Values initiative as such has not set character development as a primary goal. In fact, it is expected that some character development probably will take place in the wake of our efforts to weave the Core Values into all education and operations, but that will be a happy by-product and not a strategic goal.

In this regard it may be useful to view cultural change as occurring when the good people are given a chance to sufficiently influence the 'confused' people so as to move the culture in a positive direction. Those persons who are in the 'confused' category may well undergo a character transformation as a result of this experience, but such transformation may not be required to cause cultural change.



Of course, this discussion pertains only to the Core Values initiative and does not bear upon initiatives at USAFA or elsewhere to encourage character development in trainees.

Q. "TIPPING"

The word "tipping" is here used in a loose way to refer to the idea that cultures do not change in a simple cause-and-effect way. That is, one person (or group of persons) performing a single act (or sequence off acts) is very unlikely to induce significant, immediate change in a culture. Rather, it seems much more likely that cultures change in response to a very large number of acts whose effects, collected and combined over time, tip the balance toward cultural change. If we believe the culture of the Air Force needs improving, then we must not assume that one person (for example, the Secretary or the Chief of Staff) will discover and do the one magic thing needed to induce instant change in the culture. What we must believe is that the accumulated weight of the effects of many actions will in fact produce the desired change in the culture.



For a summary of the more technical uses of this term, see "The Tipping Point" in *The New Yorker*, 3 June 1996, p. 32.

R. FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism is the view that we can find an explanation and (limited) justification for the Core Values by establishing their purpose or function in some concrete application and context. Functionalism tells us that we must subscribe to this or that Core Value because the Core Value has a clearly identifiable and important function to play in the profession of arms.

Functionalism is not a challenge to other explanations for the Core Values. The Core Values may very well have an ultimate foundation, and that foundation may very well be religious in nature, but those facts are consistent with functionalism as the term is used here. Functionalism doesn't rule out religious foundations, but it does say this: regardless of their religious views, all military professionals must obey the Core Values because of the critical function the Core Values play in our business. Saying that the Core Values have a purpose or function in no way undermines their authenticity or their ultimate origins. In fact, the functionalist interpretation of the Core Values is consistent with all other interpretations except one—the interpretation that claims the Core Values have no application to our pedestrian affairs—and it is by no means clear that anyone subscribes to it.

S. CHAPLAINS AND CHAPEL PROGRAMS

Given what has been said thus far, it should be obvious why the Core Values initiative should not be a program administered by the Chaplain. If the Core Values articulate the price of admission to professional military service—they describe the basic obligations of the air and space warrior—then their proper administration is from within the chain of command.

Likewise, the Core Values initiative in no way competes with extant chapel programs.

T. DO-IT-YOURSELF

There is an unmistakable quality of "do-it-yourself" about the Core Values initiative, and that quality is there by design. First, it is consistent with the requirements of active learning—the conditions for professional service cannot be spoon-fed; they must be discovered, understood, accepted, and applied in an appropriate way. This requires personal effort.

It should be noted, however, that the Core Values initiative is not a 'county option' plan. The architecture and doctrine are consistent across the Air Force; local units must develop and execute the one best way of making that architecture and doctrine work in their operations.

U. ASSESSMENT

The Core Values initiative de-emphasizes assessment because so many assessment efforts of the past have been counter-value in nature and effect. All too often in the past, assessment tools have become ends in themselves—things more important than the mission itself. Leadership through data manipulation became the only avenue to promotion, and these assessment tools became a corrupting influence.

This does not mean assessment should not be attempted. However, it is better to err on the side of too little than on the side of too much, and the assessment tools that are developed must never become ends in themselves.

CHAPTER VII
ACTIVE LEARNING

V. LEADERS AND TEACHERS

Teaching and learning are not restricted to the classroom. Teaching may be a form of leadership, but it is no less true that leaders also teach—whether they actually desire to do so or not. Consequently, this chapter applies to all three components of the Core Values initiative. Even though its application to the Schoolhouse Weave is obvious, active learning plays a critical role in the Field Weave and the Continuation Phase as well. It is therefore imperative that all Gurus become sufficiently familiar with this chapter to properly advise and prepare their advisees for their unavoidable teaching tasks.

W. BACKGROUND

In the simplest possible terms, **active learning** is learning by doing. Active learning places the student/subordinate in direct contact with the subject-matter, and the student/subordinate gains knowledge about the subject-matter by being invited to perform operations on it and make decisions about it. Although active learning makes the student/subordinate the center of attention, it does not coddle or cater to the student/subordinate; on the contrary, active learning places *far greater demands* on the student/subordinate than the traditional lecture method of teaching. The teacher/leader becomes a guide, quality controller, evaluator, task master, and mentor—but the teacher/leader *never* relieves the student/subordinate of his/her fundamental responsibilities as a member of the learning community. If successful, active learning produces a graduate who is an independent, self-directed, and self-perpetuating learner.

Active learning is frequently contrasted with **passive learning**. Passive learning is learning by 'insertion' or transmission. The teacher/leader conveys pre-digested, well organized information to the student/subordinate, who is expected to memorize that information for later regurgitation and application. Passive learning places the teacher/leader at the center of attention, while student/subordinate obligations amount to little more than being attentive, taking notes, and responding when spoken to. If successful, passive learning produces a graduate who is a dependent learner exposed to a large amount of information, which he or she is capable of employing or applying with varying degrees of success.

Active and passive learning have strengths and weaknesses. Passive learning is a great way to convey large quantities of information in a short period of time, but it does little in and of itself to develop student/subordinate analysis or thinking skills beyond memorization. Active learning has the general disadvantage of reducing the amount of information to which a student/subordinate is exposed, but it has several significant advantages:

(1) *Independent learning*: Although a case is discussed in a group context, it tends to promote independent learning by arousing interest in the student, who proceeds to pursue that interest and reflect on the subject-matter outside the classroom. Completely on their own, students continue to plumb the depths of the architecture of the subject-matter for very extended

periods of time (sometimes for years), and the interest aroused is so intense that it cannot be extinguished easily.

(2) *Autonomous judgment*: Independent learning fosters autonomy in judgment. That is, as students begin to pursue their interest in the subject-matter, their discoveries have a personal quality that seems to fuel a normative orientation in the owner. (These discoveries are *my* discoveries: How do they measure up to *your* discoveries?) The student develops a place to stand from which the intellectual terrain can be critically surveyed and the opinions of others skeptically assessed.

(3) *Reasoning skills*: At the same time that students are penetrating to the heart of the subject-matter's architecture, they also are hard at work determining how they should proceed with and assess the effectiveness of their investigations. They either discover the value of pre-established investigative methodologies or they actually develop similar methodologies on their own. The 'madness in method' is found to have a justification.

(4) *Professional skills*: In addition to the more general skills a student develops, there are those profession-specific skills that cases can develop. In medicine, the 'living case' of an octogenarian with joint pain helps to build bedside manner and skills of diagnosis. In business school a case may be used to explore and develop strategies for market expansion and international negotiation. In professional military education a case may be used to game a certain scenario to practice how best to use forces of varying composition and capacity.

(5) *Community building*: Along with the intellectual benefits there are affective ones. As the class works together toward the common goal of coming to terms with the architecture of the subject-matter, they learn much about each other and form bonds of cooperative friendship. The class becomes a group and the group becomes a team. Prejudice begins to evaporate as people speak to each other as individuals and not merely as representatives of this or that group. (Cases, for example, are used quite effectively in social actions training, and they have been used to build lines of communication among and between LA street gangs.)

(6) *Information retention*: In addition to all of the benefits enumerated above, it also is true to say that active learning transfers information to students in a permanent or semi-permanent way. As opposed to information that is memorized for the purpose of test regurgitation and then quickly forgotten, the insights and conclusions reached during a case discussion are retained for a very long time. For example, a student who discovers 'might makes right' in the course of discussing Thucydides' account of the Athenian invasion of Melos, is likely to retain the concept and to understand its implications far longer than the student who is told about the invasion and its implications by his professor.

Active learning is no stranger to the Air Force. From climbing telephone poles and extinguishing fires, to flying aircraft and repairing them, Air Force personnel already are engaged in learning by doing. However, because active learning has not received the "scientific" treatment given to passive learning in Air Force classrooms, there is some question as to whether or not the active learning we are presently doing is as efficient and effective as it could be. Furthermore, it is very difficult to draw conclusions from current Air Force active learning initiatives to the initiative to employ active learning in teaching the Core Values.

Given that we want Air Force personnel to take ownership of the Core Values and to develop the cognitive skills necessary to properly apply the Core Values in their decision making

and professional responsibilities, then active learning is the method of choice for the Core Values initiative. And given that we want to do all of this in a way that convinces our personnel of the of the professional relevance and importance of the Core Values, then we need to do our teaching of the Core Values in the context of the technical and professional challenges our people learn about in the Schoolhouse and face daily in the Field. In other words, we must conduct active learning in the context of active learning about other technical and professional subject-matter. Thus, the Schoolhouse Weave is not just a technique for saving time; it is crucial to the Core Values initiative.

X. THE TASK

There is one more significant difference between active and passive learning. Whereas the instructor can turn passive learning on and off like a light switch, active learning takes place whether the instructor desires it to do so or not. Student/subordinates watch the teacher/leader, they see the ways in which business is conducted, they live in an environment of our creation—and they constantly form impressions and draw conclusions from these experiences.

While we cannot switch active learning on and off, we can take control of and organize it in ways so that our people are more likely to form the most accurate impressions and draw the right conclusions. Furthermore, if the architecture of our active learning initiative is well-designed, we can greatly increase the value of the learning experience, thus increasingly the likelihood that we can positively impact the attitudes of our people and the climate of our organization. *Our task, therefore, is to assume control of the active learning already taking place in our organizations, design a blueprint that will give it the greatest possible coherence, direction, and effectiveness; and follow that blueprint faithfully so that we can maximize the Core Values opportunities only active learning can provide.*

Y. ACTIVE LEARNING TYPES

For our purposes we will identify seven distinct types of active learning; each of these types has unique characteristics that make it suitable for certain applications and unsuitable for others.

1) ***Modeling;***
2) ***One-way stories;***
3) ***Two-way stories.***
4) ***Directed discussion;***
5) ***Lived experience;***
6) ***Simulations;*** and
7) ***Cases.***

1. MODELING

Modeling is that form of active learning in which the student/subordinate draws professionally-relevant conclusions by observing the attitudes, behavior, and habits of another professional. Modeling may involve something as simple as the student/subordinate *watching* the behavior of the other professional and drawing conclusions privately without further discussion or exploration of the significance of that behavior or the intentions behind it. (It is

this simple form of modeling that goes on whether or not we wish it to.) But modeling may also be an extremely complex activity in which the student/subordinate watches and is watched by another professional such that both persons engage in regular dialogue about their behavior and its appropriateness in the professional context. This is the sort of modeling that takes place during *performance feedback* or, in what is perhaps the most complex arrangement, *mentoring*.

Modeling is the only form of active learning required by the Core Values initiative, and it is required only because it is unavoidable in its simplest form.

Example: A student in 3-level tech school observes the immature behavior and poor academic performance of the other persons in her class, and she remembers what that her recruiter said, "Oh, you'll be entering an elite career field!"

Example: A student in Squadron Officer School is invited to be one of several junior officers to have lunch with a former POW. The POW's humility and quiet confidence are so impressive that the student/subordinate finds new reasons for a dedication to the cause of national defense.

Example: A Captain and his commander go TDY. A breakfast buffet is included in the cost of their room, and so they chow down every morning. Per regulations, the Captain declares these breakfasts on his travel voucher as "meals provided," and tells the commander that he has done so. The commander responds: "OK, I'll do the same, but that's the last time you go TDY with me."

Example: A Branch Chief refuses to pass the buck when his folks drop the ball during an aircraft generation exercise. He takes full responsibility for what occurs and insists the he and he alone should pay the consequences because he made a bad decision that caused his branch to fail.

2. ONE-WAY STORIES

One-Way Stories are that form of active learning in which the teacher/leader simply tells a story to his/her subordinates/students. The teacher/leader may or may not draw conclusions for subordinates (in fact, the story have greater sticking power if conclusions are not drawn, leaving subordinates/students to wrestle with the implications.) The teacher/leader may or may not ask a student/subordinate to comment, and then comment on the student's/subordinate's comments. However, the one-way story becomes a directed discussion (see below) when the entire group is invited to engage in a free-wheeling discussion about the story. Normally, One-Way Stories are used when the teacher/leader wishes to maintain fairly strict control of process and content.

Example: A group commander is interviewing a captain for a squadron commander position. The captain is told the story of a previous squadron commander who ordered the soda machine and all coffee-makers removed from the squadron area because of his religious objections to the consumption of caffeine. The group commander then asks the interviewee to comment on this story.

Example: An instructor at the AETC Wing Commanders Course invites her student/subordinates to comment on the following story: A Wing Commander in Korea owned a French poodle ("Fifi"), which he took everywhere with him. Fifi was to be treated as royalty, and got the best food in the chow hall, a seat in the staff car, and a specially-constructed dog house. Members of the local EOD unit were disgusted by this treatment of a

canine, and so they successfully kidnapped Fifi, got her drunk on beer laced with sugar, created a full body cast from plaster-of-Paris for her, and inserted a bomb lug nut in the middle of the back of the cast before it hardened. The wing commander was frantic over the loss of his beloved pooch, but he nevertheless decided to fly the next day's mission. As he was doing the pre-flight of his F-4, he discovered Fifi (alive and well but seriously hung over) hanging from a bomb rack in her full body cast, furiously kicking her little manicured feet.

3. TWO-WAY STORIES

Two-Way Stories are that form of active learning in which the teacher/leader invites subordinates to tell and comment on a story of their own; other student/subordinates are then asked to comment on the story-teller's comments, as well as to give their understanding of the professionally-relevant implications of the story just told.

4. DIRECTED DISCUSSION

Directed Discussion is that form of active learning in which the teacher/leader invites student/subordinates to collaboratively analyze and draw conclusions about features in the ethical climate in which they live or work, including recommendations or plans for improving a poor environment by fixing certain features or sustaining a good one by preserving other features.

Example: An instructor at the Senior NCO Academy invites in captains, majors, and Lt Colonels from SOS, ACSC, and AWC to discuss with his student/subordinates the following question: "Are Chief Master Sergeants (or E-9's in general) more trouble than they are worth to the Air Force (or the military profession)?"

Example: At the end of the out-brief for the annual Quality of Life Survey for her unit, a commander says to all assembled: "Well, we were pretty good except for the questions dealing with trust. Do we really have a trust problem, and how do we go about fixing it?"

5. LIVED EXPERIENCE

Lived Experience is that form of active learning in which a person is expected to draw professionally-relevant conclusions from a sequence of events that person has shared and discusses with another professional. A lived experience is a genuine (not staged or simulated) experience in which the challenges or dangers are shared, thus making the participants (temporary) peers.

Example: The crew of a B-52 experience a quick-spreading engine fire during an engine run-up following an alert klaxon. High winds whip the fire, which quickly destroys a wing of the aircraft. The crew barely escapes. Later, the aircraft commander meets with the crew and invites them to comment on the professionalism displayed during these events.

Example: A trainee commits suicide in BMT. Those responsible for her welfare meet to discuss the event and its possible causes.

6. SIMULATIONS

Simulations are that form of active learning in which the student/subordinate is asked to draw professionally-relevant conclusions from a sequence of events constructed and controlled by the teacher/leader , but only lived through by the student/subordinate (subordinate), either alone or in conjunction with other student/subordinates .

Example: While waiting to take his "psych" test for admission to Starfleet Academy, Wesley Crusher hears an explosion and screaming coming from a room down the hall. Rushing to see what has happened, Wesley discovers two injured men in the room, and he realizes he has time to save only one before the emergency doors crash into place. Wesley must choose, and the choice he makes turns out to be his "psych" test. The explosion and the injuries were simulated.

Example: During an ORI a wing simulates deployment overseas. The end-result is a disaster: tons of frustrated cargo must be left on the ramp as wing personnel board the planes.

7. CASE STUDIES

Case Studies are that form of active learning in which the student/subordinate is asked to draw professionally-relevant conclusions after engaging in collaborative analysis and decision making with other student/subordinates about challenges faced by third parties. A "case" is anything that will compel group decision making. The best cases are real or true; do not give away the answer; and are professionally relevant to the members of the group.

Example: An Astronautics class at the Air Force Academy reads about, analyzes and debates the actions of the persons involved in the *Challenger* disaster.

Example: A National War College ethics class reads and discusses the professionalism displayed in *Billy Budd*.

Z. THE TYPES IN-TURN

It is impossible in this space to completely describe the active learning types. What this section does do, however, is (1) describe them in terms of their pedagogic (teaching) characteristics, (2) indicate the techniques we may use to apply them, and (3) list traps and pitfalls associated with each type.

Each of the types of active learning has a variety of pedagogic characteristics. Some of them are relevant to the Core Values initiative, others are not. In this chapter we are concerned with those characteristics they have in common and which help us decide which type of active learning may be most appropriate for performance of the Schoolhouse Weave in a particular course or the Field Weave in a particular unit or both.

As tables A and B show (please see Appendix 1: Tables), we can compare and contrast the active learning types along two axes: the "Challenge" axis and the "Influence" axis. The Challenge Axis represents the added burdens or resource demands of the various active learning types. One consults this axis to answer the question: *What additional work must I do, what additional resources must I expend, or what additional requirements must I satisfy if I adopt this active learning type?* The Influence Axis attempts to represent the usefulness of the active learning types in reaching desired certain goals and/or their capacity to backfire and produce undesired goals. One consults this axis to answer the question: *Given that this is what I want to accomplish, which active learning type should I choose?*

There is no "science" associated with the numbers in Table A; at best, the numbers a ‘guesstimate’ of the characteristic value of a particular learning type. Nevertheless, even as guesstimates, the numbers can give us a fairly reliable general impression of the uses and the costs of using each of the learning types.

1. MODELING

a) Characteristics

With respect to the Challenges Axis (Table A), the ratings assigned to Modeling are very low. It is comparatively easy to implement in an organized way because it is unavoidable in its simplest form. The cost of its implementation in the Schoolhouse is the same as the cost of its implementation in the Field, and the only real 'expense' associated with it is in the time needed to train personnel to perform it in its complex form and to administer a systematic program.

With respect to the Influence Axis (Table B), the assigned ratings make it clear that Modeling can have a powerful influence on individuals as well as organizations. This is especially true in the superior/subordinate relationship, where Modeling can have a very significant positive or negative influence on the subordinate.

In its simplest form, Modeling is unavoidable, and if well-organized and regulated, it can have a very significant effect at a very low cost.

b) Technique

The techniques associated with modeling can be quite complex and time intensive, but the expenditure of effort can have a tremendous payoff both for the person doing the modeling and those for whom the modeling is done.

(1) At the simplest possible level, the person doing the modeling can perform a *self-analysis* using a worksheet like the one found at Appendix 1, Table C. The instructor or other leader should use the worksheet to identify those areas where he/she is especially likely to promote or undermine a core value. For example, if he/she works in a unit whose mission is to constantly respond to last minute taskings from a very senior officer, then he or she should realize that faith in the system is something to worry about modeling. It is possible for a leader in such a position to undercut the influence of a core value with a single careless remark about the very senior officer or the very senior officer's staff.

Likewise, instructors can use the worksheet at Appendix 1, Table C to identify those core values that are most appropriate to consciously model to prepare students for field operations. For example, if the instructor teaches the basic course of an AFSC in which it is possible for technicians to cut corners without being discovered for several years, the instructor may want to emphasize the importance of integrity when no one is watching. This may be modeled in the way the instructor goes about his or her duties in the classroom and by the way the instructor emphasizes certain steps during practical exercises.

(2) At a more complex level, modeling can involve *dialogue* between the superior and the subordinate (teacher and student) about the nature of professionalism, the obligations it imposes, the ways in which the superior and the subordinate do or do not measure up to the Core Values, and the ways they might work together to ensure their piece of the Air Force is values-based.

> (a) Performance Feedback—such a dialogue may be an occasional and infrequent one, such as during performance feedback sessions; the superior would not run through the Core Values as a checklist, but might instead identify three or four core values subordinate commendably follows and three or four that might require a bit more attention by the subordinate. The superior should also invite the subordinate to similarly evaluate the superior.

(b) Mentoring—AFPD 36-34 (*Air Force Mentoring Program*, 1 NOV 96) defines a *mentor* as "'a trusted counselor or guide'" and *mentoring* as "a relationship in which a person with greater experience guides another person to develop both personally and professionally." Because mentoring is "a fundamental responsibility of all Air Force supervisors" and "covers a wide range of areas . . . (including) career guidance, professional development, Air Force history and heritage, and knowledge of air and space power. It also includes knowledge of the ethos of our profession, and understanding the Air Force's Core Values of integrity, service, and excellence."

AFPD 36-34 also suggests that mentoring can be folded into performance feedback, but there is no requirement that it should stop with a performance feedback session. Indeed, those who truly wish to model may wish to develop an on-going mentoring relationship in which the subordinate is genuinely challenged to achieve maximum professional and personal development. Moreover, AFPD 36-34 directs the development of a local mentoring program for company grade officers, but there is no reason why company grade officers should be the only persons mentored. Under the Core Values initiative concept of career-long professional development, everyone should be mentored in the manner described by AFPD 36-34.

c) Traps and Pitfalls

The great trap or pitfall of this active learning type is the assumption that all modeling can be controlled by the superior, i.e., "they observe what we want them to observe." The fact is, "they" observe everything, whether "we" want them to or not. Modeling can have as strong a negative effect as a positive one, and to take it lightly or for granted is to court disaster—both for oneself and for one's subordinates.

2. ONE-WAY STORIES

a) Characteristics

One-Way Stories require the least expense of all because they require even less administrative work than Modeling. Although One-Way Stories do not have quite the large payoff as Modeling, they can be quite effective in demonstrating the importance of the Core Values to subordinates and in sampling the beliefs and attitudes of persons and organizations.

b) Technique

The technique of using the One-Way Story is really quite straightforward and well known to most of us. The trick (if there is one) is to find a story that illustrates the point you want to make and is receptive to the audience. The best such story is true, personally relevant to the audience, memorable, thought-provoking, and values-driven (consistent with the *Little Blue Book*).

One-Way Stories become a form of active learning when they compel the listener to reflect upon their content and implication; the One-Way Story should be something the listener carries away from the conversation and continues to think about from time to time. The best such story is one that impresses unforgettable Core Values lessons on the listeners—relevant lessons they can apply on the job. A list of key considerations follows:

- Is the story you plan to tell personally relevant to your audience? (Is it about someone who is like the members of the audience in some key respect or is someone with whom they can easily identify?)
- Do you know the story to be true?
- Does it make a worthwhile Core Values point?
- Does it make a Core Values point in a subtle and thought-provoking way? (The person telling the story should avoid prefacing it with a phrase like, "Let me tell you a story about humility." Instead, the story should be rich enough to allow the persons who hear it to draw their own appropriate Core Values conclusions without hitting them over the head
- Is the story values-driven? (That is, it is not enough that the story makes a values point; it must also rest on a firm values foundation. For example, it would be unacceptable to make a point about courage by telling a story that involved disrespect to some ethnic group. The point made about courage will be wiped away by the bigotry displayed, and that bigotry will become the *real* lesson of the story.)

c) Traps and Pitfalls

When does a story fall short of the mark? When it is unintelligible or irrelevant to the audience; when it violates the Core Values; and/or when it does not challenge the listener to take it away from the conversation and to think it over.

3. TWO-WAY STORIES

a) Characteristics

Two-Way Stories pose a greater challenge than either Modeling or One-Way Stories, but not by much. Plugging Two-Way Stories into the Schoolhouse is a challenging activity because it may require significant adjustments to a lesson plan or block of instruction to accommodate this technique. At the very least, the instructor will need to carefully evaluate placement of two-way discussion in the curriculum.

With the increased work, however, there are increased benefits associated with Two-Way Stories. If I tell you a story to make a point (as in One-Way Storytelling), there is a good chance the story will have a positive payoff if it has been properly selected and told. But if I get you to swap stories with me to make some point, then I have dramatically improved the chance that you will understand the point I am trying to make; for, by choosing a story and telling it to me, you are actually applying the point I wish to make. This is especially true if I follow the story exchange with a discussion of the stories we have told and their effectiveness in making the point I am illustrating.

Thus, by expending slightly more work than the work expended in One-Way Storytelling, Two-Way Stories promise a somewhat larger bang for the buck.

b) Technique

The technique associated with Two-Way Stories is very similar, but not equivalent to, One-Way Stories. The person initiating the exchange (the first storyteller) should do so as though he/she is telling a One-Way Story, but from that point forward the situation changes. After the first story is told, a listener is encouraged to tell a story from his/her experience, and the discussion that follows that story focuses explicitly on its Core Values content. The second story

teller is asked to evaluate what he/she believes to be the Core Values of content of his/her story. Comments are then made about that evaluation (either by the first storyteller or by other listeners)

Two-Way Storytelling thus promotes the deeper investigation of the Core Values and the way they influence our daily activities. What the listeners should carry away from the experience is the challenge to more completely understand the Core Values and their proper application. It is also a good way to help others reflect on One-Way Storytelling as a form of active learning.

c) Traps and Pitfalls

The traps and pitfalls of One-Way Storytelling apply here. Additionally, there are the risks associated with inviting a listener to tell a story. Is it on target? Is it values-driven? These are the kinds of question with which the person in charge must deal. A values violating story cannot be allowed to pass without criticism. If the values lesson of the story is obscure, it must be clarified.

4. DIRECTED DISCUSSION

a) Characteristics

Directed Discussion is a difficult thing to do well, especially within the constraints of a formal course. The leader/teacher places something on the table for discussion (personal story, article from the newspaper, some recent event in the unit's history) and then invites a free-wheeling discussion. Subordinates/students are invited to give their evaluation of the thing in question, and to suggest what might be done about or in response to that thing. The goal (generally speaking) is not to reach a consensus about the topic or what should be done about it. The goal is usually something more indirect—for example, team building or to give those involved in the discussion a better sense of the complexities of their professional challenges and responsibilities. The difficulty with Directed Discussion, however, is in the teacher/leader achieving just the right amount of control. Too much control, and the discussion never gels as it should; too little control, and the discussion may become a food fight.

There are certain contexts, however, in which the use of Directed Discussion can have significant payoffs. It is extremely useful in sampling the ethical climate of an organization, and it can be extremely powerful in promoting the Field Weave by inviting the members of an organization to carefully and publicly explore what is good or bad about the climate in which they live, as well as the ways in which that climate can be preserved/improved.

b) Technique

Directed discussion involves the introduction of some subject (for example, an article in the local paper about the misbehavior of some Air Force person, the implications of a new uniform requirement, decreasing benefits, etc.) and then achieving a Core Values payoff by allowing a controlled discussion of that subject. Directed discussions can be extremely effective forms of active learning because participants are more likely to carry away from the experience and think about things they have passionately discussed with their peers.

The following considerations are relevant to any directed discussion:

- Is the item chosen for discussion likely to produce a Core Values payoff?

- Is the conversation consistent with the Core Values? In this respect it is useful to follow the Rules of Engagement found at Appendix 1, Table E, especially rules 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8.. Although this table is designed for Case Studies (see below), it applies to Directed Discussion because of the social component shared by both active learning types.
- Does the person who initiates the conversation follow the Goldilocks Control Balance Principle: not *too* much, not *too* little, but just enough control? One sure sign there is too much control is a non-self-sustaining discussion (one requiring constant 'jump starts' to get going). One sure sign of too little control is the proverbial 'food fight' in which the discussion generates anger and confusion but sheds very little light on the subject matter.

c) Traps and Pitfalls

Food fights and overly-long conversations are the most significant traps.

5. LIVED EXPERIENCE

a) Characteristics

Lived Experience can be one of the most influential forms of active learning. Conclusions drawn or lessons learned from an actual, real-world experience—especially one in which the professional characteristics of the persons involved were challenged in an extreme way—are likely to leave an indelible mark on those living the experience.

b) Technique

Lived Experience would ordinarily be a directed discussion involving only those persons involved in the experience. It is conceivable, too, that it might become an opportunity for Two-Way Storytelling (each person relates that portion of the experience which he/she believes to be especially significant).

c) Traps and Pitfalls

It is because of the traps and pitfalls associated with Lived Experience that we identify it as a separate type. The other six active learning types lack complete spontaneity or, to put it another way, their employment usually follows some amount of preparation on the part of the leader/teacher. Not so Lived Experience, which can never be fully anticipated and are frequently completely spontaneous. Those who wish to capitalize on Lived Experience may want to consider the following:

- Those who wish to turn shared experiences into active learning opportunities must be fully versed in the *Little Blue Book*, especially its definitions of the Core Values.
- Those who wish to employ Lived Experience may want to learn to do it from another person already proficient in this learning type.
- Those who wish to employ Lived Experience should be proficient in Modeling, Two-Way Storytelling, and Directed Discussion before attempting to tackle Lived Experience.
- Those who wish to employ Lived Experience should be aware that all parties will almost certainly carry the experience home with them and continue to reflect on it—so much so that they may wish to revisit the discussion of it on several occasions in the future. In other words, if you use Lived Experience, the discussion of it may well consume a lot of your time.

6. SIMULATIONS

a) Characteristics

Simulations combine the rich content of Lived Experience with the organization afforded by a case to produce the potentially most influential active learning technique. Of course, simulations require an immense amount of planning and organizational control if they are to be most effective.

b) Technique

The best Simulation is one that runs itself without the intervention of the person responsible for the Simulation. The person responsible for the Simulation should of course discreetly observe it and ensure that the rules of the simulation are being followed, but the goal is to ask subordinates/students to come as close as possible to reality during the exercise.

c) Traps and Pitfalls

In a sense, Simulations are Directed Discussions without the intervention of the teacher/leader. Thus, the pitfalls are the same as for Directed Discussion, but with the added complication that a Simulation requires much more advance planning.

7. CASES

a) Characteristics

Cases are very similar to Simulations, except that cases require less initial planning to be successful and have a slightly lower instructional payoff. A case is anything that invites students to collectively scratch at and penetrate to the architecture of the subject matter. In this respect, it can be discursive or non-discursive. If it is discursive, it can be a paragraph long or many pages. If it is non-discursive, it can be anything from a fish to dissect to a pile of wreckage from an aircraft accident. Whatever its precise nature, the case must compel students to make decisions in a social context. An excellent case is an immediate doorway to the subject matter, but it is not itself a guided tour. The door is thrown wide, leaving students to explore what is there and to develop procedures to optimize that exploration. These general considerations hold in the tightly controlled environment of law school every bit as well as they hold in the more open-ended context one finds in the study of international affairs or medicine.

Cases are especially useful in developing advanced analysis, reasoning, and decision making skills in students.

b) Technique

Those interested in the technique of teaching case studies should contact the Core Values Website for further information.

c) Traps and Pitfalls

The following traps and pitfalls make up the downside of case teaching:

- *Labor intensive*: Case teaching requires a great deal of in-advance preparation. The educator must anticipate the twists and turns of the class discussion so as to ask just the right questions that will nudge the course of the discussion in the right direction. Such planning actually begins with the design of the course and will continue up to the day the case is taught.
- *Loss of control*: The educator loses control in the same measure as he or she 'empowers' students to assume responsibility for their education. No two sections will discuss a case in

the same way, cover the same area of subject-matter architecture in the same way, or even employ the same categories or labels to deal with that subject-matter.

- *Inefficiency*: From the standpoint of all involved, cases at first may seem to be a profound waste of time, especially when the purpose of the case is to convey principles and concepts the professor could easily lecture about.
- *Dual competency requirement*: The passive method requires the educator to possess a competency with respect to the subject-matter—and that is the only competency he or she will ever need. The case method requires a dual competency, viz. subject-matter and teaching process. To those immersed in the passive method, this seems especially inefficient; the educator is too busy doing research and publishing to spend any time learning to teach. In fact, learning to teach is considered to be a time sink and a dodge.

APPENDIX 1

TABLE A

CHALLENGES AXIS (CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIVE LEARNING TYPES)

This table is a rough-and-tumble representation of the costs associated with the various active learning types. When combined with Table B, which describes the benefits associated with these types, it should be possible to form a general, but useful idea of which type to use under which consequences. For a more detailed discussion of this table and its uses, see Chapter Four, Section E, of this "Guide."

1= little, few, modest 7 = a lot, many, high, much * = depends on circumstance + = number indicated or higher	MOD	LIVD EXP	DIR DSCSN	SIM	1-WAY	2-WAY	CASES
Work required to perform in Schoolhouse	1	*	5	6	2+	4+	5
Work required to perform in Field	1	2	1	3	1	1	7
Demands on administrative skills and intelligence	2	1	2	6	2+	2+	3+
Demands on administrative time and resources	4	1	4	3	1	1	1
Demands on instructor skills and intelligence	2	5	5	3	2+	3+	4+
Demands on instructor time outside the classroom	2	1	4	4	2+	1	6+
Demands on student time outside the classroom	1	1	1	3+	1	2+	3+
Demands on student maturity and experience	1	3	4	3+	1	3	4+
Demands on student intelligence	1	3	3	3+	1	2	3+
Demands on faculty development resources	3	3	5	3	2+	2+	6
Demands on physical resources	1	1	3+	2+	1	1	3+
Demands on classroom time management	1	1	6	3+	2+	3+	5+

TABLE B

INFLUENCE AXIS (CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIVE LEARNING TYPES, PART 2)

This table very roughly represents the benefits associated with each of the active learning types. When combined with Table A, which describes the costs associated with these types, it should be possible to form a general, but useful idea of which type to use under which consequences. For a more detailed discussion of this table and its uses, see Chapter Four, Section E, of this "Guide."

1= little, few, modest, low 7 = a lot, many, high, much, high * = depends on circumstance + = number indicated or higher	MOD	LIVD EXP	DIR DSCSN	SIM	1-WAY	2-WAY	CASES
Capacity to influence students to own a conclusion or principle	7	5	5	7	3	6	7
Capacity to help students grasp importance of the Core Values	7	7	5	7	5+	6	7
Capacity to improve group communication skills	1	4	4	4	2	5+	7
Capacity to build trust in a group	1	4	3	7	1	3	7
Positive effect on analysis skills and professional decision making	3	4	3	7	3	4+	7
Utility in sampling student attitudes and beliefs	1	4	6	3	6	6	5
Utility in sampling the climate of an organization	1	4	6	3	6	3	5
Utility promoting the Field Weave	7	7	7	7	3	3	2
Capacity to positively change the climate of an organization	4+	5+	2+	7	2	3	7
Capacity to negatively change the climate of an organization	4+	5+	2+	7	2	3	7
Capacity to positively change the thought or behavior of an instructor	5+	4	3+	2	1	2	4
Capacity to negatively change the thought or behavior of an instructor	2	3	2+	2	1	2	4
Capacity to positively change in thought or behavior of a student	5+	4	3+	6+	3	3	5
Capacity to negatively change the thought or behavior of a student	5+	3	2+	6+	3	3	5
Capacity to cause change in thought or behavior long after initial learning experience is over	5+	2	2	7	3	4	7

TABLE C

PROFESSIONAL COMPASS WORKSHEET

This worksheet guides any member of the Air Force through the process of matching the Core Values with his/her individual behavior, attitudes, and ways of doing business. It asks the person to consider the full context within which professional duties are carried out, and to further consider how he/she might go about promoting a values-based Air Force. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Four, Section E1 and Chapter Two, Section D2.

GIVEN THE FOLLOWING CORE VALUE . . .	→	**WHAT CAN I DO IN THE FUTURE TO PROMOTE THIS CORE VALUE?**	**WHAT MUST I AVOID DOING IN THE FUTURE SO THAT I DON'T UNDERMINE THIS CORE VALUE?**
INTEGRITY FIRST			
Integrity is a character trait. It is the willingness to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is the "moral compass"—the inner voice; the voice of self-control; the basis for the trust imperative in today's military.			
Integrity is the ability to hold together and properly regulate all of the elements of a personality. A person of integrity, for example, is capable of acting on conviction. A person of integrity can control impulses and appetites.			
But integrity also covers *several other moral traits* indispensable to national service.			
Courage. A person of integrity possesses moral courage and does what is right even if the personal cost is high.			
Honesty. Honesty is the hallmark of the military professional because in the military, our word must be our bond. We don't pencil-whip training reports, we don't cover up tech data violations, we don't falsify documents, and we don't write misleading operational readiness messages. *The bottom line is we don't lie, and we can't justify any deviation.*			

Responsibility. No person of integrity is irresponsible; a person of true integrity acknowledges his or her duties and acts accordingly.			
Accountability. No person of integrity tries to shift the blame to others or take credit for the work of others; "the buck stops here" says it best.			
Justice. A person of integrity practices justice. Those who do similar things must get similar rewards or similar punishments.			
Openness. Professionals of integrity encourage a free flow of information within the organization. They seek feedback from all directions to ensure they are fulfilling key responsibilities, and they are never afraid to allow anyone at any time to examine how they do business.			
Self-respect. To have integrity also is to respect oneself as a professional and a human being. A person of integrity does not behave in ways that would bring discredit upon himself or the organization to which he belongs.			
Humility. A person of integrity grasps and is sobered by the awesome task of defending the Constitution of the United States of America.			

GIVEN THE FOLLOWING . . .	→	WHAT CAN I DO IN THE FUTURE TO PROMOTE THIS CORE VALUE?	WHAT MUST I AVOID DOING IN THE FUTURE SO THAT I DON'T UNDERMINE THIS CORE VALUE?
SERVICE BEFORE SELF			
Service before self tells us that professional duties take precedence over personal desires. At the very least it includes the following behaviors:			
Rule following. To serve is to do one's duty, and our duties are most commonly expressed through rules. While it may be the case that professionals are expected to exercise judgment in the performance of their duties, good professionals understand that rules have a reason for being, and the default position must be to follow those rules unless there is a clear, operational reason for refusing to do so.			
Respect for others. Service before self tells us also that a good leader places the troops ahead of his/her personal comfort. We must *always* act in the certain knowledge that all persons possess a fundamental worth as human beings.			
Discipline and self-control. Professionals cannot indulge themselves in self-pity, discouragement, anger, frustration, or defeatism. They have a fundamental moral obligation to the persons they lead to strike a tone of confidence and forward-			

looking optimism. More specifically, they are expected to exercise control in the following areas:			
Anger. Military professionals—and especially commanders at all echelons—are expected to refrain from displays of anger that would bring discredit upon themselves and/or the Air Force.			
Appetites. Those who allow their appetites to drive them to make sexual overtures to subordinates are unfit for military service. Likewise, the excessive consumption of alcohol casts doubt on an individual's fitness, and when such persons are found to be drunk and disorderly, all doubts are removed.			
Religious toleration. Military professionals must remember that religious choice is a matter of individual conscience. Professionals, and especially commanders, must not take it upon themselves to change or coercively influence the religious views of subordinates.			
Faith in the system. To lose faith in the system is to adopt the view that you know better than those above you in the chain of command what should or should not be done. In other words, to lose faith in the system is to place self before service. Leaders can be very influential in this regard: if a leader resists the temptation to doubt 'the system', then subordinates may follow suit.			

GIVEN THE FOLLOWING . . .	→	WHAT CAN I DO IN THE FUTURE TO PROMOTE THIS CORE VALUE?	WHAT MUST I AVOID DOING IN THE FUTURE SO THAT I DON'T UNDERMINE THIS CORE VALUE?
EXCELLENCE IN ALL WE DO			
Excellence in all we do directs us to develop a sustained passion for continuous improvement and innovation that will propel the Air Force into a long-term, upward spiral of accomplishment and performance.			
Product/service excellence. We must focus on providing services and generating products that fully respond to customer wants and anticipate customer needs, and we must do so within the boundaries established by the taxpaying public.			
Personal excellence. Military professionals must seek out and complete professional military education, stay in physical and mental shape, and continue to refresh their general educational backgrounds.			
Community excellence. Community excellence is achieved when the members of an organization can work together to successfully reach a common goal in an atmosphere free of fear that preserves individual self-worth. Some of the factors influencing interpersonal excellence are:			
Mutual respect. Genuine respect involves viewing another person as an *individual* of fundamental			

worth. Obviously, this means that a person is never judged on the basis of his/her possession of an attribute that places him or her in some racial, ethnic, economic, or gender-based category.			
Benefit of the doubt. Working hand in glove with mutual respect is that attitude which says that all coworkers are 'innocent until proven guilty'. Before rushing to judgment about a person or his/her behavior, it is important to have the whole story.			
Resources excellence. *Excellence in all we do* also demands that we aggressively implement policies to ensure the best possible cradle-to-grave management of resources.			
Material resources excellence. Military professionals have an obligation to ensure that all of the equipment and property they ask for is mission essential. This means that residual funds at the end of the year should not be used to purchase 'nice to have' add-ons.			
Human resources excellence. Human resources excellence means that we recruit, train, promote, and retain those who can do the best job for us.			
Operations excellence. There are two kinds of operations excellence—internal and external.			
Excellence of internal operations. This form of excellence pertains to the way we do business internal to the Air Force—from the unit level to Headquarters Air Force. It involves respect on the unit level and a total commitment to			

maximizing the Air Force team effort.			
Excellence of external operations. This form of excellence pertains to the way in which we treat the world around us as we conduct our operations. In peacetime, for example, we must be sensitive to the rules governing environmental pollution, and in wartime we are required to obey the laws of war.			

TABLE D

THE "CRYSTAL BALL" APPLICATION OF CORE VALUES DOCTRINE

The purpose of this table is to discuss ways in which Core Values doctrine can be used to assess the ethical climate of an organization. This application is called the "Crystal Ball" application to suggest that any such assessment effort will be imprecise and incomplete—at best. For a more detailed discussion of the "Crystal Ball" application of Core Values doctrine, see Chapter 2, Section D2.

GROSS INDICATORS By "gross indicator" is meant one of those in-place measurements that normally catches the attention of the boss when it is flashed on the screen at standup. These indicators may have some value assisting us to gauge the ethical climate of an organization, but we are very far from knowing what, if any, connection exists between, for example, the number of letters of reprimand handed out in a squadron and the ethical climate of that squadron.	**Has your organization recently performed well in inspections and staff assistance visits?** **Does your organization have a commendable track record with respect to judicial and non-judicial punishments and adverse administrative actions, especially those arising from sexual harassment or racial/ethnic conflict?** **Does your organization have a positive reputation with customers, as revealed by surveys?**

SUBTLE INDICATORS By "subtle indicator" is meant one of those small things that may point to a deeper, more complex state of affairs. For example, if the movie bearing his name is to be believed, General Patton thought that the refusal of headquarters personnel to wear neckties and helmets was a sign that the whole Army lacked discipline and was not combat ready. Listed here are small things that <u>may</u> tell us something about the ethical climate of an organization. There is no guarantee they are as useful as General Patton's indicators, but they should provide grist for the mill.	
Who comes first in your organization?	*Take a walking tour of your organization. Do the persons on the cutting edge of your mission have the resources they need to do the job? Do the persons on the cutting edge of the mission have a work environment as nice as*

	those who support them? Are job critical resources distributed in a manner to maximize mission effectiveness? For example, if the primary task of your organization is to do word processing, and those who do the actual word processing have 286's and their supervisors have Pentium 166's, then there may be a problem.) Obviously, RHIP. But is RHIP being invoked to justify selfishness and careerism? *Review the leave log: Who is granted leave over the holidays? Are subordinates compelled to work while more senior personnel are on leave? Moreover, who is signing all of the leave forms: Are mid-level supervisors doing this or has the commander reserved this as his/her function? If the latter, then it is quite possibly the case that your predecessor was a micromanager who did little to build trust in the organization.* *Talk to the supervisors: Can they answer simple questions about subordinates (such as, Does that person have dependents? What is that person's first name? Where is that person from? When is that person due to test for promotion? When is that person in the zone?)*
If you stand by a main exit at closing time, are you likely to be trampled by those eager to leave the building?	*Obviously, even total professionals can be eager to leave the building at the end of the duty day, but if the day ends at 1630, and the building is empty and dark at 1632, then it would not be reasonable to infer that persons in your organization are not fully committed to service before self or that they may find the atmosphere in the organization so oppressive that they cannot control the urge to flee.* *It also might be instructive to watch the door an hour before the end of the duty day: How many senior personnel are leaving at that time on a regular basis?*
Do the people assigned to your organization have a solid knowledge of the instructions, directives, tech data, and other rules governing your operation?	*Obviously, a person may know the rules and not follow them; but this question is driven by the belief that knowing the rules at least implies the possibility of a genuine commitment to excellence, service, and integrity. A person of integrity learns the rules so that he/she can do her/his duty. A person dedicated to service will learn the rules because he/she knows that standards are set by others and are not determined by what he/she feels is right. Of course, a person committed to excellence will learn the rules so that he/she will understand the meaning of acceptable and superior job performance.*
If you sit and listen to a	*It is not clear how much weight should be assigned to this*

conversation among the persons in your organization, are they more likely to use the words "we" and "you" than they use the words "me" and "I"?	*indicator, but it is reasonable to infer that people regularly talk about things that they think about regularly. For example, if a person in your unit talks about 'getting drunk' or 'getting bombed' every time you encounter her, then you have good reason to believe that she thinks a lot about doing these things. Likewise, if a person assigned to your unit talks mostly about himself and not about other persons or things, then you may be forgiven the inference that he is the center of his universe. Does that make him a careerist who places self before service? No, it does not. But it is food for thought.*
Do unit personnel openly and regularly blame other persons or outside causes for problems occurring in the unit?	*It may well be the case that outside forces are causing problems inside the unit, but a general tendency to always blame someone else may be an indicator of a serious integrity problem. Persons of integrity, as defined in Part One of this manual, accept their responsibilities and insist on being held accountable.*
When a problem occurs, do persons in the unit ask, "Who did this?" or do they ask "How can we fix this?"?	*This question is different than the preceding one, which really asks whether or not the persons in your unit accept responsibility. This question asks whether the persons in your unit are oriented toward personalities (and punishment) or mission accomplishment. Perhaps your predecessor 'ruled' through fear and intimidation; in that case, persons can be expected to be oriented toward personalities and punishments—and that means they had greater temptations to check 6 and sacrifice integrity.*
When a problem occurs, are people afraid to tell you about it?	*This reluctance may be a sign that your predecessor was inclined to shoot the messenger and that you have much work to do on the level of trust in your organization.*
Do unit personnel have a tendency to say "That's not fair" when they are given short notice tasking?	*Obviously, persons in your unit may have a legitimate complaint about the distribution of burdens or benefits in the unit when they use the phrase "That's not fair" (for example, it may be a sign that a supervisor is assigning jobs on the basis of his/her racial prejudice). But there are many other cases where "That's not fair" really means "That's not convenient" or "Regardless of the impact on the mission, you shouldn't ask me to do any more work than anyone else." In such cases, the person saying "That's not fair" has a real problem understanding the concept of service before self.*
Do persons in your organization	*Perhaps they are reluctant to make decisions because they*

display a fear of decision making, even when the decisions seem to be about minor or trivial things?	*want to first figure out how things stand with the new boss before they assert themselves, but this reluctance may also be a sign that your predecessor was a micromanager who refused to allow anyone else to make decisions. In the latter case, it is possible that the level of trust in the unit may be something to be concerned about.*
Is there evidence of a "filling the squares" attitude in your unit?	*For example, was your predecessor a "show, glow, and blow" careerist? If so, you can bet the wrong example was set for the junior folks in the squadron, thus increasing the possibility they will emulate your predecessor.* *For example, are your subordinates concerned primarily with their next assignment or getting promoted, rather than with how to do things better in the organization or taking the initiative to fix something everyone else has overlooked as a problem?*
Do your people display a "smarter than thou" attitude, which is directed to persons above them in the chain of command?	*Such an attitude may have some basis in fact or it may not, but the important thing is that it may lead persons to act on the belief that they don't need to follow higher headquarters directives.*
Do your people respect themselves as military professionals?	*That is, do they have interests outside the job? Do they take time to take leave? Do they strive to remain fit? Do they 'party hardy'? Are they upset when they set the wrong example? Are they aware that they set an example?*

TABLE E

CASE DISCUSSION

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

This table identifies and discusses a suggested list of rules of engagement for case discussions. With some adjustments, some of these rules can be applied to other active learning types. See Chapter 4, Section E4B.

1. . PREPARE THOROUGHLY	Read the case, reflect on its content, and discuss it with others before coming to class.
2. TAKE "FREE-FALL" RISKS.	Express your views without prejudging them. We want to hear what you have to say because you may have that golden angle or perspective that helps us to break through confusion and ignorance.
3. LISTEN CAREFULLY.	Focus on other person's thoughts, not his/her efforts to express them. Ask questions to clarify what is said. Re-state the person's remarks to be sure you understand his/her point.
4. PROMOTE DEMOCRACY.	Become suspicious whenever everyone agrees that a judgment is true or that an argument is successful. Encourage a wide variety of viewpoints and opinions. Avoid "group think," peer pressure, and the convergence of opinion. (The more views that you entertain, the more likely it is that you will discover the internal logic of the situation you are assessing and find the best available course of action.)
5. EXTEND CHARITY.	Always give your colleagues the benefit of the doubt.
6. PRACTICE CIVILITY.	Never forget that your colleagues have a fundamental, inviolable worth as human beings and always must be respected as such. Avoid dealing in personalities or making personal attacks. Leave your ego in a box in your room. The case discussion classroom is a forum and a laboratory—not an arena. We are here to hammer out new levels of understanding, new agendas for investigation, and tentative solutions —we are not here to hammer on each other. Encourage others to take part and applaud the efforts of those who do.
7. ACCEPT AMBIGUITY.	There is very little "closure" in life—learn to live with it. Most of the "solutions" we discover are at best tentative and hypothetical. What we must do is use the best available means to reach the best working hypotheses—and that means drawing upon the strengths of the Learning Community.
8. BUILD COMMUNITY.	Faithfully observe the ROE and gently remind others that they should do the same. Constantly seek new ways to perpetuate and expand the community.
9. TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.	Someone once said that the 10 most important words in life are, "If it is to be, it is up to me." Believe it.

TABLE F

MATCHING COURSES WITH LEARNING TYPES

The purpose of this table is to generate discussion of what active learning types will work with which courses. Obviously, this is not written in stone and, as the cautionary note given below indicates, only experts know best. For a more complete discussion, see Chapter Six, Section C.

CAUTION: Because experts know best, this table can be nothing more than a set of recommendations, given the best guess of an outsider looking at generalities. The only mandatory form of active learning is Modeling, and it is mandatory because it is unavoidable. In the table below, "M" means "mandatory", "✓" = "seems reasonable," "👎" means "probably not a good idea," and "?" means "only an expert will know."

ENLISTED COURSES	MOD	1-WAY	2-WAY	DIR DISC	LIVD XP	SIMS	CASE
1. SELECTION/INDUCTION	M	?	👎	👎	👎	👎	👎
2. BASIC MILITARY TRAINING	M	✓	👎	?	?	👎	👎
3. 3-LEVEL TRAINING	M	✓	👎	?	?	👎	👎
4. 5-LEVEL OJT UPGRADE	M	✓	👎	?	?	👎	👎
5. 5-LEVEL CDC	M	✓	✓	?	?	?	?
6. 7-LEVEL TRAINING	M	👎	✓	✓	?	?	?
7. AIRMAN LEADERSHIP SCHOOL	M	?	✓	✓	?	✓	✓
8. NCO ACADEMY	M	👎	?	✓	✓	✓	✓
9. SENIOR NCO ACADEMY	M	👎	👎	✓	✓	✓	✓
OFFICER COURSES							
1. SELECTION/INDUCTION	M	✓	👎	👎	👎	👎	👎
2. ACCESSION TRAINING	M	✓	?	✓	✓	✓	✓
3. AIRMAN BASIC COURSE	M	✓	?	✓	✓	✓	✓
4. INTRO TECH TRAINING	M	✓	?	✓	✓	✓	?
5. ADVANCED TECH TRAINING	M	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	?
6. SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL	M	👎	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
7. AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE	M	👎	👎	✓	✓	✓	✓
8. AIR WAR COLLEGE	M	👎	👎	✓	✓	✓	✓
9. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT COURSES	M	👎	👎	✓	✓	✓	✓

APPENDIX 2

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT:

A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

8. CONTENTS

- ★ Today's Air Force
- ★ Planning Into the Next Century
- ★ Air and Space Power for the Next Century
- ★ Core Competencies
- ★ Air Force People
- ★ Key Elements of Air Force Infrastructure
- ★ Looking Back to the Present to Plan for a New Century
- ★ Final Thoughts

9. AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Change in the world around us requires change in the Air Force.

The end of the Cold War swept away national security requirements that had appeared to be fixtures of the global security landscape. The Air Force anticipated the change and produced a vision for dealing with the post-Cold War world in the ground-breaking document, *Global Reach-Global Power*. This vision has guided the restructuring and modernization of the Air Force for the past six years. Because the change and uncertainty of the immediate post-Cold War era will endure, the Air Force must forge a new vision that will guide it into the 21st Century.

To enable the Air Force to meet the challenges of change, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force initiated a rigorous, systematic, multifaceted examination of future demands on the Air Force as a member of America's joint military force. This revolutionary effort has had the deep involvement of Air Force leaders. It was guided by a Board of Directors consisting of senior military and civilian leaders, and chaired by the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

After extensive study and discussion, the Air Force senior leadership began to build this Air Force vision for the 21st Century. It was shaped by *Joint Vision 2010*, the new guidance published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Air Force leaders understood that their new strategic vision must meet the national security needs of the nation, and a national military strategy that has as its focus an increasingly U.S.-based contingency force. The Air Force also recognizes the emerging reality that in the 21st Century it will be possible to find, fix or track and target anything that moves on the surface of the earth.

Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force is based on a new understanding of what air and space power mean to the nation—the ability to hit an adversary's strategic centers of gravity directly as well as prevail at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. Global

situational awareness, the ability to orchestrate military operations throughout a theater of operations and the ability to bring intense firepower to bear over global distances within hours to days, by its very existence, gives national leaders unprecedented leverage, and therefore advantages.

This strategic vision addresses the entire Air Force—people, capabilities and infrastructure—and charts the course of the Air Force into the first quarter of the 21st Century. The vision is the first step in the Air Force's back-to-the-present approach to long-range planning. Although this strategic vision document establishes overall direction, the Air Force will develop a Long-Range Plan to make the vision come true. Formulating a coherent, shared strategic vision is a critical step, but the real challenge is to make the vision actionable and implementable.

AA. TODAY'S AIR FORCE

Explorations of the future must proceed from where the Air Force stands today: the world's most powerful air and space force. New technology and new operational concepts already offer an alternative to the kind of military operation that pits large numbers of young Americans against an adversary in brute, force-on-force conflicts. This new way of war leverages technologically superior U.S. military capabilities to achieve national objectives. It is a strategy of asymmetric force that applies U.S. advantages to strike directly at an adversary's ability to wage war. It offers potentially decisive capabilities to the Joint Force Commander to dominate the conduct of an adversary's operations across the spectrum of conflict.

But technology and tactics only go so far. Our core values, history, mission and the professionalism with which they are brought together are what make us the institution we are today. Our core values are simple and forthright:

- ☐ Integrity first
- ☐ Service before self
- ☐ Excellence in all we do

These values are both a guide and source of great pride to the men and women of the Air Force team. As we plan for the future, it is important to remember that what makes the Air Force successful will not change. Quality people define the Air Force. From the flight line to the depot to the workstation transmitting on-orbit satellite repair instructions, it is the professionalism and dedication of our people that makes the Air Force the preeminent air and space force to meet the nation's needs.

The men and women of the Air Force can build upon a tremendous heritage. They are the beneficiaries of an Air Force forged in World War II by the vision of airmen such as General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold. We have the opportunity today, on the eve of the 21st Century, to build a new vision that will ensure the future vitality of our force. Our challenge is to dominate air and space as a unique dimension of military power. Global Engagement provides the strategic blueprint for meeting that challenge.

BB. PLANNING INTO THE NEXT CENTURY

For all the transformation the world will undergo in the next 30 years, fundamental U.S. national security objectives will remain largely as they have been for the past 220 years: to ensure our survival as a nation, secure the lives and property of our citizens, and protect our vital national interests.

Securing those vital interests under future conditions, however, will significantly change the demand for U.S. military capabilities into the 21st Century. In *Joint Vision 2010*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided a common direction for our Services into the next century. The Chairman's vision calls for the capability to dominate an opponent across the range of military operations—Full Spectrum Dominance. The plan to achieve this goal comprises four operational concepts to guide future joint warfare development—Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics. In addition, Full Spectrum Dominance requires Information Superiority, the capability to collect, process, analyze and disseminate information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

1. JOINT VISION 2010-GUIDANCE TOWARD 2025

These concepts form a lens through which the Air Force looks to the first quarter of the 21st Century.

What the Nation Will Need From Its Military in 2025

WHAT?

Protect the nation's interests, wherever and however they are threatened

Respond to new challenges and new missions

Hedge against surprises

Support national information needs

Provide strategic and operational choices

Respond to changing science and technology

WHERE?

In non-traditional environments

In the shadow of NBC weapons, or after the use of NBC weapons

Increasingly from the CONUS

Global infosphere

HOW?

To win the nation's wars decisively by dominating the battlespace

With minimal human losses

With minimal collateral damage

With reasonable demands on the nation's resources

In accordance with the nation's values

As partners in joint-combined and regional operations

WHEN?

Immediately, when called upon

CC. AIR AND SPACE POWER FOR THE NEXT CENTURY

Full Spectrum Dominance depends on the inherent strengths of modern air and space power—speed, global range, stealth, flexibility, precision, lethality, global/theater situational awareness and strategic perspective. Air and space power also contributes to the level of engagement and

presence necessary to protect and promote U.S. national interests by augmenting those forces that are permanently based overseas with temporary or rotational deployments and power projection missions.

Ensuring that air and space power continues to make its unique contributions to the nation's Joint Team will take the Air Force through a transition of enormous importance. We are now transitioning from an air force into an air and space force on an evolutionary path to a space and air force. The threats to Americans and American forces from the use of space by adversaries are rising while our dependence on space assets is also increasing. The medium of space is one which cannot be ceded to our nation's adversaries. The Air Force must plan to prevail in the use of space.

Space already is inextricably linked to military operations on land, sea and in the air. Several key military functions are migrating to space: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); warning; position location; weapons guidance; communications; and, environmental monitoring. Operations that now focus on air, land and sea will ultimately evolve into space.

All the Services depend heavily on space assets to support their missions. The Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space Command (USCINCSPACE) is already tasked with the missions of space control and force application in support of the joint warfighter. The Air Force will sustain its stewardship of space and will fully integrate Air Force space capabilities in joint efforts to support the needs of the nation.

The Air Force recognizes that any further use of space will be driven by national policy, international events, threats moving through and from space, and threats to U.S. space assets. However, the nation will expect the Air Force to be prepared to defend U.S. interests in space when necessary.

DD. CORE COMPETENCIES

Our core competencies represent the combination of professional knowledge, airpower expertise, and technological know-how that, when applied, produces superior military capabilities. A particular core competency is not necessarily unique to the Air Force. Speed, flexibility, and the global nature of its reach and perspective distinguish the Air Force's execution of its core competencies.

The first quarter of the 21st Century will demand that the Joint Force Commander field robust, flexible capabilities to cope with a wide range of contingencies. Each military service must present to the combatant commander a set of relevant and complementary capabilities. This presentation allows the Joint Force Commander to consider all options available, and to tailor campaign plans to best meet the military objectives of the mission.

The Air Force contribution to the Joint Force Team is graphically depicted as an arch at left. It begins with a foundation of quality people. Air Force men and women carry out the core competencies of Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, and Agile Combat Support. These are represented as an arch because they are all mutually supporting and provide synergistic effects. These competencies are brought together by global awareness and command and control to provide air and space power to the Joint Force Team.

Within the Air Force, core competencies provide a bridge between doctrine and the acquisition and programming process. In the context of long-range planning, defining future core competencies provides strategic focus for the vision. Each core competency illuminates part of the strategic vision that will guide decisions and set the course toward the Air Force of the 21st Century.

- ☐ Air and Space Superiority
- ☐ Global Attack
- ☐ Rapid Global Mobility
- ☐ Precision Engagement
- ☐ Information Superiority
- ☐ Agile Combat Support

1. AIR FORCE COMMITMENT TO INNOVATION

The key to ensuring today's Air Force core competencies will meet the challenge of tomorrow is Innovation. Innovation is part of our heritage as airmen. The Air Force was born of a new technology—manned powered flight. Innovation will enable the Air Force to evolve from an air force to an air and space force on its path toward space.

The Air Force is committed to a vigorous program of experimenting, testing, exercising and evaluating new operational concepts and systems for air and space power. It will provide additional emphasis in six areas of ongoing activity in Air Force centers of excellence. That will be accomplished with a series of focused battle laboratories for **space, air expeditionary forces, battle management, force protection, information warfare and unmanned aerial vehicles**.

These new battle labs will be aimed, both institutionally and operationally, at our core competencies. Creating focused battle labs will explore new ideas and foster innovative technologies that will improve the capabilities of our core competencies.

The rate of technological change has accelerated and the nation's future force must keep pace to maintain its military edge. We must reinvigorate the spirit of innovation and creativity that has long been the hallmark of the United States Air Force.

EE. AIR FORCE PEOPLE

People are at the heart of the Air Force's military capability, and people will continue to be the most important element of the Air Force's success in capitalizing on change. The Air Force of tomorrow and beyond must encourage individuals to be comfortable with uncertainty and willing to make decisions with less than perfect information. Accordingly, our people must understand the doctrine, culture and competencies of the Air Force as a whole—in addition to mastering their own specialties. Emphasis on creating an Air Force environment that fosters responsiveness and innovation, and rewards adaptability and agility will be crucial as we move into the early part of the next century. Many things may change, but the Air Force of the first quarter of the 21st Century will continue to place a high priority on maintaining the high quality of its men and women, and on providing quality of life for Air Force members and their families.

1. THE TOTAL FORCE OF THE FUTURE

One sign of change in the Air Force will be how the definition of the Air Force operator develops in the future. At its birth, all Air Force operators wore wings. Future definitions of operators

will change as the Air Force changes. Moreover, all combat operations in the 21st Century will depend on real-time control and employment of information, further broadening the definition of the future operator. *In the future, any military or civilian member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space power will be considered an operator*.

The composition of the future Total Force will change as the nature of air and space power changes. As a result, the Air Force is committed to outsourcing and privatizing many functions now performed internally. The force will be smaller. Non-operational support functions will increasingly be performed by Air Force civilians or contractors. Most uniformed personnel will be operators and a greater percentage will be from the Reserve components.

To prepare for the changes ahead, the Air Force has reviewed, generally reaffirmed and initiated some adjustments to its career development patterns for its officers, enlisted and civilian force. To ensure its future leaders all share a full and common understanding of air and space operations, the Air Force decided to create a new Air and Space Basic Course. This course will focus on the history, doctrine, strategy and operational aspects of air and space power. The desired outcome is for each new officer and selected senior NCOs and civilians to have a thorough knowledge of the day-to-day capabilities of combined air and space operations. Most officer graduates from this course will go directly to operational jobs as their first assignment before performing their functional specialty.

The Air Force will seek new opportunities to capitalize on the synergy of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces in an integrated TOTAL Force. In its effort to maximize and improve operational effectiveness and efficiency, the Air Force will explore additional opportunities for new Guard and Reserve missions as well as expanding the use of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) . The Air Force's ability to rely upon and integrate its Reserve components is already a fundamental strength, one that will continue to play a major role for the nation in the next century.

2. A FORCE GROUNDED IN CORE VALUES

The ideals embodied in the Air Force core values are:

- ☐ Integrity first
- ☐ Service before self
- ☐ Excellence in all we do

They are universally prescriptive. Despite the uncertainty of the future, the Air Force can say with certainty that today and tomorrow, it must live up to these ideals or it cannot live up to its responsibilities. Our core values are fundamental and timeless in nature, and reach across the entire force. Our core values are values for service, values for life, and must be reflected in everything that we do.

A values-based Air Force is characterized by cohesive units, manned with people who exhibit loyalty, who want to belong, and who act in a manner consistent with Air Force core values, even under conditions of high stress. To ensure this values-based Air Force, three elements—education, leadership and accountability—provide a framework to establish the strongest imprint of shared Air Force core values. In the Air Force of tomorrow, as in the Air Force of today, these stated and practiced values must be identical.

The Air Force will continue to reinforce its core values in all aspects of its education and training. The goal is to provide one hundred percent of the Total Force with core values education and training continually throughout a career. The Air and Space Basic Course will also ensure that the Air Force's future leaders, military and civilian, have a common, shared foundation in core values, doctrine, and operations.

FF. KEY ELEMENTS OF AIR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Defining our future core competencies tells us what business the Air Force will be in as it enters the 21st Century. But the Air Force must change the way it does business if it is to meet the future demands for air and space power. Continuing pressure on resources will make increased efficiency and reduced infrastructure costs necessary for success.

The Air Force has long recognized the importance of responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars and will strive to achieve the highest standards for efficiency. Ensuring the nation has capabilities to hedge against unforeseen and multiple threats across the full spectrum of conflict puts a premium on efficiency. The real penalty for inefficiency is not just wasted dollars, but unmet demand for military capabilities.

Our warfighting activities will be designed for effectiveness and our support activities will be designed for efficiency. All support activities will be run more like businesses, using the "best practices" gleaned from top performers. Air Force personnel will focus on preparing for and conducting military operations—their competence—while support activities not deployed for combat will be performed by a robust civilian and competitive private sector. The Air Force is committed to the organizational and cultural change to make this vision a reality.

The Air Force will increase the efficiency of its modernization process through the focused exploitation of emerging information technologies and by accelerating its ongoing acquisition reform program. It also will strengthen the concept of integrated weapon system management by clarifying relationships between single-product managers, their customers and the depot and contracted activities that support them.

The Air Force is committed to the aggressive reduction of infrastructure costs. The role of commercial industry will be maximized to ensure "best-value practices" throughout the development and production process. These activities—research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) , and sustainment—will be consolidated into Centers of Excellence encompassing mission areas directly related to Air Force core competencies. The Air Force will also explore teaming with the other services to form Joint Centers of Excellence for RDT&E.

Inefficiency drains resources needed for the capabilities the nation needs from its future joint force team. The overlap and redundancy of test and evaluation facilities must be reduced through streamlining, integration, outsourcing and privatization. New technologies, particularly in testing through modeling and simulation, must be exploited to reduce costs and improve effectiveness.

The Air Force's determination to become more efficient will also affect the composition of its future workforce. Its commitment to an aggressive program of civilianizing many combat support functions, as The Air Force's determination to become more efficient will also affect the composition of its future workforce. Its commitment to an aggressive program of civilianizing

many combat support functions, as well as outsourcing and privatization, will push more support functions into the civilian workforce and, in many cases, into the private sector.

The Air Force believes that one of its most important attributes is a sense of community among its members and their families. Far more than simple "pride in the team," this factor builds the motivational identity and commitment that underlie our core values, career decisions, and combat capability. The excellence of our installations and Quality of Life standards contribute to this, and to the general well-being of the members of the Air Force family. The Air Force is rededicating itself to both maintaining this sense of community and finding new and more efficient ways of providing it.

GG. LOOKING BACK TO THE PRESENT TO PLAN FOR A NEW CENTURY

This document sets out a new Air Force strategic vision for the 21st Century. It provides a vision of the future and a path back to the present to guide today's planners. Following this path requires a revitalized and institutionalized long-range planning process.

The Long Range Plan will identify those initial steps and transition decisions which are necessary to reach the goals outlined in this strategic vision document. Transition decisions are critical to formulating meaningful divestment and investment strategies, to making transitions from sunset to sunrise systems and capabilities, and to providing the milestones and feedback mechanisms that ensure accountability. The Long Range Plan will further guide the Air Force's other planning and resource allocation processes.

HH. FINAL THOUGHTS

Global Reach-Global Power prepared the Air Force to deal with the challenges of the transition era following the Cold War. *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* charts a course that will take the Service beyond this transitional period and into the future. It is a future in which dramatic changes wrought by technology will be the norm. It is also a future in which the core values of service, integrity and excellence will continue to sustain the men and women of the Air Force. Most importantly, the Air Force's devotion to air and space power will continue to provide the strategic perspective and rapid response the nation will demand as it enters the 21st Century.

Our Vision Statement remains: **Air Force people building the world's most respected air and space force. . .global power and reach for America.**

APPENDIX 3
USAF CORE VALUES
COMPREHENSIVE LESSON PLAN
(SAMPLE)

- I -

LESSON DESCRIPTION

Title: United States Air Force Core Values

Teaching Method: Guided Discussion/Case Study

References: *Policy Letter Digest*, Air Force News Agency, May 1995
Little Blue Book
AFDD-1
URL: http://www.usafa.af.mil/core-value/ (USAF web site)

Instructional Aids And Handouts: CSAF Introductory video, sample case study videos, distance learning tools

Student Preparation: Read USAF Core Values manual; AFDD-1.

Educational Objective: The objective of this lesson is for each Air Force member to respond positively to their role in demonstrating USAF Core Values.

Method(s) Of Evaluation: Commander's Guide Climate Checklist and Quality of Life Survey sample questions.

- II -

USAF CORE VALUES STRATEGY

*We must ensure the culture of the Air Force is a **culture of conscience**, not a culture of compromise.* The Air Force exists *solely* to provide for national defense through the application of aerospace power. The Air Force does not exist to provide us employment. The Air Force exists for the sake of defending the United States of America, its form of government, and its people against all foreign aggression. The culture of compromise dangerously erodes our capacity to carry out this mission. We must fly, fight, and win; but how can we have confidence in our ability to do these things if we accept a "me first" culture of compromise?

I. That is why we have the **Air Force Core Values**—*Integrity first*, *Service before self*, and *Excellence in all we do*. If all our people accepted the operational importance of these values; and echelons across the Air Force used these values as the basic principles for guiding their professional conduct; and if these values could become the windows through which all of us examine and appreciate the requirements of public service—we would be sure to have the culture of conscience needed to successfully serve in the defense of our country.

By infusing the core values into our organizational structure and operational procedures, the Core Values Strategy will help to ensure that ours is a culture of conscience and not a culture of compromise.

I. The Core Values Strategy is designed to educate the force, encourage a climate of conscience, enforce the observance of standards, and evaluate who we are and where we're going. The strategy will develop through three 'rounds' or phases:

A. ***Round 1: The Field Weave***—As its name suggests, the purpose of the Field Weave is to infuse, imbed, or weave the Core Values into all Air Force operations. The Field Weave has two basic components:

1. *The Top-Down, Command Cascade*: All commanders—from MAJCOM to Flight—will be required to initially teach the Air Force Core Values and the implementation initiative to all of their subordinates. This duty cannot be delegated, and the first such training session will be conducted by the CSAF at General Officers conference. The purpose of this lesson is to (1) explain the meaning of the Core Values in terms concretely meaningful for the members of the unit in question and (2) to announce, explain, and heartily endorse the Core Values initiative.
2. *The Bottom-Up Review*: The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review is to identify and repair those policies, procedures, and paradigms that contribute to a culture of compromise in the Air Force or one of its units. This process will be briefed up-channel and incorporated into MAJCOM briefings given at CORONA Top.

B. ***Round 2: The Schoolhouse Weave***—The goal of the Schoolhouse Weave is to introduce the Core Values to as many Air Force courses as possible. Selected Core Values Cadres will be created for the purpose of teaching all Air Force instructors/educators to do the following:

1. Appropriately insert or weave Core Values discussions into their respective curriculums.
2. Select and apply the active learning technique appropriate to the learning level of the course they are teaching.
3. Write proper cases, simulations, and other instruments for use in Core Values lessons.
4. Teach the entire spectrum of active learning methods.
5. Coordinate their efforts across all courses (accession, PME, technical) so as to maximize teaching the efficiency of the cradle-to-grave training continuum.
6. Ensure that the education and training they offer will **best prepare their students for the Core Values challenges** they will face on their next operational assignments.

C. ***Round 3: Continuation***—The purpose Round 3 is to ensure the initiative continues, especially in the push to the field. This will be accomplished by the following:

1. Creation of a cadre of consultants or disciples whose job it will be to stay current with respect to the latest Core Values materials and to provide their commanders with the best possible advice concerning ways to establish a local initiative and to keep it moving forward.
2. Creation of an Air Force Core Values Website.
3. Publication of official doctrine about the Core Values and their definitions. AFDD-1 will contain a chapter on the subject, and all Air Force personnel—officer, civilian, and enlisted—will receive a copy of the Core Values manual (AKA the "Little Blue Book").

4. Creation of an "Architectural Control Committee" (ArchConCom) that will have oversight on all curriculums, the Website, and field initiative plans.

- III -

LESSON LEADER INFORMATION

Lesson leaders must be aware of and prepare for the unique requirements and pitfalls associated with the teaching of the Core Values.

I. **Active learning is the best way to teach the Core Values**. It is called "active" learning because it demands much more action from students than the traditional "lecture" method of teaching.

A. Normally, students are asked to consider a real-world problem that contains within itself the fundamental concepts and principles the teacher wishes to cover during that particular lesson.

B. Through a guided-discussion, the students discover the desired concepts and principles on their own, and by so doing they come to see the truth of those ideas and take ownership of them. It has been claimed that people retain "**10% of what they read; 26% of what they hear; 30% of what they see; 50% of what they see and hear; 70% of what they say; and 90% of what they say as they do something**."

C. Because we want Air Force personnel to do more than merely memorize the definitions of the Core Values—because we want them to understand, accept, apply, and, live by the Core Values—active learning promises to be the single best method for this initiative.

II. This means that the lesson leader must be prepared to lead a **guided discussion** as well as to give a lecture.

A. In the case of commanders or supervisors, this may mean telling a story from real life and then asking subordinates to discuss the Core Values issues at work in that story (see the attachment of this lesson plan for examples of such stories).

B. In the case of Schoolhouse lesson leaders, this may man asking students to read a formal case study and to analyze it in accordance with pre-defined methods or techniques. (The Blackhawk Shoot-down and B52 cases in the attachment to this lesson plan are good examples.)

III. To lead a guided discussion well it is important to carefully select and prepare the stories/cases you intend to teach.

A. Is the story or case ambiguous enough to stimulate different perspectives that can be argued during the discussion?

B. Are you sure you have properly identified the Core Value issue(s) at work in the story/case?

C. Is there a way to introduce the story without giving away your analysis of its issue(s)?

D. Is there a way to tell the story or teach the case without giving away the ending (so students can discuss what they would do without the pressure of knowing what was actually done)?

IV. Leading a discussion means **introducing** the story and then inviting the **active involvement** of all participants.

A. They should be encouraged to perform their own analyses: *Given the definitions of the Core Values, what is the Core Value issue at work in this story?*

B. They should be encouraged make their own decision about the issue: *What would you do in this situation and why?*

C. They should be asked to consider ways of preventing the re-occurrence of this problem: *How could we fix the organization so that this situation wouldn't happen again?*

D. They should be asked to relate this to their own experience: *Has something like this happened to you?*

E. They should be asked to evaluate their unit in relation to this case or story: *Do we have a similar problem? Why do you say this? How can we fix it?*

V. The single biggest problem in leading a guided discussion about the Core Values is the so-called 'food fight' or 'free-for-all'. The lesson leader should be willing to nudge the discussion in the directions he/she identified during lesson planning.

VI. It should always be remembered that **this is not a values clarification exercise**. The Secretary and Chief of Staff have clarified the Core Values for us. The purpose of these directed discussions is for students to discover the relevance and importance of the Air Force Core Values. *There are correct answers, and those answers are found in the Air Force Core Values.*

VII. **Additional Help**: Lesson leaders should consult available resources prior to teaching a Core Values lesson. These resources include the following:

A. The Air Force Core Values Website, especially those materials under the "Do It Yourself" file;

B. In the Field, commanders and supervisors should consult the local **Core Values Consultant**; while this person cannot be delegated the task of actually teaching a lesson, he or she is prepared to fully assist you in your efforts.

C. Schoolhouse instructors, course directors, and supervisors should consult the members of the local **Core Values Cadre**. Some of these persons have been specially trained in active learning techniques.

- IV -
THE LESSONS

Three distinct lesson types are required to be taught under the Core Values initiative:

I. *Introductory* type, in which a block of time is created for the discussion of the Core Values, their definitions, and the strategy for their implementation.

II. *Pre-planned Values Opportunity*, in which an opportunity to discuss the Core Values is anticipated to exist in the context of the discussion of some other subject matter.

III. *Spontaneous Values Opportunity*, in which an opportunity to discuss the Core Values is capitalized upon as it arises spontaneously in the course of discussing some other subject matter.

Schoolhouse personnel are expected to regularly employ all three lesson types to ensure a maximum Core Values weave.

Initially, **Field personnel** will be most concerned with the Introductory type of lesson plan, but as they develop an active Core Values initiative in their units, Field personnel also will want to employ Pre-planned and Spontaneous values opportunities as ways of weaving the Core Values into their operations.

A. *INTRODUCTORY* LESSON

I. *ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN*: Topical

II. *LESSON STRATEGY*: This lesson is designed for all Air Force members--headquarters, commanders and supervisors at all levels, schoolhouse and training environments, officer, enlisted, and civilians. Regardless of your level, this lesson should be used in an informal setting to encourage discussion without repercussion.

A. First, review the definitions of the USAF core values, considering the exposure these folks may have had to this information previously.

B. Second, the lesson leader uses case studies to highlight the culture of compromise versus conscience that exists in daily activities, using the example cases provided to develop personal examples, or sanitized unit examples.

C. Last, move ahead and answer the "what do we do about it?" question. The lesson leader needs to point out personal growth and appreciation of the core values doesn't stop with one encounter. Leaders should use every opportunity, planned and spontaneous, to reinforce the values. There is no solid time frame for presentation of the material; the lesson leader should use his/her judgment.

III. *LESSON OUTLINE***:**

A. 1. Definitions of core values:
1. a. Integrity
2. b. Service Before Self
3. c. Excellence in All We Do

B. 2. Do we have a culture of compromise?
1. a. Case Studies (See Attachment 4)

C. 3. What do we do about it?

IV. *SAMPLE*: For a sample of this lesson plan, see Attachment 1.

B. *PRE-PLANNED VALUES OPPORTUNITY*

I. *ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN:* Topical

II. *LESSON STRATEGY*: The strategy of a Pre-planned Value Opportunity is to anticipate and capitalize upon the opportunity to discuss the Core Values in the context of another teaching or discussion point.

III. *LESSON OUTLINE*: Pre-planned Values Opportunities do not have a distinct outline of their own but rather occur in the context of the outline of the original teaching or discussion point. The can be formally introduced or they can arise in a 'by-the-way' fashion.

IV. *SAMPLES:*

A. *Schoolhouse:* SSgt Smith teaches a course in Avionics Maintenance. A particular lesson in that course requires SSgt Smith to discuss the completion of a certain aircraft maintenance form. She knows that pencil-whipping is a real temptation with this form because most people in the maintenance community don't like its length or the 'stupid' questions it asks. She also knows, however, that the form is a 'necessary evil' that is used by planners to order parts and to track aircraft maintenance rates. Consequently, as she prepares to teach the course, she identifies the discussion of the form as a golden opportunity to bring up and discuss *Integrity first* and *Excellence in all we do*.

B. *Field*: Lt Col Jones commands a Security Police Squadron. He has noticed that one of his junior enlisted personnel has been getting to work early and leaving late to take care of various additional, but important tasks around the squadron. Lt Col Jones also is aware that at the next Commander's Call, the First Shirt will discuss the annual Holiday Charity Drive. Lt Col Jones decides that this would be a golden opportunity to discuss *Service before self*. He will make the point that it is important to support the charity drive, but that *Service before self* means much more than community service projects: It also sometimes means sacrificing personal time to get the job done (like the airman who has been coming in early and leaving late).

C. *SPONTANEOUS VALUES OPPORTUNITY*

I. *ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN*: Topical

II. *LESSON STRATEGY*: The strategy of a Spontaneous Value Opportunity is to capitalize upon an unexpected opportunity to discuss the Core Values in the context of another teaching or discussion point.

III. *LESSON OUTLINE*: Spontaneous Values Opportunities do not have a distinct outline of their own but rather occur at the spur of the moment as some other topic is being discussed.

IV. *SAMPLES*:

A. *Field*: Captain Blue flies a mission during the ORI and fails to release his bombs on target on time. When the aircraft lands, Captain Blue gives his squadron commander the bad news, and then he tells the commander: "You know, sir, I'm sure it's a maintenance problem. Let's lay the blame on the maintenance pukes." But when the commander inquires as to whether or not Blue faithfully followed his checklists, he is told: "Well, not exactly. I didn't recycle the circuit breakers because I could tell they were all the way in." The commander takes this spontaneous opportunity to discuss all three Core Values with the Captain.

B. *Schoolhouse*: A Basic Military Training instructor is giving a lesson on standards of appearance to a group of basics. As he is explaining Air Force policy regarding hair length and the wearing of ear rings, one of the basics raises his hand and says, "Who's to say whether or not I can wear my hair long or wear an ear ring while I'm in uniform?" The instructor takes this spontaneous opportunity to point out that *Service before self* requires default rule following and that the leaders of the Air Force have the total prerogative to formulate the rules. Following the Core Values is a condition of continued Air Force service.

- V -
TRAINING STRATEGY

The concept of a Training Strategy applies to the Field as much as it does to the Schoolhouse. Because the Field Weave applies to education and training units as much as it does to any other unit in the Air Force, school units will have to develop a double training strategy—one for their student populations and one for their permanent party personnel.

A. THE FIELD TRAINING STRATEGY

In the most general terms possible, the Field Training Strategy should consist of two major components: (1) Initial and (2) On-going training.

I. ***Initial training*** supports the Command Cascade portion of the Field Weave, and to that extent it should focus on introducing all assigned personnel to the Core Values and the Core Values initiative. In this regard, commanders and supervisors will begin by teaching lessons of the first or *Introductory* type, and then subsequently follow-up in the short term with lessons of the second and third types.

II. ***On-going training*** supports the continuing effort to weave the Core Values into the operational activities of the unit, and it can include the following:

A. Using Core Values discussions as part of an active mentoring program;

B. Insisting that supervisors include Core Values training as part of their On-the-Job-Training responsibilities;

C. Establishing a schedule for visiting work centers on a regular basis to conduct Core Values discussions with assigned personnel;

D. Taking a few moments during commander's call to discuss the Core Values relevance of recent events in the news;

E. Including Core Values training as part of your newcomer orientation: *Where is the newcomer likely to come across counter-value situations in your organization? Under what operational conditions is he/she likely to be tempted to violate the Core Values?* .

III. It is imperative that unit-level training not become a fill-the-square or pass-the-buck exercise. It is quite possible that questions like those found in Attachment 4 will be made a part of the Air Force Quality of Life survey.

B. SCHOOLHOUSE TRAINING STRATEGY

Training strategies will be formulated by each AETC training wing, PME school, and professional course, as well as each of the major mission elements at the USAFA. Oversight for these strategies will be assigned to the ArchConCom (see above in II). The ArchConCom will review these strategies with the following questions in mind:

I. Is there a true weave of the Core Values represented in this strategy?

A. Does the weave extend across the entire curriculum?

B. Are Pre-planned Values Opportunities identified? Are there enough of them in each course?

C. If Introductory lessons are taught, are there too many of them across the curriculum?

D. Does the strategy suggest that the various course developers have collaborated to ensure maximum efficiency from the weave?

II. Is there evidence that active learning is the method most used to conduct these lessons?

A. For example, are appropriate cases being written and woven into the curriculum?

B. For example, is the Core Values Cadre actively and adequately preparing other instructors to conduct active learning?

C. For example, is there a program in place to provide platform instructors the feedback they require to become good active teachers?

III. Is the strategy sensitive to the requirement that students will be trained in the Core Values to a level commensurate with the responsibilities of their next job in the field?

Deficient strategies will be returned to the MAJCOM/DRU commander for correction and other appropriate action.

ATTACHMENT 1

LESSON EXAMPLE:

***INTRODUCTORY* TYPE**

ATTENTION

(Optional: Consider the perfect working environment. The type of environment where mutual trust exists, people work in unison to accomplish the mission. How many of you have that right now? Why not? What are you doing about it? What *can* you do about it?)

MOTIVATION

There is a difference between accepting less than ethical behavior and approving of behavior which incorporates integrity, service, and excellence. The best way to understand this is to evaluate yourself based on these USAF core values. As an ethical member of the Air Force, you are trusted, respected, and approved of by your subordinates, peers, and superiors.

OVERVIEW

1. Definitions of core values
   a. Integrity
   b. Service Before Self
   c. Excellence in All We Do
2. Do we have a culture of compromise?
   a. Case Studies (See Atch 1)
3. What do we do about it?

BODY

1. Definition of Air Force Core Values

a. INTEGRITY

I. *Integrity First* is the primary core value. It is the bedrock of professionalism.

II. Integrity is the willingness to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is the trait that includes other essential character

traits: courage, honesty, responsibility, accountability, justice, openness, and self respect. Integrity holds these other traits together.

III. Integrity is the moral compass of the military professional. It's the inner voice, the source of self control, the basis for the trust that is imperative in today's military.

IV. Integrity means having the courage to take responsibility for your actions and those of your subordinates. Don't quibble . . . don't shift the blame . . . don't look for scapegoats in your outfit. If you fouled up, 'fess up and press on. In doing so, you set the right example for your troops and earn the respect of subordinates and superiors alike.

b. SERVICE BEFORE SELF

I. *Service before self* reminds us that military service is a *calling*. Leaders must subordinate personal needs to the mission, the people, and the nation. *Air Force leaders must measure personal success in terms of mission accomplishment and the welfare of their people*. Characteristics include: rule following, respect for others, discipline and self control, and faith in the system.

II. Examples of careerism and self interest are all too common, but these traits do the most damage when displayed by a leader. A leader unwilling to sacrifice individual goals for the good of the unit cannot convince other unit members to do so. The mission suffers with potentially devastating effects. While personal goals often coincide with Air Force goals, there is no room for personal agendas at the expense of the American people.

c. EXCELLENCE IN ALL WE DO

I. The third core value tells us that military professionals must be in continual *pursuit of excellence*. There is no room for the 'good enough' mentality in the Air Force. Good enough is never good enough. Anything less violates the sacred trust of the American people. Traits include: product-service excellence, personal excellence, interpersonal excellence, personnel excellence, and organizational excellence.

II. Air Force members cannot accept the status quo. We live in a world of rapid change; this means that today's answers will not satisfy tomorrow's questions. The obligation to excel is a moral one for military professionals.

III. We are not engaged in a game or sport. The old saying that "it's not whether you win or lose that counts, but how you play the game" does not apply. We must follow rules as we conduct our operations, but failure is not an option. Only success is acceptable.

IV. Likewise, we're not promoting work for the sake of work, rather excellence of the work accomplished. The goal is the best effort possible--best energy, creativity, and use of time and talents.

2. Is there a culture of conscience or compromise in our unit? We'll explore this question through the hands-on use of case studies (See Atch 1).

NOTE: Develop personal or unit sanitized examples from the examples given. Emphasize the core values issues in each area. These cases are designed to highlight gray areas, results developed from peoples' action or inaction.

3. What are we going to do about the ethical climate we have right now? Hold everyone--officer, enlisted, or civilian; junior, senior, or middle management; headquarters staff, schoolhouse, or field--to the same high standards of conduct and professionalism through career-long learning.

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

1. Definitions of core values:
   a. Integrity
   b. Service Before Self
   c. Excellence in All We Do
2. Do we have a culture of compromise?
   a. Case Studies (See Atch 1)
3. What do we do about it?

REMOTIVATION

You must take with you a commitment to improve our ethical environment. To do this, each of us must *live* the core values. This is not a program that you should support, this is the foundation of your Air Force.

CLOSURE

(Optional: Success is impossible unless officers, enlisted, and civilians understand, internalize, and operationalize the core values.)

ATTACHMENT 2

SAMPLE CASE STUDIES

CASE #1

You are a junior officer assigned to the Protocol Office of a MAJCOM command section. For the past six weeks you have been breaking your neck to complete a very important project—the visit of the Secretary of Defense to your MAJCOM. Without a doubt, this is an important visit: every few days the Vice Commander asks for an update on the preparations, and all sorts of people from around the headquarters are suddenly dropping by to offer their support. Three NCOs have been assigned to you for the duration of this visit. You, and they, are working fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, to make sure everything is squared away.

The SECDEF visit goes without a hitch. The MAJCOM commander is overjoyed with your performance. The day after the SECDEF departs, one of the three NCOs who worked on the project with you stops by your task and says, "Hey, Captain, did you hear the news? The boss is going to give us all Achievement Medals for the great job we did on the SECDEF's visit. What I don't understand, though, is why Major Smith is going to get a medal, too." Major Smith is the Chief of Protocol, and in your opinion she did absolutely nothing on this project. In fact, if anything, she caused more problems than she solved.

Lead Off Question (LOQ): Is it fair that she should get a medal? What, if anything, should you do about it?

Follow-up Question (FUQ): How do the moral traits of Courage, Honesty, and Responsibility apply here?

FUQ: What about having faith in the system? Should you question areas where you may not have all the facts?

FUQ: Relate this scenario to Excellence.

FUQ: What should be done to improve this ethical environment so the person feels they can bring the facts out without repercussion?

CASE #2:

During mobility exercises, deploying members are required to carry their mobility bags, which are usually heavy. In many cases, since the members know they're not going anywhere, they stuff their bags with newspaper so the bags appear full. It is the responsibility of the unit mobility officer or NCO to ensure the bags are complete and checked off before the exercise begins to ensure readiness.

LOQ: Discuss the Core Values of the deploying member and the mobility officer/NCO in this scenario.

FUQ: What type of environment is encouraged by not exercising the way we fight? What should be done about it?

FUQ: How does it damage morale in the unit if this practice is “common and accepted?”

CASE #3:

SMSgt Young is the scout master for his base's only Boy Scout troop. His troop recently finished a lengthy fund raising drive and purchased some much-needed camping equipment that had been chewed up by mice in their scout hut. The troop now needs some decent, air-tight storage containers to help protect the equipment. SMSgt Young is the superintendent of a maintenance squadron and knows that such containers have been gathering dust in his organization for some time. The containers had been used to ship spare avionics parts and then put into a storeroom to get them out of the way. The containers are recyclable and could be sent back to depot. SMSgt Young's scout troop is not an "official" DOD organization, but it does support the children of many families on base.

LOQ: Should he use the containers to store the scout troop equipment?

FUQ: What about going through channels to get the equipment donated to the scout troop?

FUQ: What if he did use the containers and three months later the containers are needed for their original purpose? Would he get the containers back from the troop or request more containers?

FUQ: What if you're the squadron commander and find out about this situation?

CASE #4:

Lt Col Grant commands a maintenance unit. Her troops, many of them young airmen living in the dorms with little extra money, don't get to use MWR facilities (like the auto hobby shop) very much because they work "odd" hours compared to most other units. Several of the airmen have asked for her permission to use squadron tools to do off-duty work on their POVs. Lt Col Grant knows they're unable to use the auto hobby shop because they are too busy supporting the mission when the auto hobby shop is open. She has been unable to get the hobby shop manager to change operating hours. She decides to let her troops use squadron tools and even makes a squadron vehicle maintenance bay available to them.

LOQ: Is there anything wrong with this situation?

FUQ: Service before self tells us that a good leader places the troops ahead of one's own comfort. What's wrong with taking care of the troops? Isn't the commander permitted to use her own judgment?

FUQ: Part of integrity is moral courage - doing what is right even if the personal cost is high. Did the commander do the right thing? Could she have been more innovative in coming to a different solution?

FUQ: Assuming there is no adverse mission impact and the commander does nothing to hide what is taking place - after all, she thinks this is a reasonable accommodation, does the appearance of wrongdoing, perceived by other troops in the dorm, make a difference?

FUQ: Assume wrong-doing has occurred, despite the best of intentions, what happens now?

CASE #5:

Doctor Daniels is the course director for a tough, required engineering course at the USAF Academy. It is one week before the mid-semester progress report. Ten days after the report, the football team will play Notre Dame in a nationally televised game. The star running back for the Falcons (a serious Heisman candidate) today failed the examination in Dr Daniels' course and will be placed on academic probation – meaning he will miss the Notre Dame game. The Falcons will likely be humiliated on national TV. He failed only by four points out of 250 and Dr. Daniels doubts whether the core course is all that relevant to officer preparation. He believes that a victory over Notre Dame will have very positive implications for the Academy in upcoming Congressional hearings. Dr. Daniels considers "finding" an additional four points on the running back's test.

LOQ: If you were Dr Daniels, what would you do?

FUQ: Is there an integrity problem if the change in score has no effect on anyone else's course standing? Suppose Dr. Daniels changes the "cut sheet" and re-scores everyone's test to reflect the additional points?

FUQ: How may this be viewed from an excellence standpoint? Dr. Daniels is the course director and may redo the "cut sheet" at his discretion. Suppose another instructor queries Dr. Daniels about his change of mind and perceives Dr. Daniels is up to something.

FUQ: Service before self speaks of rule following and doing one's duty. Is Dr. Daniel's doing any more than rationalizing if he finds a way to pass the failing football player?

CASE #6:

Capt Stanley is the Executive Officer for a strategic reconnaissance unit whose mission is controlled and dictated by the highest levels of the Executive Branch. Recently, Congress has been charging that Capt Stanley's unit is filled with a bunch of "cowboys" who don't care about rules, regulations, or civilian control of the military. Capt Stanley's commander, Col Webster (also known as "Buckaroo Bonsai") is a wild man who is deeply respected and loved by his subordinates. Capt Stanley knows Col Webster, who is married, is having an affair with SSgt. Stark (whose husband works in another unit on base).

LOQ: What actions should Capt Stanley take? How does he KNOW an affair is taking place? (Should the suggestion of wrongdoing be a commander's undoing?)

FUQ: What is Capt Stanley's responsibility for changing Col Webster's behavior? Is it Capt Stanley's business that Col Webster is possibly doing something wrong?

FUQ: Suppose Col Webster's extramarital affair is harming no one, except that SSgt Stark is in his chain of command - a blatant violation of fraternization policy. Does this make a difference?

FUQ: Is this entire situation, more or less, a UCMJ issue?

FUQ: You're a flight commander working for Col Webster: what should you do?

CASE #7:

TSgt Brown was assigned as NCOIC, Personnel Readiness Unit (PRU), within the Military Personnel Flight (MPF), responsible for maintaining base level strength accounting (assigned versus available), and for managing deployment of personnel for contingency TDYs. TSgt Brown's predecessor was MSgt Johnson who retired after running the PRU for three years. TSgt Brown quickly realized that MSgt Johnson ran a laid back section. The two other people assigned to the section, SSgt Smith and A1C Jones, didn't do much during the day and TSgt Brown knew much of their work wasn't getting done.

TSgt Brown spoke with each person in private and after getting to know them, he provided initial feedback clearly stating his expectations for doing their jobs. TSgt Brown noted an immediate change in A1C Jones' work output, but not in SSgt Smith's. TSgt Brown spoke with him again. During counseling, SSgt Smith stated he worked with MSgt Johnson for three years in PRU and he never complained about not getting work done. TSgt Brown showed SSgt Smith five to six important tasks he was responsible for that weren't getting done.

In SSgt Smith's mind, TSgt Brown was too "gung-ho" and meticulous. SSgt Smith had worked for MSgt Johnson in the PRU for three years; they had all the tasks down to a science. The relatively smaller tasks couldn't be too important. After all, no one up the chain was saying anything. Why should TSgt Brown?

Four months later, TSgt Brown received a phone call from his assignment manager at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), offering him a remote assignment to Saudi Arabia. TSgt Brown eventually learned that AFPC's records reflected that he was a volunteer for an overseas world wide remote assignment. TSgt Brown explained that this was a computer error, and that he would immediately change his status to a non-volunteer.

TSgt Brown did some investigating and determined that three weeks earlier, someone updated him as a volunteer for an overseas world wide remote assignment at a computer terminal located in the separations section of the MPF. He also determined the password used to access the computer terminal belonged to SSgt Hamlet, who later admitted to letting SSgt Smith borrow the password on the day the computer update was made. Naturally, TSgt Brown suspected that SSgt Smith made the computer update. After informing the commander, the SP's conducted a formal SP investigation and

SSgt Smith admitted to making the update. SSgt Hamlet received an LOR from the commander for not protecting his password. SSgt Smith was eventually discharged.

LOQ: What happened in this organization?

FUQ: Why did SSgt Smith do what he did? How well do his actions conform to ANY core values concept?

FUQ: What were some of SSgt Smith's other alternatives?

FUQ: What could TSgt Brown have done differently? Would anything he had done prevented SSgt Smith from going as far as he did?

FUQ: How culpable is MSgt Johnson?

FUQ: Discuss the consequences of giving a friend your computer password, especially knowing that it was against regulations to do so.

CASE #8:

Sunday morning Captain Roberts was planning to sleep in when the phone rang. Roberts answers the phone and is surprised to hear the flight commander, Major White, say "I'm looking for volunteers to fill sandbags for a nearby community threatened by a flood." Captain Roberts says he has plans for the day and will not be able to help. He will see what he can do tomorrow.

LOQ: How do the core values relate to an off-duty time situation like this?

FUQ: Is an Air Force installation's relationship with the local community your responsibility? What if your wing commander believes it is, and prompts regular "volunteer" projects?

FUQ: Captain Roberts didn't give a specific reason for not helping, is he performing less than Excellent in his duty?

FUQ: Does Service before self mean you must respond to all requests for help?

CASE #9:

CT 43 Crash: Failure of Integrity and Excellence

The investigation board for the CT 43 accident concluded there were three causes for the accident: Failure of Command (to enforce AF instructions), aircrew error (with both mission planning and execution of the approach into Dubrovnik), and improperly designed instrument approach procedures (Croatian designer didn't provide 2,800 foot obstacle clearance, only 2,200). As with most accidents, the tragic chain of events could've been broken along the way, but wasn't.

Failure of Command

The failure of command was a failure of senior leadership at the unit involved to follow HQAF instructions forbidding the use of uncertified airfields newly opened to the USAF in the former Soviet Union. This was even after a waiver was specifically denied, compelling all aircrews to violate the instructions as well.

Air Crew Errors

Additionally, the aircrew made basic errors. Crew rest was broken at least twice in getting late weather information updates and changes to the mission. The pubs used in the accident squadron were out-of-date, though current pubs were available. Aircraft configuration for landing, approach airspeed, and course settings were in error.

LOQ: What do you do in a squadron that breaks the rules, even "little ones nobody follows" to get the mission accomplished more quickly?

FUQ: What is the impact on morale when the leaders "turn the other way," allowing violations? Are there examples you can think of? How did you feel about the situation?

FUQ: What can you do to pursue excellence and minimize complacency when a job includes mundane planning and constant, tedious, preparation?

FUQ: What are the areas under your control that you could make better? (Are your Operating Instructions current? Are you asking to get the best training possible? Are you as sharp in required task performance as the mission requires?)

FUQ: What if your supervisor asks you to do something regularly that isn't within the rules? How can you fix it now?

CASE #10:

A GS-13 engineer, working in a contractor facility as part of a Systems Program Office, has uncovered evidence of questionable production practices in an aircraft plant which have resulted in undue,

although not unsafe, stress on structural components. These may be the cause of premature failure and replacement of these components.

The engineer persuades his commander (O-6), Procuring Contracting Officer (GM-15), supervisor (GM-14), program engineering (O-5), and flight operations (O-5) to initiate a government study of the situation. Results are due in 6 months, but nothing happens - the study is not accomplished. The same people in the organization are informed of this inaction by SPO engineering.

The engineer is given the impression that this is not very important in this multi-million dollar program and that this minor matter is just aggravating the contractor and the government. Business as usual - not much has changed in 25 years of government service.

LOQ: Is Excellence missing when production practices MAY be responsible for premature failure of parts?

FUQ: How is the omission of the study an Integrity issue?

FUQ: Does it make a difference that most people think the commander wants a job with this contractor when he retires in 2 years? How can you pursue Excellence when your supervisor clearly has personal objectives?

FUQ: How would you improve this situation?

CASE #11:

At approximately 0730 local time in Turkey, an E-3A AWACS aircraft departed Incirlik AB on its assigned mission: to provide airborne threat warning and air control for all Operation Provide Comfort aircraft operating inside the TAOR. As normal operations directed, the AWACS was the lead aircraft and would fly the first of the 52 sorties scheduled for that day's operations. The AWACS proceeded to its assigned air surveillance orbit located on the northern border of Iraq. The crew included a mission crew commander (who supervises all controllers) and a senior director (who supervises all weapons controllers). The mission crew commander had limited experience and was not currently qualified because he had only flown one sortie in the past three months. The weapons controllers included an en route controller (responsible for clearing OPC aircraft in and out of the TAOR) and a TAOR controller (who controls OPC aircraft inside the TAOR). Also on board the AWACS was an airborne command element (ACE), a CFACC representative who works directly with both the mission crew commander and the senior director. OPLAN 91-7 directed that the ACE "will be aboard [AWACS] to serve as the representative of the CFACC for time critical decisions." However, according to CFACC testimony, the ACE had no decision-making authority.

The two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters took off from Diyarbakir at approximately 0820 local. Their mission was to transport passengers and cargo from Diyarbakir to the MCC Headquarters at Zakhu. From Zakhu, their mission was to transport the co-commanders of the MCC and other staff officers to the Kurdish towns of Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq, and return. The Black Hawk pilots reported to the

AWACS en route controller as they entered the no-fly zone of northern Iraq at approximately 0920 local. Six minutes later, they landed at Zakhu.

The Black Hawks were detected by the AWACS shortly after its onboard systems reached operational status. The surveillance section assigned the flight a "friendly general" track symbology and a track designator. Both the senior director and the mission commander had the track symbology displayed. The en route controller acknowledged the helicopters' entry into the TAOR. The senior director changed the Black Hawk helicopter "friendly general" symbology to a "friendly helicopter" symbology, but there is no evidence to indicate that the en route controller attempted to perform a Mode IV check on the Black Hawks as the ACO implies that the AWACS crew should. The en route controller monitored the helicopters until the IFF returns faded from AWACS coverage at approximately 0924 local. The helicopters' symbology was suspended, an action that maintained the symbology in the vicinity of Zakhu.

At approximately the same time the Black Hawks were landing at Zakhu, two F-15Cs took off from Incirlik. The AWACS en route controller identified the F-15s and maintained radar contact with them as they proceeded to the TAOR. Their mission was to perform an initial fighter sweep of the no-fly zone and clear the area of any hostile aircraft prior to entry of coalition forces. Following the fighter sweep, the F-15s were to establish a combat air patrol (CAP) for their defensive counter air mission.

All fighter aircraft operating from Incirlik AB conduct missions in the TAOR in accordance with the standing ACO and SPINS and the daily ATO. It is the responsibility of all aircrews flying OPC missions to understand all directives governing air operations. The CFAC DO is responsible for ensuring that arriving aircrews are briefed on all aspects of the OPC flying mission. These rules of engagement (ROE) briefings were provided by the CFAC DO for change-outs of complete flying units, but there was no arrangement to ensure that individual replacement pilots coming to OPC were centrally briefed. Briefing these personnel was an individual squadron responsibility. Both F-15 pilots had come to OPC on temporary duty assignment rotations. Both had read the Aircrew Read File, and both had received a squadron ROE briefing.

The rules of engagement provided were reduced, in briefings and in individual crew members' understandings, to a simplified form. One result of this simplification was that some crew members were not aware of all specific considerations required prior to engagement. These considerations included identification difficulties, the need to give defectors safe conduct, and the possibility of an aircraft being in distress with its crew unaware of their position.

At 0954 local, the Black Hawk flight reported to the AWACS en route controller that they were en route from "Whiskey to Lima" (codewords respectively for Zakhu and Irbil). The en route controller who received their call was not familiar with the location of "Lima" and did not look it up, although materials to do so were available. At that time, the en route controller reinitiated the helicopter track symbology.

According to directives, the TAOR controller was responsible for controlling aircraft inside the TAOR. However, neither the en route controller nor the senior director instructed the Black Hawk helicopters to change from the en route radio frequency to the TAOR frequency, which was being monitored by the TAOR controller. To compound the situation, the Black Hawks were squawking the wrong Mode I code (no changeover from en route code to TAOR code); but there is no evidence that either the en route controller or the senior director told the helicopters that they were still "squawking" the Mode 1 for outside the TAOR. Even so, the "H" symbology assigned to the Black Hawk flight was regularly displayed on the senior director's radar scope from 0904 until 1011 local.

Interviews with helicopter pilots assigned to the Black Hawk unit revealed that they were not aware that the ATO specified separate transponder Mode I codes for operating inside versus outside the TAOR. In fact, they had routinely flown in the TAOR using the Mode I code designated for use outside the TAOR. "Normal ops" for the Black Hawks was to use the one code, and AWACS had not pointed

out the incorrect procedure on previous flights. There is nothing to indicate that the correct code and procedure were briefed on the morning of the accident.

At approximately 1011 local, the Black Hawk flight entered mountainous terrain at low altitude and faded from AWACS radar and IFF coverage. At that point the controller suspended the helicopters' track symbology, which caused the computer to move the symbology based on the last available heading and airspeed information. Unfortunately, the en route controller, who had not transferred control of the flight to the TAOR controller, did not note the heading and speed the flight was following to point "Lima"; nor did he identify the flight path the helicopters had reported they would follow.

At approximately 1013L, the air surveillance officer designated the Black Hawks' last known location on the senior director's radar scope by placing a computer-generated "attention arrow" to point out the area of interest. Even though the arrow was accompanied by a blinking alert light, the senior director did not acknowledge. Sixty seconds later, the arrow and light were automatically dropped from the scope.

The F-15 flight lead reported entering northern Iraq to the AWACS TAOR controller at approximately 1020L. Since the ATO did not contain any detailed information on the Black Hawk helicopters and the AWACS TAOR controller had not advised the fighters of friendly activity in the area, they had no knowledge of the helicopters. Although several independent sources aboard the AWACS had knowledge and visual display of the Black Hawks, no one informed the F-15 pilots of their presence. Unfortunately, the en route controller dropped the Black Hawk symbology--the only visual reminder to the AWACS crew that the Black Hawks were in the TAOR--from the radar scopes at 1021L.

At approximately 1022L, as the fighters began their TAOR "sweep," flight lead reported a contact to the TAOR controller. The TAOR controller had no radar return or IFF replies from that location. Moreover, neither the mission crew commander nor the senior director aboard the AWACS directed the weapons or surveillance sections to locate and identify the reported contact. Meanwhile, the F-15 pilots attempted to identify the contacts by electronic means but were unsuccessful. They initiated an intercept to investigate.

At approximately 1023L, the AWACS received intermittent IFF signals from the helicopters in the area where the F-15 pilot had called his contact. Simultaneously, the "H" character also reappeared on the senior director's radar scope. Clearly, the Black Hawks were squawking the same IFF Mode I and II codes that they were squawking before the AWACS lost radar contact at approximately 1012L. However, AWACS personnel made no radio calls regarding the IFF returns to the fighters, even though the returns increased in frequency and remained on the display without interruption from 1026L to just before 1028L.

When the F-15s, now at approximately 20 NM from the helicopters, reported another contact, the TAOR controller responded with "Hits there," which means corresponding contacts. However, a replay of the AWACS magnetic tape recordings clearly show "IFF paints," rather than "hits," at the reported location. (A "hit" describes a radar return; a "paint" describes an IFF reply.)

At 1026L, the Black Hawk helicopters' IFF returns were clearly visible, along with intermittent radar returns on the AWACS radar scopes. Nevertheless, at 1028L, the en route controller initiated an "Unknown, Pending, Unevaluated" track symbology in the area of the helicopters' returns and attempted an IFF identification. By this time, the F-15 flight lead had closed to within 5NM of the helicopters and visually detected a single helicopter. As the fighters began to close for an identification pass, no one aboard the AWACS attempted to determine specific IFF aircraft identification or to do a Mode IV check on the helicopters. The "H" character previously attached to the helicopters' IFF return was still present on the senior director's radar scope.

At approximately 1028L the F-15s made a visual identification pass (VID) at 450 knots indicated airspeed, approximately 1,000 feet left and 500 feet above the Black Hawks. The lead F-15 pilot visually misidentified the Black Hawks as Iraqi Hind helicopters. The F-15 wingman saw the two helicopters but

did not positively identify them as Hinds. At this time, the F-15s and the Black Hawks were too close together for the AWACS crew to identify separately. The F-15 flight lead again reported "two Hinds" and the TAOR controller responded, "copy Hinds."

The F-15 lead flew to a position approximately 5-10 NM behind the helicopters and called "Engaged" to AWACS, indicating his intention to attack the helicopters. He also told his wingman to "Arm Hot" and proceeded to brief the engagement--he would shoot the trail helicopter and the wingman was to shoot lead. There is no indication that the AWACS senior director, the mission crew commander, or the ACE made any radio calls throughout the intercept or that they issued any guidance to either the AWACS or the F-15 pilots.

At 1030 local the F-15 flight lead reported they had "splashed" two Hind helicopters.

Immediately following the engagement, the F-15 pilots flew two visual "recce" passes over the crash site. Nothing could be identified except burning debris. Following an air refueling with a KC-135 tanker, the fighters resumed their defensive counter air mission for another 1.5 hours, then returned to Incirlik AB at 1300L.

Shortly after 1100L, the JSOTF operations officer at Incirlik received initial notification from CTF C2 of an accident allegedly involving Hind helicopters and that the location of the Black Hawk flight was unknown. The JSOTF directed their response force at the MCC (forward) to prepare to launch a search and rescue (SAR) team.

Following the intercept, the AWACS crew had continued their routine mission. At approximately 1130L the CFAC ground-based mission director called the ACE, onboard the AWACS, to report that the Black Hawks were unaccounted for. At around 1214L, the CFAC ground-based director instructed the ACE to find the Black Hawks and confirm good radar contact with them. Unable to locate the Black Hawks, the AWACS departed the TAOR and landed at Incirlik AB at 1915L.

At 1315L, Kurdish civilians notified MCC (forward) of the crash site location of two US helicopters that had been shot down. Immediately, the CTF gave the authorization to launch the SAR force. Almost simultaneously, a team of Special Forces personnel and civilian interpreters departed MCC (forward) at Zakhu, by ground transportation, en route to the crash site.

At 2015L, almost ten hours after the accident, the JSOTF on-scene commander confirmed to the CTF commander: **US Black Hawk wreckage--26 casualties, no survivors**.

LOQ: Given the definitions of the Core Values, what is the Core Value issue at work in this story?

FUQ: What would you do in this situation and why?

FUQ: How could we fix the organization so that this situation wouldn't happen again?

FUQ: Have you been involved in a similar situation? What, if anything, did you do about it and why?

FUQ: Do we have a similar problem? Why do you say this? How can we fix it?

CASE #12:

On 24 June 1994, *Czar 52*, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild AFB, Washington, launched at approximately 1400hrs local time to practice maneuvers for an upcoming base open house and air show. The crew of four was very experienced in the B-52 and included as pilot the Chief of Wing Standardization and Evaluation (5000 hours in the B-52), as co-pilot the 325th Bomb Squadron Commander (2800 hours), as radar navigator the 325th Bomb Squadron Operations Officer (2900 hours), and as an observer in the instructor pilot seat the 92nd Bomb Wing Vice Commander (3200 hours). Following a maximum thrust (TRT) takeoff on runway 23, the aircraft performed a climbing 360 degree turn around the control tower with flaps down. 45 to 60 degrees of bank were used. After completing the 360 degree turn, the aircraft turned right to a heading

approximately 30 degrees off the runway 23 heading, continued to climb, and retracted flaps. The aircraft then turned left and descended for a low altitude (estimated at less than 500 feet above the ground), medium speed (estimated 250-270 knots airspeed) pass down the runway (runway 05) perpendicular to the one used for takeoff. After completing this pass the aircraft turned left approximately 30 degrees, using 45 degrees of bank angle, to set up for a high speed approach to runway 23 (the runway used for takeoff).

The aircraft then turned further left to line up with the runway 23, accelerated to approximately 370 knots of airspeed, and at midfield initiated a pull up to approximately 60 degrees nose high. This high pitch angle climb was held for 24 seconds until the aircraft reached approximately 9000 feet above the ground where a low-G pushover was executed. The aircraft then turned to offset to the right before beginning a descending left teardrop to make a pass down runway 05 at 1200 feet above ground level. At the end of the runway, the aircraft started a left turn, extended flaps, and rolled out on a downwind leg to set up a landing attitude demonstration.

On downwind, the aircraft's landing gear was extended and then a descending 90 degree turn was executed to a base leg. Another descending left turn to a final heading down the runway 05 was completed and the aircraft leveled off at approximately 50-100 feet above the ground. The airspeed for this demonstration was below that normally used for final approach, but greater than that for landing. Midfield down the runway, the aircraft gear was retracted and a steeply banked (approximately 60 degrees of bank) turn to the left was initiated. After 90 degrees of this left turn, the aircraft was rolled out and then turned back to the right 90 degrees to a modified downwind leg for runway 23. The aircraft then turned right to a base leg and then right again to set up a low approach to runway 23. The aircraft then accomplished a low speed approach (estimated at 150 knots airspeed) at an altitude of less than 200 feet above the ground. At the end of the runway a large amount of power was added and the aircraft made a steeply banked (approximately 80 degrees), climbing right turn. Part way around the turn the aircraft entered a partially stalled condition and began a tail first slide, losing approximately 100 feet of altitude.

As the aircraft rolled out approaching a downwind heading the stall was broken and the climb to pattern altitude (1200 feet above ground level) was continued to set up for a landing approach to runway 23. This was to be the end of the planned air show profile. After rolling out on final to runway 23, a go-around was executed because another aircraft was on the runway. The landing gear was raised, but flaps remained down. The aircraft then turned slightly left to offset from the runway and a 360 degree turn around the control tower was requested. The tower acknowledged the request, but did not specifically clear the aircraft for this maneuver. During this go-around the aircraft maintained approximately 250 feet above ground level and 170-180 knots of airspeed. As the aircraft passed in front of the tower a level left turn was begun and a small amount of additional thrust added.

As the aircraft rolled into the left turn the pitch angle was increased, bringing the aircraft's nose slightly above the horizon. Initial bank angle was greater than 70 degrees and increased to past 70 degrees after accomplishing 60 to 90 degrees of the turn. At this point the aircraft again entered a partially stalled condition and experienced another tail slide, losing 50 to 100 feet of altitude. The aircraft then rolled out to approximately 45 degrees angle of bank, which broke the stall and arrested the descent. No additional power was added and the aircraft was now flying slower than the 170-180 knots at the start of the turn. The aircraft was then again rolled to approximately 90 degrees of bank, entering a stalled condition once more, and its nose began to drop. The pilot did attempt to bring the right wing down and roll out. This effort failed and the bank angle actually increased as the nose continued to drop. The aircraft impacted the ground at 150 knots of airspeed and 95 degrees of bank. The co-pilot attempted ejection but was out of the envelope and the ejection sequence was interrupted by ground impact. All four crew members were killed in the crash. The flight lasted approximately 18 minutes.

The accident investigation eliminated maintenance, weather and crew medical conditions as factors in this crash. The focus became the airmanship and flying behavior of the crew. The question remained, why did four very experienced crew members fly a fully mission capable B-52H into the

ground? The accident investigation established that the pilot was flying the aircraft at time of impact and that the air show profile flown violated regulatory provisions, flight manual guidance and directions from the wing commander.

During the accident profile, restrictions on bank angles, altitude minimums, airspeed restrictions, and aircraft aerobatics were violated. The *Pilot's Flight Manual* for the B-52H specifies that the maximum bank angle for circling or visual approaches in the pattern to be 30 degrees. Bank angles greater than 30 degrees are considered to be "steep turns." Steep turns should not exceed 50 degrees angle of bank maximum and will not be accomplished at altitudes less than 1000 feet above ground level according to Air Combat Command Regulation 51-50 Volume 22, *B-52 Aircrew Training* and Air Combat Command Regulation 55-152, *B-52 Operating Procedures*. Except for takeoff and landing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) restricts aircraft to a minimum altitude of 500 feet above ground level. The Air Force authorizes a lower altitude of 250 feet for flyovers if approved by the FAA and approved by Major Command (MAJCOM) headquarters. No approval was requested or granted by either agency for this flight. FAA and AF regulations also prohibits the operation of aircraft below 10,000 feet at speeds greater than 250 knots indicated airspeed without waivers and MAJCOM approval. The high pitch angle climb performed in the profile is defined as an aerobatic maneuver and such maneuvers are prohibited in air traffic control zones without FAA and MAJCOM approval. Aerobatics are also prohibited by the B-52 *Pilot's Flight Manual*.

Immediately following the accident, a letter was sent by a former associate of one of those killed in the accident to the commander of Air Combat Command alleging a repeated history of flight discipline violations by the accident pilot and a refusal by senior leaders within the 92nd Bomb Wing to discipline this pilot. The accident investigation panel then conducted an inquiry covering the previous three year period to determine the veracity of these claims and the extent any problems. The investigation revealed a continuing pattern of flight discipline breaches by the accident pilot. Over the same three year period the wing leadership took no significant corrective action or in any way documented breaches of the rules by the accident pilot.

The failure to document any of the actions against or problems with the accident pilot meant that in a period of great transition in the wing (four wing commanders, three vice wing commanders, three ops group commanders, and five squadron commanders in a three year period) there was no "memory" by which to measure the repeated flight discipline violations. In addition, the wing leadership was unfamiliar with regulations concerning air shows as well as the basic flight procedures contained in the B-52 pilot's manual and appropriate ACC regulations. This ignorance of the rules and procedures prevented the wing leadership from recognizing air discipline violations and in several cases led to wing leadership apparently approving illegal maneuvers and profiles.

In May 1991 the accident pilot flew the B-52 exhibition at the 1991 Fairchild AFB air show. During this show high-banked turns (excess of 30 degrees of bank) and a high pitch angle (over 45 degrees) climb were executed. In addition, part of a high-banked turn was flown over the crowd. Neither the wing commander or the ops group commander (equivalent) were aware that this exhibition profile violated FAA regulations, MAJCOM directives, and flight manual procedures.

Two months later, in July 1991, the accident pilot flew a B-52 fly over for a 325th Bomb Squadron change of command ceremony. The aircraft flew over the ceremony formation at a height of less than 500 feet above ground level. One observer estimated that the pass was between 100 and 200 feet above the ground. Earlier in the day several passes were practiced that also appeared to be at an altitude of less than 500 feet. One pass included a steep banked turn (over 45 degrees of bank) and another ended with a high pitch angle climb followed by a wingover. Scheduling a fly over at a change of command required Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force approval. It was not requested. The bank, pitch angles and wingover maneuvers violated pilot manual guidance and the passes below 500 feet disobeyed FAA regulations. Both the wing commander and the ops group commander (equivalent) were present at the fly over and though their testimony to the accident investigation board indicated some concern over

the very low altitude of the fly over, no further investigation was conducted, no actions were documented, and nothing was annotated in the pilot's permanent training or qualification folders.

Ten months later, in May 1992, the accident pilot again flew the B-52 exhibition at the Fairchild AFB open house. A new wing commander, *Col A*, was unfamiliar with the previous incidents. The profile for this show included low altitude steep turns (greater than 45 degrees of bank) and a high speed pass down the runway followed by a steep pitch angle climb and a wingover. A Stan Eval flight commander who witnessed the exhibition described the maneuvers as "a little bit insane." At a minimum this profile violated flight manual procedures and would have required Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters approval. *Col A* testified he believed the exhibition to be in compliance with applicable MAJCOM policies. However, the wing assistant deputy commander for operations (*Col B*) saw the exhibition and was concerned with the profile. Seven days later *Col B* became the 92nd Ops Group Commander and called the accident pilot into his office. At this meeting *Col B* told the accident pilot that he was never going to fly in another air show as long as *Col B* was the ops group commander. *Col B* also told the accident pilot that that any future violation of flying regulations would result in permanent grounding. *Col B* communicated this position to his deputy, *Col C*. But *Col B* did not communicate this decision or his opinion of the air show profile to *Col A*. Nor did he document any of these decisions or opinions in the accident pilot's records.

In April 1993 the accident pilot was mission commander for a two aircraft Global Power mission to the bombing range located in the Medina De Farallons, a small island chain off the coast of Guam. During the mission close, visual formation was flown to take pictures. This type of formation was prohibited by Air Combat Command for B-52s. Later in this mission the accident pilot permitted a crew member to leave the main crew compartment and take up a position near the bomb bay access door to take a video of the bomb bay while live munitions were released on a target. The 92nd Bomb Wing commander, *Brig Gen A* was never informed of the actions that occurred during the flight. *Col B* did not recall being made aware of these events. However his deputy, *Col C*, did become aware of the flight's events sometime afterwards and believes he did discuss them with *Col B*. In addition *Lt Col A*, the commander of the 325th Bomb Squadron at the time, remembers some discussion of impromptu flight activity; however he did not learn (nor did he attempt to learn) specifically what happened and who was involved. No action was taken concerning these events and nothing appears in the accident pilot's records.

In May 1993, *Col B* was reassigned and left the base before the new 92nd Ops Group Commander, *Col D*, arrived in June. Colonels *B* and *D* were never able to meet and discuss personnel in the group. *Col C*, the deputy group commander, did remain in his position to provide continuity.

In August 1993 the accident pilot again flew the B-52 exhibition for the Fairchild AFB open house. A crew member on the flight described the profile as being flown with extreme aggressiveness. The flight profile included turns with very steep bank angles, over 45 degrees of bank, at very low altitudes, less than 500 feet above ground level. The exhibition also included a high speed pass down the runway followed by a steeply pitched climb ending with a wingover. The airspeed at the beginning of the climb was 390 knots and the pitch angle was estimated to be between 60 and 80 degrees nose high. ACC approval was required for this exhibition, but it had not been asked for or granted. The Bomb Wing commander, *Brig Gen A*, testified that he looked to his Ops Group commander, *Col D*, to ensure that the exhibition was in compliance with appropriate ACC and FAA regulations. *Col D* testified that he counted on the accident pilot to coordinate with the appropriate authorities. It appears that no one in the wing command structure realized that the profile violated ACC, FAA, and flight manual guidance.

In March 1994 the accident pilot flew a single ship mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to drop practice munitions and provide an authorized photo opportunity for a free-lance author. During this mission the aircraft repeatedly flew closer to the ground than the minimum 500 feet above ground level specified in ACC regulations. The aircraft consistently crossed ridge lines at less than this minimum altitude. The lowest crossing altitude was estimated at less than 30 feet. A member of the crew believed

that if he had not intervened and demanded a climb, and then assisted with the controls, the aircraft would have hit the ridge. During the low crossovers the aircraft flew directly over people on the ground, contrary to FAA and AF regulations. Also, while on the range, the aircraft joined a formation of A-10s for an impromptu flyby that was not planned or pre-briefed and contrary to ACC policies and directives. After hearing of the events on the range, the 325th Bomb Squadron commander, now *Lt Col B* (who would later be the co-pilot killed in the crash), asked the Ops Group commander, *Col D*, to restrict the accident pilot from further flying. Two meetings were held in April 1994 concerning the accident pilot's airmanship at the Yakima Range and the poor example it set for younger pilots. The accident pilot attended the second of these meetings. *Col D* testified that he was not aware was not aware of the events on the range until *Lt Col B* brought them to his attention. In explaining his actions to *Col D*, the accident pilot claimed to be demonstrating the capabilities of the aircraft. *Col D* verbally reprimanded the accident pilot, calling the actions at the bombing range a breach of air discipline. The accident pilot assured *Col D* that there would be no further violations of air regulations. *Col D* denied *Lt Col B's* request that the accident pilot be grounded. *Col D* testified that he was unaware that another member of the crew had to intervene to prevent an accident and never did see (or ask to see) the videotape of the mission. *Lt Col B* did not pursue the issue with wing or MAJCOM leadership. However, *Lt Col B* did decide to fly with the accident pilot anytime he flew, rather than expose young members of the crew force to his poor airmanship. *Col D* did not inform the wing commander, *Col (Brig Gen select) E*, of the accident pilot's actions at the range and nothing was annotated in the accident pilot's records.

Some time in the April-May 1994 time frame the 92nd Air Refueling Squadron Flight Surgeon, *Lt Col (Dr) C*, became concerned when he heard that the accident pilot would be flying the B-52 exhibition at the 1994 Fairchild AFB open house. *Dr C* had on at least one occasion been informed by a patient that the patient would not fly with the accident pilot because of the accident pilot's overly aggressive flying. *Dr C* expressed these concerns the Chief of Wing Safety, *Lt Col D*. However, *Lt Col* D told *Dr C* that the accident pilot was a good pilot and that the maneuvers had all been done before. Later, *Dr C* discussed his concerns with the wing Chief of Aeromedical services but the issue was not pursued because it had already been discussed with a wing safety officer.

During this April-May 1994 time frame, planning for the B-52 exhibition at the 1994 air show began. The accident pilot was assigned this mission and there is no evidence that any other pilots were considered or objections raised. At a 15 June 1994 meeting, attended by the wing, ops group, and squadron commanders, the air show plans were reviewed and the proposed exhibition briefed. During this briefing the accident pilot proposed a profile that included bank angles of at least 60 degrees, a high pitch angle climb of 50-60 degrees nose high, and a KC-135/B-52 formation. The proposed formation was rejected by the ops group commander and KC-135 aircraft commander. The wing commander, *Col E*, instructed the accident pilot that there would be no formation maneuvers, no bank angles greater than 45 degrees and no pitch angles greater than 25 degrees. Following the meeting *Col E* was still concerned with the proposed profile, so the ops group commander, *Col D*, said he would talk with the accident pilot. The following morning *Col D* reiterated to the accident pilot that there would be no pitch angles in excess of 50 degrees.

No type of approval was requested by the 92nd Bomb Wing for this planned exhibition. At a minimum MAJCOM approval was required for any type of flying exhibition. In addition, an FAA waiver was required for the type of exhibition to be flown. No waivers to authorized flight parameters were asked for or approved. The authorized parameters included a maximum airspeed of no more than 250 knots below 10,000 feet, no aerobatic flight maneuvers, no bank angles over 30 degrees for circling or visual approaches, and no steep turns below 1000 feet above ground level or greater than 45 degrees of bank.

On 17 June 1994 the first practice mission for the 1994 air show was flown. This profile was nearly identical to the accident profile, except that two complete profiles were flown. Both profiles included steep bank angles and a high pitch angle of climb. Though bank angles were not as aggressive

as those flown during the accident profile, they were contrary to ACC and flight manual guidance. Both profiles violated the wing commander's guidance given at the 15 June meeting. The ops group commander, *Col D*, flew on this mission. After this practice he told the wing commander the "the profile looked good to him; looks very safe, well within parameters." The wing commander viewed only a small portion of this flight and remembered nothing extraordinary or objectionable about what he saw.

The accident investigation board discovered a pattern of repeated flight discipline violations by the accident pilot. In every case the wing senior leadership either did not recognize the seriousness of the violation and did nothing or chose to deal with it in an unofficial manner. The investigation revealed much about a "climate" in the wing where junior officers participated in, witnessed, or later learned of flight discipline violations and did nothing. In their testimony to the board some of these officers felt that the accident pilot was given greater leeway in matters dealing with flight parameters because of his great experience and position in the wing. Another testified that he felt "blackmailed" into remaining quiet about activities in which he participated. Still another described the accident pilot as quietly desperate, sensing that the closing of B-52 operations at Fairchild was ending his own career.

There were contributing factors involved in this accident. The rapid turnover of wing leadership minimized continuity and prevented commanders from overlapping each other. The imminent closure of B-52 operations at Fairchild and its transition from an Air Combat Command to Air Mobility Command base meant that many senior leaders were unfamiliar with B-52 operations and applicable regulations and flight manual guidance.

LOQ: Given the definitions of the Core Values, what is the Core Value issue at work in this story?

FUQ: What would you do in this situation and why?

FUQ: How could we fix the organization so that this situation wouldn't happen again?

FUQ: Have you been involved in a similar situation? What, if anything, did you do about it and why?

FUQ: Do we have a similar problem? Why do you say this? How can we fix it?

ATTACHMENT 3

COMMANDER'S GUIDE

TO

EVALUATING THE ETHICAL CLIMATE IN

YOUR ORGANIZATION

An evaluation of the ethical climate of an organization should be performed *initially* (upon the assignment of the commander supervisor) and *periodically* (at least annually) thereafter.

INITIAL EVALUATION

1. *The Initial Evaluation.* The initial evaluation is an informal one conducted by the commander/supervisor responsible for the unit. For a commander/supervisor at Higher Headquarters, the initial evaluation would be conducted with immediate subordinates—those whose performance report the commander/supervisor writes. For commanders/supervisors in operational units, it is more likely the initial evaluation can be conducted with a majority of the persons assigned to the organization. In either case, the emphasis is on *informal*: the goal is to get a feel for the ethical climate of the organization so that you may begin to formulate and implement a local Core Values strategy.

2. *Initial Evaluation:* The following is a checklist of things to think about as you sample the ethical climate in your organization. No one of the following indicators is sufficient to give you a thumbs up or thumbs down on your organization's ethical climate, but the cumulative weight of the answers to the following questions is a good indication of how things stand. If all of the answers come out on the positive side of ledger, then your organization probably is on the right track; if all of the indicators are on the wrong side of the ethics balance sheet, then probably you should be seriously concerned about the ethical climate; and if the results are mixed, it may well be the case that the ethical climate may be a source of concern, but there are positive areas you can work with.

GROSS INDICATORS

Grouped under this heading are those indicators commonly recognized as potentially saying something about the level of integrity, dedication to service, and commitment to excellence found in an organization. To be sure, these indicators may say something significant about a unit, but a commander/supervisor should not leap to conclusions as to what that significant statement might be (see discussion below).

- **Has your organization recently performed well in inspections and staff assistance visits?**
- **Does your organization have a commendable track record with respect to judicial and nonjudicial punishments and adverse administrative actions, especially those arising from sexual harassment or racial/ethnic conflict?**
- **Does your organization have a positive reputation with customers?**
- **Is it evident that the members of your organization respect each other and explicitly treat each other with dignity?**
- **Are the members of your organization quick to admit mistakes when they make them?**

- **Do the members of your organization avoid the "good enough for government work" and "that's not my job" syndromes?**

A "yes' answer to any of these questions can be a positive sign, but it is important to eliminate negative alternatives before you jump to the conclusion that the moral climate of your organization is healthy. For example, suppose that few, if any, adverse actions have been taken against the persons in your unit in the past 24 months—this might indicate your troops are all squared away professionals or it could indicate that the supervisors in your organization are too spineless to take adverse actions they know should be taken. Or it might be the case that your organization has a positive reputation with customers because they have been hoodwinked, and not because the organization is dedicated to excellence. The point is not to become cynically suspicious of positive signs; the point is to avoid self-deception that might lead to believe things are better than they are.

SUBTLE INDICATORS

There is another set of indicators, less obvious than the above, that can prove to be at least as valuable in assessing the moral climate of your organization. Again, although no one indicator can definitively characterize the ethical climate of your organization, the cumulative weight of the following should be taken as a reliable suggestion as to how things stand.

Who comes first in your organization?

Take a walking tour of your organization. Do the persons on the cutting edge of your mission have the resources they need to do the job? Do the persons on the cutting edge of the mission have a work environment as nice as those who support them? Are job critical resources distributed in a manner to maximize mission effectiveness? For example, if the primary task of your organization is to do word processing, and those who do the actual word processing have 286's and their supervisors have Pentium 166's, then there may be a problem.) Obviously, RHIP. But is RHIP being invoked to justify selfishness and careerism?

Review the leave log: Who is granted leave over the holidays? Are subordinates compelled to work while more senior personnel are on leave? Moreover, who is signing all of the leave forms: Are mid-level supervisors doing this or has the commander reserved this as his/her function? If the latter, then it is quite possibly the case that your predecessor was a micromanager who did little to build trust in the organization.

Talk to the supervisors: Can they answer simple questions about subordinates (such as, Does that person have dependents? What is that person's first name? Where is that person from? When is that person due to test for promotion? When is that person in the zone?)

If you stand by a main exit at closing time, are you likely to be trampled by those eager to leave the building?

Obviously, even total professionals can be eager to leave the building at the end of the duty day, but if the day ends at 1630, and the building is empty and dark at 1632, then it would not be reasonable to infer that persons in your organization are not fully committed to service before self or that they may find the atmosphere in the organization so oppressive that they cannot control the urge to flee.

It also might be instructive to watch the door an hour before the end of the duty day: How many senior personnel are leaving at that time on a regular basis?

Do the people assigned to your organization have a solid knowledge of the instructions, directives, tech data, and other rules governing your operation?

Obviously, a person may know the rules and not follow them; but this question is driven by the belief that knowing the rules at least implies the possibility of a genuine commitment to excellence, service,

and integrity. A person of integrity learns the rules so that he/she can do her/his duty. A person dedicated to service will learn the rules because he/she knows that standards are set by others and are not determined by what he/she feels is right. Of course, a person committed to excellence will learn the rules so that he/she will understand the meaning of acceptable and superior job performance.

If you sit and listen to a conversation among the persons in your organization, are they more likely to use the words "we" and "you" than they use the words "me" and "I"?

It is not clear how much weight should be assigned to this indicator, but it is reasonable to infer that people regularly talk about things that they think about regularly. For example, if a person in your unit talks about 'getting drunk' or 'getting bombed' every time you encounter her, then you have good reason to believe that she thinks a lot about doing these things. Likewise, if a person assigned to your unit talks mostly about himself and not about other persons or things, then you may be forgiven the inference that he is the center of his universe. Does that make him a careerist who places self before service? No, it does not. But it is food for thought.

Do unit personnel openly and regularly blame other persons or outside causes for problems occurring in the unit?

It may well be the case that outside forces are causing problems inside the unit, but a general tendency to always blame someone else may be an indicator of a serious integrity problem. Persons of integrity, as defined in Part One of this manual, accept their responsibilities and insist on being held accountable.

When a problem occurs, do persons in the unit ask, "Who did this?" or do they ask "How can we fix this?"?

This question is different than the preceding one, which really asks whether or not the persons in your unit accept responsibility. This question asks whether the persons in your unit are oriented toward personalities (and punishment) or mission accomplishment. Perhaps your predecessor 'ruled' through fear and intimidation; in that case, persons can be expected to be oriented toward personalities and punishments—and that means they had greater temptations to check 6 and sacrifice integrity.

When a problem occurs, are people afraid to tell you about it?

This reluctance may be a sign that you predecessor was inclined to shoot the messenger and that you have much work to do on the level of trust in your organization.

Do unit personnel have a tendency to say "That's not fair" when they are given short notice tasking?

Obviously, persons in your unit may have a legitimate complaint about the distribution of burdens or benefits in the unit when they use the phrase "That's not fair" (for example, it may be a sign that a supervisor is assigning jobs on the basis of his/her racial prejudice). But there are many other cases where "That's not fair" really means "That's not convenient" or "Regardless of the impact on the mission, you shouldn't ask me to do any more work than anyone else." In such cases, the person saying "That's not fair" has a real problem understanding the concept of service before self.

Do persons in your organization display a fear of decision making, even when the decisions seem to be about minor or trivial things?

Perhaps they are reluctant to make decisions because they want to first figure out how things stand with the new boss before they assert themselves, but this reluctance may also be a sign that your predecessor was a micromanager who refused to allow anyone else to make decisions. In the latter case, it is possible that the level of trust in the unit may be something to be concerned about.

Is there evidence of a "filling the squares" attitude in your unit?

For example, was your predecessor a "show, glow, and blow" careerist? If so, you can bet the wrong example was set for the junior folks in the squadron, thus increasing the possibility they will emulate your predecessor.

For example, are your subordinates concerned primarily with their next assignment or getting promoted, rather than with how to do things better in the organization or taking the initiative to fix something everyone else has overlooked as a problem?

Do your people display a "smarter than thou" attitude, which is directed to persons above them in the chain of command?

Such an attitude may have some basis in fact or it may not, but the important thing is that it may lead persons to act on the belief that they don't need to follow higher headquarters directives.

Do your people respect themselves as military professionals?

That is, do they have interests outside the job? Do they take time to take leave? Do they strive to remain fit? Do they 'party hardy'? Are they upset when they set the wrong example? Are they aware that they set an example?

ATTACHMENT 4

CORE VALUES CLIMATE SURVEY

The following are sample items for the Quality of Life Survey. They provide feedback to the unit commander on the health of the organization.

<u>SAMPLE ONE</u> (The Ethical Climate Itself)

Please use the scale below to answer items 1 through 12.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Does Not Apply
a	**b**	**c**	**d**	**e**	**f**	**g**	**h**

In my branch, division, or staff agency . . .

1. We have been trained in the core values.
2. We are encouraged to discuss the core values.
3. We are expected to follow the core values.
4. We are encouraged to report bad news.
5. We are regularly asked to compromise our integrity.
6. We have a "nine to five" mentality.
7. The majority of assigned personnel place service ahead of self.
8. The lower level supervisors live the core values of *Integrity First*, *Service Before Self*, and *Excellence in All We Do*.
9. The mid-level supervisors live the core values of *Integrity First*, *Service Before Self*, and *Excellence in All We Do*.
10. The senior level supervisors live the core values of *Integrity First*, *Service Before Self*, and *Excellence in All We Do*.
11. We understand how the core values specifically apply to our jobs and daily activities.
12. Ethical persons usually are rewarded and unethical persons usually are punished.